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Industrial Modernization and the American Civil War

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COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

INDUSTRIAL MODERNIZATION AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

By

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This thesis is dedicated to my wife, who has been steadfast in her support and encouragement. It is also dedicated to Michael Creswell, my mentor and friend, who taught me that a steadfast focus on the fundamentals and constancy are key ingredients for success, no matter the endeavor.

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ABSTRACT

What explains why and how America fought the Civil War? This thesis argues that a multi-disciplinary approach is a useful analytical tool for understanding the causes of the American Civil War beyond the scope that a single discipline can provide. This study does not portend to rebut or replace the contributions made by the single-disciplinary approach, but rather to build a contextual picture based on their individual contributions. The result of this process reveals that the Industrial Revolution was a catalyst that explains why many of the events happened the way that they did. The argument is developed by reviewing the social, political, and military events of the era in relation to each other through the lens of industrialization. This work will show that the American Industrial Revolution lay at the core of the social, political, and military events that sparked and shaped this great conflict. Understanding the causes of human events is as critical as understanding their effects. By grasping the root causes of the war, we can better understand how and why it was fought. This study of American society, American politics, and the country's military establishment provides the context needed to understand the reasons for the American Civil War and why it was fought the way it was.

INTRODUCTION

Atlanta lay smoldering in ruin as he methodically marched toward his next objective like a locomotive. Amid screams and pleas, he destroyed many of the South's most critical railroads, factories, and urban population centers. He had conditioned himself to systematically destroy the enemy center of gravity,¹ wherever it may lie. In a classic hammer and anvil operation, General William T. Sherman swung his army through the South to meet up with the massive army assembled by General Ulysses S. Grant to deliver the decisive blow that would end America's bloodiest war.²

This study is about the origins of the American Civil War. In it I argue that long before a shot was fired, before angry mobs protested slavery in city streets, there was a spark that started it all. In the heart of burgeoning towns the length of the country, the hiss and whirring of industrial machinery changed America in unimaginable ways. As the wheels of steel churned, they set into motion a chain of events that made conflict seemingly inevitable.

It is often the conclusion of a war that offers a moment for reflection, yet to understand the American Civil War one must first understand its root causes. This war had been an especially brutal one. In it brother was pitted against brother in an epic contest that nearly tore the country apart. Although the war has long since concluded, certain fundamental questions remain unsettled. Those lingering questions help drive this study. Why did they fight? What was the ultimate cause of the American Civil War? Why did it change so drastically from its beginning to its end? Answers to these questions would help make sense of the carnage and reveal essential truths about the country during that period.

The importance of understanding what caused the war is paramount. Failure to understand the causes of the Civil War would relegate us to a sifting through a seemingly endless list of facts, dates, battles, and names devoid of context. We must understand the facts of the Civil War in relation to each other. This context will provide a base for

¹ Clausewitz defines the center of gravity as the place where the most decisive blow can be cast to crush the will of the opposition. The center of gravity need not be the enemy fighting force. As we will see, as the war became modern, the center of gravity shifted from the battlefields to the factories. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Trans. and eds. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 587.

² Charles B. Flood, *Grant and Sherman: The Friendship That Won the Civil War* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2005), 283.

understanding the forces that caused the war. When viewed in context, some well-established theories appear to have been over emphasized. Conversely, other obvious, but less promoted ideas become particularly insightful. I have found this to be the case with the explanations of slavery, the economy, and the American Industrial Revolution respectively.

Military historians generally conclude that the war was fought over slavery, the economy, or they sidestep the question altogether to focus on narrower issues.³ When viewed in context to one another, slavery and the economy become two critical points along the continuum of a larger narrative. They are not, in and of themselves, sufficient to explain the cause of the war. As David Potter contends, using singular approaches to explain large historical topics like the American Civil War leads historians to erroneous conclusions.⁴ By broadening the scope of review we find the natural relationship between slavery and the economy, which expands the depth and breadth of our understanding of the period.

Placing the socio-political phenomena of slavery and the economy into a complementary relationship with one another is revealing. It shows that there was a force that both magnified and accelerated the friction caused by these issues. The American Industrial Revolution, which occurred at the turn of the Nineteenth-Century, was a true game-changing event.⁵ It is difficult to overstate its impact. Industrialization was a

³ David M. Potter, *Impending Crisis: America Before the Civil War—1848-1861*, Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1963), 49. Although he ultimately concludes that the cause of the war was slavery, Potter comes to his conclusion by a holistic approach. In doing so he thoroughly presents the problems associated with attempts to explain the civil war from the single perspective of the slavery, the economy, or even cultural differences. See William C. Davis, *The Lost Cause: Myths and Realities of the Confederacy* (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1996), 181-82. Davis concludes that the root cause of the war was the protection of slavery. An example of a purely military historical account is Shelby Foote whose exhaustive three volume work gives a brilliant account of the facts, figures, dates, and battles fought during the civil war. See Shelby Foote, *The Civil War: A Narrative* vols. 1-3 (New York: Random House, 1986).

