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Do states that fit the audience cost expectations for effectively signaling preferences and resolve enjoy a greater likelihood of not facing reciprocation for threatening words or uses of force? This paper seeks to theoretically and empirically examine whether audience cost expectations remain when no longer separated along regime types, but instead with audience cost capacity. By examining international crises and directional uses of force I can test an implied theoretical extension of audience cost theory. I use Rousseau et al's revised ICB dataset with audience cost measures generated based on Weeks theoretical regime classifications. The research indicates that aggregated regimes thought to generate audience costs lose any discernable advantage. It is likely that states in international crises are past the point at which audience costs can effectively be used by leaders.
Audience Costs, Signaling Resolve, Opposition Reciprocation
Date of Defense
October 28, 2010.
Submitted Note
A Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science.
Bibliography Note
Includes bibliographical references.
Advisory Committee
Mark Souva, Professor Directing Thesis; Will H. Moore, Committee Member; Dale Smith, Committee Member.
Publisher
Florida State University
Identifier
FSU_migr_etd-3591
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