Influence of Actor Attributes and Social Relations on Game Transition

Economic development policy in jurisdictionally fragmented metropolitan areas is often characterized as a competitive environment in which local governments compete for jobs and growth. However, the positive and negative intergovernmental externalities from growth create demands for more integrated development approaches that can address economies of scale, urban sprawl, income inequality, environmental impacts, and other regional issues. This dissertation examines the formation of regional economic development partnerships among local government to explain patterns of local government cooperation in pursuing economic development. The traditional game theoretic approach, based on assumptions that actors are motivated by rational calculation of benefits and costs, provides useful insights for understanding the essence of the collective action problem, but it provides only a limited and incomplete explanation for the emergence and sustainability of regional development collaboration. This dissertation investigates how the social context in which a game is embedded can determine which game the actors are supposed to play and, therefore, shapes the action of players. In other words, social structures should be considered to be both the medium and the outcome of the players' activities. A formal model of regional partnership formation is developed, taking into account actors' attributes and social relations. Propositions regarding how contextual and relational factors affect regional partnership formation are derived from this model and empirically tested.