⁴ Potter, *Impending Crisis*, 41-47; and Eric Foner, *The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010) 117-118. Foner highlights the dilemmas and contradictions in the anti-slavery movement. Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 3. Foner disagrees with Historians Avery Craven and Arthur Schlesinger's views on the causes of the Civil War.

⁵ Peter N. Stearns, 4th ed. *The Industrial Revolution in World History* (Colorado: Westview Press, 2013), 61-62. Stearns acknowledges the time frame for industrialization, but adds a caveat. He asserts that there were in fact two industrial revolutions in America. The first happened before the Civil War and the second happened during the conflict. This is an interesting perspective that adds weight the change industrialization had on the way the war was fought. See Gavin Weightman, *Industrial Revolutionaries: The Making of the Modern World—1776-1914* (New York: Atlantic Books, 2007), 38.

juggernaut that profoundly changed the institutions that form the base of my analysis: America's social, political, and military institutions.⁶ It is in that time of immense social, political, and economic change brought on by industrialization that we find the beginning causes of the war, an emerging rival culture—industrial modernization.⁷

The culture of industrial modernization, I argue, clashed with the preexisting agrarian-based culture and created the spark that ignited the passions of war. The initial clashes occurred in the social sphere. The new culture began to challenge long-held traditions as antiquated and obsolete. When industrial sectors grew to rival agricultural sectors in terms of population growth and economic might, the arguments became bitter. The debate over economic resources elevated the clash from merely a social confrontation to a political confrontation.

Industrialists by and by aligned their political might with their social views, which increasingly subordinated the South in particular to unwanted economic measures. In an effort to maintain the political balance of power and maintain their slave-based economy, southern politicians maneuvered to add slave-holding states to the Union. Although somewhat successful, southern politicians ultimately concluded that they could not maintain the political balance of power and seceded from the Union. The act of secession elevated the clash yet again from a socio-political conflict to a military conflict. Once the Civil War began, industrialization continued to have a transformational impact. The nature of warfare radically changed as the technological advances of industrial warfare were harnessed on the battlefield. Of particular interest to this study is how the warfighters, particularly in the North, internalized those advancements and changed the nature of warfare during the conflict. The Civil War began as a traditional European-style conflict and

⁶ Daniel Walker Howe, *What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815- 1848* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 525-569. Howe explains the social, economic, and political changes that took place following the technological advances of the industrial revolution. See Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, *The American Spirit: A study of the Idea of Civilization in the United States Vol. IV—The Rise of American Civilization* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), 228-229.

⁷ Daniel Walker Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 182.

concluded with the hallmarks of modern warfare, which many historians erroneously attribute to World War I, nearly a half of a century later.⁸

The remainder of this study is organized along the following lines. The first chapter establishes the procedures and defines the key terms used in this study. The second chapter examines the social and economic divisions America experienced following the Industrial Revolution and how those divisions propelled the nation towards civil war. The third chapter reviews the political consequences that followed the socioeconomic impact of industrialization. The fourth chapter explores the affect industrial modernization had on the warfighter and how it changed the nature of the war. The fifth chapter draws this study to a close by recounting the social, political, and military impact the American Industrial Revolution had on the American Civil War.

⁸ Russell F. Weigley, "American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 419; and William R. Weir, *Turning Points in Military History* (New York: Citadel Press, 2005), 126-127.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORY AND DEFINITIONS

Methods and Procedure

The method used in this study is straight forward. The historical evidence used in this study is derived from significant social, political, and military events that begin at the dawn of the American Industrial Revolution in the 1790s, and concludes with the end of the American Civil War in 1865. Traditionally, historians explain events from the view point of a single field: social, political, or military. The method I use in this study is designed to overcome the limitations of a singular viewpoint in order to provide greater context.

Through the review of the significant social, political, and military events of the period in context to one another I have identified three distinct phases in which industrialization changed America during the Civil War era: cohesion, disruption, and fracture. The period of cohesion is characterized by a general sense of unity and a common platform of understanding that forms the status quo. The period of disruption is characterized by the emergence of a rival viewpoint that challenges the status quo by implementing new processes that void the status quo. The period of fracture is characterized by a clash between the status quo and the emerged rival viewpoint to determine which viewpoint will remain.

The procedure applied in this study is fairly mechanical. The argument proceeds by placing the social, political, and military disciplines in sequential order to one another. This construct is somewhat artificial and accordingly, the presentation suffers to some degree because the events generally happened all at the same time. But, in order to present a coherent argument I have stratified the three disciplines in an order of logical progression: social breakdown begets political breakdown, which begets military conflict. The reader will be able to appreciate the full weight of the argument put forth at the conclusion of the study. By taking the stratified analysis of each discipline and overlaying them onto one another, the reader will be able to appreciate the transformational impact of American Industrial Revolution and how it set the conditions for the American Civil War. We begin by establishing the validity of the multi-disciplinary approach.

Multi-Disciplinary Approach

Context is everything when studying the American Civil War. My goal in this study is to provide a comprehensive account that brings perspectives from different disciplines in relation to each other in a manner that accounts for the uniqueness of the Civil War era.⁹ Speaking to the validity of a multi-disciplinary approach in his seminal work, *On History*, Eric Hobsbawm declared:

[R]evolutions and similar subjects of study can normally be integrated into a wider field which does not merely lend itself to, *but requires*, a comprehensive grasp of social structure and dynamics: the short-term social transformations experienced and labelled as such, which stretch over a period of a few decades or generations. We are dealing not simply with chronological chunks carved out of a continuum of growth or development, but with relatively brief historic periods during which society is reoriented and transformed, as the very phrase 'industrial revolution' implies. . . The popularity of such historically crude terms as 'modernization' or 'industrialization' indicates a certain awareness of such phenomena.¹⁰

Determining the root causes of the war requires a multi-disciplinary approach. I have chosen to characterize the approach as multi-disciplinary rather than multi-field because several key concepts that drive this study, for example modernity and traditionalism, are derived from sociology rather than history. This study combines both the historical and sociological disciplines to explain the American Civil War. In this study historical events are presented by discipline: social, political, and military. These disciplines function as pillars within an institutional framework. The three pillars represent the mutually reinforcing foundational elements that stabilized America during the era. The function of social, political, and military disciplines as pillars within an institutional framework is explored more fully later in this chapter.

Individually, each discipline has a school of thought capable of producing an independent explanation of what caused the Civil War. The power of a multi-disciplinary approach is that it gives the historian a new tool for evaluating and interpreting

⁹ Eric Hobsbawm, *On History* (New York: The New Press, 1997), 61. In a statement immediately preceding these remarks, Hobsbawm laments the strained progress historians have endured over time to broaden the aperture of the historical lens by providing social and economic context to historical events and political figures.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 90 (emphasis added).

transformational events that require a more comprehensive analysis. The strength of a singular approach is its potential for establishing critical facts and calling attention to unique details. The weakness of this approach is that it produces results that are restricted to a narrow scope of analysis. Each discipline, for example, could undoubtedly identify the American Industrial Revolution as a factor in Civil War era America. They could not, however, adequately explain the ideological conflict it sparked or how deeply that conflict permeated every facet of American life in the lead up to the war.

The procedural analysis employed in this study is also in line with Peter Taylor's geo-historical approach. Taylor argues that in addition to providing context, overlaying multiple viewpoints can also reveal insights into historical events that individual disciplines cannot.¹¹ Taylor's approach allows us to understand that the key events that happened across the disciplines during the period were significantly affected by a much larger event: industrialization. The multi-disciplinary approach provides a canvas large enough to marshal the interrelationship of the critical events that led to America's bloodiest war. Clausewitz espoused that war is an extension of politics. A multi-disciplinarian would improve upon his statement by adding that politics is an extension of society. How could we possibly hope to understand either in a vacuum?

Not all historians agree with the multi-disciplinary approach. Peter Novick, for example, in his book *That Noble Dream*, argues that the multi-disciplinary approach jeopardizes the history profession.¹² His chief concern is that breaking down barriers between disciplines erodes the rigor and methodology historians depend upon to maintain objectivity. Novick may have been responding to what historian Peter Burke called 'the new history.'¹³ New history rejects the traditional historical approaches that center on politics and the nation-state. Instead, new historians embrace the concept that any subject can have a history. They openly walk away from Novick's "noble dream" of objectivity. Although the friction between the various approaches is outside the scope of this study, it is

¹¹ Peter J. Taylor, *Modernities: A Geohistorical Interpretation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 4.

¹² Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 584-591.

¹³ Peter Burke, "Overture: The New History: Its Past and Its Future" in *New Perspectives on Historical Writing*, 2nd ed., ed. Peter Burke (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 3.

presented here to illustrate that the multi-disciplined approach has detractors and that historians endorse various methods for analyzing historical events.

This study does not discount the value of singular approaches. In fact, it heavily relies on the insights they provide. This study proceeds by combining the social, political, and military disciplines in order to more fully understand a concept that cannot be studied otherwise—industrial modernization. Overlaying critical events from multiple disciplines allows us to more fully understand the forces that triggered them. By using the social, political, and military events as a backdrop, the significance of industrialization naturally rises to the forefront. As the argument proceeds it will become evident that industrial modernization was as significant a cause for the war as slavery, or the economy. And in many instances, it was the driving force that made the issues combustible. The term industrial modernization is an ideological concept that is used throughout this study and will be defined later in this chapter. The concept of ideology is a fundamental building block for understanding industrial modernization. Let us next review the base concept of ideology put forth in this study.

Ideology

Ideology, as put forth in this study, is the view from which an individual interprets the world around them. Political historian Lyman Tower Sargent has a particularly informative perspective for understanding the significance of sociological in forming one's ideological make-up during the Nineteenth-Century. In a summary analysis of the views of Karl Marx he states:

[A] person's membership in a particular class produced a picture of the world shaped by the experiences of that class. Thus it would be almost impossible for an individual class member to form an accurate conception of the world. Marx argued that *socialization*—that is, the process by which an individual comes to learn about and accept the values of the society—is strongly shaped by that person's place in the class system of that society. In other words, he contended that the social setting in which each of us lives determines the broad outlines of the way we think. The members of different classes are both directly and indirectly taught to think and behave in ways appropriate for their own class. This pattern is often called the social construction of reality. What we perceive is created by the social

world we inhabit; living in a different society, we would perceive a different reality.¹⁴

According to Sargent society plays a vital role in determining one's world view. Society sets the rules for interpreting the world and how one is to interact with it. As we will see later in this study, the way people living in agricultural areas thought about the world remained largely the same while those of the folks living in industrial areas became vastly different. They came to view the world and each other in vastly different ways. One subtle assumption in Sargent's observation of the social construction of reality is that morality—what was “appropriate”—is a key component of ideology. As we will see in the following chapters, establishing and rejecting behaviors and practices based on notions of what was and what was not appropriate became highly contentious. It was in large part the declaration of right and wrong, foreign and familiar, that ultimately divided agriculturalists in the South and West from industrialists in the North into irreconcilable camps.

Political scientist Roger Eatwell adds a political nuance to Sargent's interpretation of the sociological aspects of ideology:

A political ideology is a relatively coherent set of empirical and normative beliefs and thought, focusing on the problems of human nature, the process of history, and socio-political arrangements. It is usually related to a programme of specific short run concerns. Depending on its relationship to the dominant value structure, an ideology can either act as a stabilizing or a radical force. Single thinkers may embody the core of an ideology, but to call a single person an 'ideologist,' or 'ideologue,' would normally be seen as pejorative. The term 'political philosopher' or 'political theorist,' therefore, seems more appropriate for a thinker capable of developing a sophisticated level of debate. Political ideologies are essentially the product of collective thought. They are 'ideal types,' not to be confused with specific movements, parties or regimes which may bear their name.¹⁵

Political Scientist Samuel P. Huntington follows Eatwell by defining ideology as, “[A] system of ideas concerned with the distribution of political and social values and acquiesced in by

¹⁴ Lyman Tower Sargent, *Contemporary Political Ideologies: A Contemporary Analysis* (Canada: Wadsworth, 2009), 6; and Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 4.

¹⁵ Roger Eatwell, “Introduction: What are Political Ideologies,” in *Contemporary Political Ideologies: Liberalism, Conservatism, Socialism and Social Democracy, Marxism and Communism, Anarchism, Nationalism, Fascism, Feminism, Ecologism, Islam and Fundamentalism*, 2nd ed., ed. Roger Eatwell and Anthony Wright (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 1999), 17.

a significant social group.”¹⁶ The nuances that Eatwell and Huntington add are significant because they show that political institutions codify social norms through the law. Political institutions governed by the majority can impose their will on minority subjects. We will see later in this study that southern politicians rejected the framework illustrated here when they became the minority political power. The imbalance of power ultimately became their justification for seceding from the Union, plunging the nation into a civil war. For now we will continue on from the concept of ideology to the two frameworks that underpin this study.

Ideological and Institutional Frameworks

This section is designed to cue the reader to the conceptual mechanics that underlie the multi-disciplinary approach employed in this study. At the heart of this study is an intellectual history of a conflict of ideas and values. Those ideas were borne out in the lives of those living in the era trying to make sense of a rapidly changing world around them. As we will see in the later chapters, in the years leading up to the war, Americans struggled with much more than the argument of slavery and the economy. The transformations brought on by industrialization created new social norms, values, and institutions. From this perspective, history becomes much more than a chronological recounting of events and dates. It is an attempt to explain the meaning of critical facts in relation to the people that made them significant. We therefore must look to the ideological and sociological make-up of the country as well as the traditional nation-state institutions to understand the American Civil War.

This thesis employs a broad conceptual orientation for understanding how two frameworks interacted with one another to cause the Civil War. The first framework is best presented as ideological and the second as institutional. The interaction between the two frameworks was triggered by the Industrial Revolution. Inherently abstract concepts like ideology, modernization, and traditionalism are difficult to grasp without the requisite context. Context provides canvas upon which these ideas can be viewed with a level of

¹⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, “Conservatism as an Ideology.” *American Political Science Review* 51, no. 2 (1957), 454.

clarity.¹⁷ The seismic changes that occurred following industrialization provide the needed context to explore the interaction between the ideological and institutional pillars in the build up to the war.¹⁸ When key social, political, and military events are viewed in relation to evidence of the ideological conflict, it becomes reasonable to declare that the American Industrial Revolution lay at the core of what caused the American Civil War. We next define ideology for the purposes of this study. We now establish the ideological pillar.

Ideological Framework

The first framework this thesis employs is ideological. The ideological framework consists of two pillars: Modernity and Tradition. Although these two concepts will be defined in the next section, they are presented here for the purpose of explaining the procedure employed in this study. The traditional pillar championed stability; the modern pillar championed change. Adversarial in nature, the interaction between the two pillars produced a three-phase reaction: cohesion, disruption, and fracture.

Although not necessarily determinative, industrial modernization proceeded against traditionalism with a sense of machine-like inevitability. The three phases illustrate the stages of transition the country experienced from pre-industrialization to the conclusion of the war. The three-phase action within the ideological framework triggered social, political, and military changes that caused the existing institutional framework to crumble. The results of this process are readily recognizable events that are generally acknowledged by historians to be significant contributors to the impending war. Each individual pillar has examples, which include the anti-slavery movement in the social pillar, the Kansas-Nebraska Act in the political pillar, and the Battle of Gettysburg in the military pillar. The causes of this illustrative list of events can be explained in part by the adversarial relationship between agricultural traditionalism and industrial modernization. The relationship between modernization and traditionalism reveals how the era came to be defined by binary choices: North and South; Agricultural and Industrial; and Slave and Free. Between the two polarizing ideologies there was little room for common ground. Let us now examine the second framework employed in this study—the institutional framework.

¹⁷ Taylor, *Modernities*, 3.

¹⁸ Robert A. Nisbet, *The Sociological Tradition* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 23.

Institutional Framework

The institutional framework consists of three pillars: social, political, and military. These pillars are the backdrop upon which the argument proceeds. There are several points that distinguish the institutional and ideological frameworks. First, the institutional framework conceptually concrete while the ideological framework is at times conceptually opaque. The social, political, and military pillars that make up the institutional framework have a familiar logical connection to the Civil War. This is in part because they are the singular disciplinary approaches historians generally take when analyzing the war. Secondly there is no adversarial relationship between the pillars of the institutional framework. The pillars are static in relationship to one another. The action of the institutional framework is triggered by the changes that occur within each of the three pillars. As the three-phase ideological conflict fractured each pillar, it compounded the pressure on the remaining pillars. This concept is illustrated in Newton's Second and Third Laws of Motion; the change that occurred within each pillar had a direct corresponding effect on the remaining pillars.¹⁹ The institutional framework was steadily weakened by ideological friction as the Nineteenth-Century unfolded.

The interaction between the ideological and institutional frameworks is directly connected to industrialization. The machinations from these interactions produced the conditions that caused the war. As industrialization grew in America, the ideology of modernization grew with it, unceremoniously trampling traditionalism along the way. Viewing social, political, and military disciplines as pillars within a single framework gives us the flexibility to explore comprehensive solutions to the cause of the war. Similarly, viewing the concepts of tradition and modernization as pillars within a single framework reveals the heart of the matter: that industrialization sparked an ideological clash that was all-consuming. When the two frameworks are combined, we see a sequence of actions that moved from one institutional pillar to the next with increasing velocity. The ripple effects

¹⁹ Isaac Newton, *The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, trans. Bernard I. Cohen and Anne Whitman (California: University of California Press, 1999), 416-417. Here Newton states that the second law of motion is that motion grows with force. As the impact of industrialization began in the social, carried over into the political, and ended in military conflict, it did so with ever increasing force. In keeping with Newton's third law of motion that each action has an equal and opposite reaction, the more industrial modernization grew, the more robust the response from traditionalists became.

of industrialization can be traced as they radiated from town squares to the halls of Congress, and ultimately onto the battlefield. Now that the ideological and institutional frameworks have been established we move to discuss the key terms used in this study.

Defining Terms

In discussing causes the Civil War, this study relies upon several core terms and concepts. Defining terms such as modernization and traditionalism can be somewhat problematic. This is because the terms are inherently abstract and sufficiently pliable to be applied to many periods and situations. The key to the terms used in this study is that they are specifically connected to the Nineteenth-Century. By grounding the terms and definitions in the Nineteenth-Century, the following definitions are intended to minimize potential distractions and orient the reader to the core terms and concepts of this thesis. We begin by defining traditionalism.

Traditionalism

This thesis sets the foundation of traditionalism in America just before the turn of the Nineteenth-Century. For the purpose of this study, this start point is presented as established. Although it is outside the scope of this study, I do note that the establishment of agricultural traditionalism was itself a relatively new phenomenon in America. It began in the preindustrial European mythology of the sacred garden, which was projected onto the North American colonies during the colonization of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.²⁰ This is stated to acknowledge that America was far from a static society socially, culturally, or politically leading up to the Nineteenth-Century. This study sets traditionalism in the early Nineteenth-Century because of its direct contrast to modernization, which shortly followed. The agrarian-based system of the Nineteenth-Century had a social ideology that looked to the past to understand the present. Its adherents gave little to no regard to the potential of the future. *The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* defines Traditionalism as:

The naïve conservatism of ordinary individuals, who desire only to live and die as their fathers lived and died and who therefore recoil from any

²⁰ Leo Marx, *The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Idea in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 85, 104-116.

radical social transformation, becomes converted into conscious conservatism or traditionalism under the impact of revolution. Traditionalism arises as a reaction to the attempt of a revolution to reconstruct state and society *ab ovo* upon rational foundations.²¹

This unsympathetic definition highlights the most pronounced trait of traditionalism: stability. The next most pronounced trait of traditionalism is the embrace of emotion over reason. Although mostly on point, there is a slight contradiction in this definition. Although it does not affect the main point, this inconsistency is worth mentioning. Naivety, as presented here, is not a component of traditionalism. Traditionalists did not robotically tread the well-worn pathways of the past. They *chose* to do so. Those choices were based on a common reservoir of past experiences. Turning to stability, note that change can trigger a unique set of actions and reactions based on strength of the attempted revolution or transformation. These reactions signal the adversarial relationship between traditionalism and modernization. The relationship between traditionalism and modernization is adversarial. It is also inherently ideological because they both seek to establish the governing social norm. And yet not all change is rejected—only *radical* change is spurned. As we will see later, traditionalists accepted some of the first fruits of the American Industrial Revolution. It was only when those developments began to displace the status quo that traditionalists grew agitated.

The *Blackwell Dictionary of Modern Social Thought* defines Tradition/Traditionalism as:

Holding a specific place among the customs, convictions, folkways, and styles which are the building blocks of human cultures, tradition is commonly reserved for customs which have considerable depth in the past and an aura of the sacred. The word tradition comes from the Latin verb *tradere* which meant to deliver, transmit, hand down through time.²²

This definition critical because it establishes past experiences as the building blocks of a culture. Accordingly, looking to the future would destabilize the foundation of the culture. At its extreme, to accept one is to reject the other. Not only does the past anchor the present, is seen as sacred. It acts as a spiritual cloak that completely covers the building

²¹ Edwin Seligan, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 15 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), 67.

²² William Outhwaite, ed., *The Blackwell Dictionary of Modern Social Thought*, 2nd ed. (UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2003), 701.

blocks that have been handed down over time. An attempt to pierce that cloak and alter those blocks would be akin to poking a hornet's nest.

The building blocks of the past are legitimized by their longevity. According to the *Dictionary of Social Sciences*, tradition:

Generally refers to persistent cultural patterns that evoke or testify to continuity with the past. In principle, there can be of almost any kind: beliefs, customs, knowledge or values. Some accounts of tradition stress actual continuity with the past; others stress the belief that certain practices are legitimate or proper because of their antiquity.²³

Based on this definition some traditionalist beliefs and practices are legitimized solely because they have been in use for a long time. Based on this definition, beliefs and values based on continuity with the past help anchor the foundation of traditional society.

Challenging a faith grounded in practices handed down from generation to generation with future-orientated rebuttals would almost produce a heated debate.

According to these definitions the cornerstone of Nineteenth-Century traditionalism was stability. Stability was attained through past experiences. As a personal guidebook, consulting past experiences is generally regarded as a good approach to navigating new challenges. One may freely choose to rely on past experiences or try something new altogether. As a social ideology, however, the process becomes much more rigid. In places where traditionalism governed the lens through which the world was viewed and interpreted, one was not so free to choose. Where one did elect the future over the past there was social and cultural blowback. The main cause for concern was that relying on anything other than a common past would destabilize society. We next define modernization.

Modernization

In contrast to tradition, change is the cornerstone of modernization. The primary goal of modernization is to replace past foundations with something newer and better—which are regarded by modernists to be one in the same. Modernity is defined by the *Reader's Guide to the Social Sciences* as:

²³ Craig Calhoun, ed., *Dictionary of the Social Sciences* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 488.

The outcome of a number of different processes: political, economic, social and cultural. Key political processes are identified as the establishment of secular political power in the form of the nation-state, with the development of warfare and the concepts of sovereignty and legitimacy acting as crucial supports to this form. Closely aligned with these are economic processes, specifically the emergence of monetarized exchange economy characterized by large-scale production and consumption of commodities and the accumulation of capital. Social processes include the decline of traditional social hierarchies and their replacement with dynamic class and gender relations. Finally, of fundamental importance is the rise of secular, materialistic culture and its associated intellectual currents of individualism and rationalism, these latter comprising important facets of Enlightenment thought.²⁴

Nineteenth-Century modernization was a social ideology. The first conflicts leading to the Civil War were social. Industrialization presented alternatives that facilitated a shift in social processes that displaced traditional social hierarchies. Although changes in the dynamics of class and gender were most pronounced in industrialized areas, its influence was present throughout America. This definition also presents a series of attributes that are adverse to the tradition strongpoints of religion, connection to the land, and emotion: secularism, materialism, and rationalism. Modernization assumes that man can satisfy himself with devices of his own creation. He need not be shackled by the past or by reliance on religion. He may confidently proceed into the unknown, cloaked in the security of his own intellect.

This definition also illustrates the social and political threats modernization poses to traditionalism. The social freedom to break with the past has political consequences when economics are involved. When empowered by converting labor into money and by the accumulation of capital, modernists threaten traditionalists both socially and politically. They became a threat to uproot social norms, and perhaps more importantly, economic norms. As noted in the definition, modernization is capable of triggering massive social, political, and economic change—all at the same time. This would be akin to an all-out assault on the very building blocks traditionalists seek to preserve. The key to this definition is that modernization spans the breadth of the institutional framework. No cow is too sacred. It subjects all elements to reason and seeks progress regardless of outcome.

²⁴ Jonathan Michie, *Reader's Guide to Social Sciences*, vol. 2 (London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001), 1058.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines Modern as: “Of a movement in art and architecture or the works produced by such a movement: Characterized by a departure from or a repudiation of accepted or traditional styles and values.”²⁵ This definition is blunt and to the point: to accept modernity is to repudiate tradition. At best, modernity is an ideology that coexists awkwardly with tradition. Interestingly, this definition suggests that the arts are the primary platform for expressing the presence of modernity. As we will see in the next chapter, Nineteenth-Century literature, plays, and other art forms give strong evidence of the presence of modernity in America leading up to the war. The *Random House Unabridged Dictionary* advances along the lines of the arts while adding the concept of individuality by defining Modern as: “Of, pertaining to, or characteristic of contemporary styles of art, literature, music, etc., that reject traditionally accepted or sanctioned forms and emphasize individual experimentation and sensibility.”²⁶ This definition targets art and individuality. It was the impact of a multitude of empowered individuals dissecting tradition that provided modernization its potency.²⁷ As we will explore in the next chapter, the arts played two critical roles in evidencing modernization in the early to mid-Nineteenth-Century. First it was a way for those experiencing modernization to tell about their experiences. Secondly, it became a tool used by those who learned to harness it to challenge traditional norms.

Historian Daniel Walker Howe defined modernization in holistic terms that captures the definitions of modernization presented thus far:

“Modernization” is the term applied by social scientists to economic development and certain concomitant cultural changes considered to reinforce it, such as secularization and the assimilation of ethnic differences. Societies undergoing modernization are usually characterized by industrialization, technological innovation, population growth, increased literacy, growing national self-awareness, and value changes in the direction of greater time-thrift and productivity. Such a society was Nineteenth-Century America.²⁸

Howe’s definition speaks to the breadth of impact modernization can have on a society.

²⁵ J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 948.

²⁶ Stewart B. Flexner, ed. *Random House Unabridged Dictionary*, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1993), 1236.

²⁷ Marshal Berman, *All That is Solid Melts into Air* (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), 22.

²⁸ Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs*, 182.

To briefly summarize, modernization's main anchor is change. Change is established by uprooting traditional norms and replacing them with something better: secularism, materialism, and rationalism. Improvement based on new revelations of science and rationality made looking to the tomorrow rather than yesterday the standard for living. Modernization as a social ideology is inherently disruptive to stable societies and brings a degree of uncertainty as to what the future will bring. We now turn to the relationship between modernization and industrialization.

Modernity and Industrialization

Modernization in the Nineteenth-Century was the ideological by-product of the Industrial Revolution.²⁹ It was the catalyst that changed American society in the 1800s. Modernity and industrialization both adhere to the pursuit of progress through change.³⁰ The concepts are so closely aligned that they are used interchangeably in studies of the Nineteenth-Century.³¹ During that period, technological advances increased people's willingness to discard long-held traditions, opening the way for unprecedented wave of social change.³² As the advances of industrialization spread throughout the country, modernization grew in kind. Robert Nisbet describes industrialization's effect on Nineteenth-Century Europe in terms that are relevant to understanding what Americans experienced during that same time period:

Two forces, monumental in their significance, gave urgency to these themes: the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution. It would be hard to find any ideal of thought and writing in the century that was not affected by one or both of these events. The cataclysmic nature of each is plain enough if we look at the responses of those who lived through the revolutions and their immediate consequences. Today it is only too easy to submerge the identity of each revolution. But to intellectuals of that age, radical and conservative alike, the changes were almost millennial abruptness. Contrast between present and past seemed stark—

²⁹ Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987), 5.

³⁰ Nicholas Daly, *Literature, Technology, and Modernity: 1860-2000* (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 4.

³¹ Taylor, *Modernities*, 19.

³² Roger Friedland and Derrde Boden, *Nowhere: Space Time and Modernity* (California: University of California Press, ltd., 1994), 2.

terrifyingly or intoxicatingly, depending upon one's relation to the old order and the forces at work on it.³³

The transformational impact of industrialization was not exclusive to Europe. Nisbet's assessment illustrates just how impactful industrial modernization could be on a society. We will see in the coming chapter examples through the arts that validate the correlation between Nisbet's comments and the experiences Americans had during industrialization.

Industrialization is a large factor that separates Nineteenth-Century modernization from other social phenomena. Three highly influential sociological theorists have underscored the significance of the tension modernization creates in societies: Émile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and Max Weber.³⁴ Each sociologist helps to illustrate industrialization's relationship to modernization in the Nineteenth-Century.

Durkheim considered industrialization and the division of labor as the inevitable consequences of a modernizing society.³⁵ He considered advancement of technology and the use of machinery to generate capital as staples of modernization. Durkheim also commented on the sociological impact of modernization. Unwilling to label it in negative terms, he openly questioned whether a society is morally better off because of modernization. He painstakingly skirted the line of being judgmental. By characterizing economics and art as amoral concepts, neither good nor bad, he determined that they are simply reflections of a deeper undiscernible reality. He did, however, note the impact of modernity and science. Declaring science the highest point of clarity, he signaled the force with which the modern rational proceeds against traditionalism. In a matter-of-fact stroke of confidence he concluded that not everyone need participate in the economic and artistic processes of modern society, but that "everyone is now forced not to be ignorant [of it]."³⁶ To Nineteenth-Century modernists, progress and science were inescapable truths. The forced acceptance of rationalism over tradition is a friction point reviewed in greater detail in the next chapter.

³³ Nisbet, *The Sociological Tradition*, 22.

³⁴ Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity: The Raymond Fred West Memorial Lectures at Stanford University* (California: Stanford University Press, 1990), 11.

³⁵ Émile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, trans. George Simpson (Digireads.com Publishing, 2013), 41.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 47.

Karl Marx considered industrial capitalism an essential element of modernity. His observations on western social upheavals of the mid-1800s describe the types of changes America experienced leading up to the war:

The development of the industrial proletariat is, in general, conditioned by the development of the industrial bourgeoisie. Only under its rule does the proletariat gain that extensive national existence which can raise its revolution to a national one, and does it itself create the modern means of production, which become just one of many means of its revolutionary emancipation.³⁷

The development of the industrial proletariat followed by revolutionary emancipation mirrors the periods of disruption and fracture discussed in this thesis. Industrialization empowers the masses to revolt against traditionalism. As the revolution gains momentum, the people become capable of breaking with traditionalism altogether. The newly-emancipated are then free to create a social environment of their own design. The process described by Marx is readily identifiable in the industrial population centers in the years immediately preceding the war in movements such as the free labor movement and the abolitionist movement, which will be explored in the following chapters.

Weber accentuated “rational capitalism,” which fused aspects of economics with the importance of technology for interpreting Modernity.³⁸ In his essay on Methodism, Weber contrasts modern capitalism to protestant values. His assessment was rather bleak:

This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which day-to-day determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. In Baxter’s view the care of external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the “saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment.” But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage.³⁹

Weber’s view of modernity binds the machines of industry to capitalism. The impact of this connection creates such force that it ultimately transforms society itself. Industrialization threatened to hyper-individualize society in exchange for increased production and

³⁷ Frederick Engels and Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: With Related Documents*, ed. John Toews (Boston: Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999), 145.

³⁸ Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, 12.

³⁹ Karl Emil Maximilian Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2003), 181.

consumption of goods. While Weber championed the division of labor and specialization, industrialization threatened to hollow out its meaning. Indeed, his concern was that if industrialization were not kept in check, Americans would lose their spiritual and ethical core, driven by work for work's sake.⁴⁰ Although Webber's comparison of living in those times to being trapped in an iron cage may seem excessive, he was not alone in his ominous view of the modern era. American contemporary arts and literature of the era depict a similar sense of the dark side of industrialization, technology, and modernization: the inevitability of progress.

Industrialized Warfare and Hard War

Industrialization transformed the war from a traditional one into a modern one. The historian Modris Eksteins defines modern warfare as:

Socio-political and economic might converted to the war machine/ armed forces; the importance of railways for transportation of munitions and massive troop movement as well as denial of those advantages; massive casualties in short periods of time, trench warfare; total warfare; *and ultimately the triumph of rationality over emotion, expanding the battlefield to systematically destroy the enemy for the sake of order.*⁴¹

Although not unique, converting socio-political and economic hostilities into fuel for war is a necessary component of modern warfare. Interestingly, the definition includes the term "war-machine," which connotes a subtle distinction from traditional warfare. The emphasis on the importance of railways is unique to modern warfare. Access and denial of this critical capability is necessarily connected to industrialization and its capacity to influence military conflicts. The hallmarks of modern warfare—individual battles that were short in duration yet high in intensity, which yielded massive casualties; and trench warfare—were all evident in the American Civil War. Yet it is the pursuit of rationality over emotion that decisively made the Civil War modern.

Ekstein's rationale for modern war is the key concept at play here. The rationale looks to systematically destroy the enemy force for the sake of preserving order. This distinction will be shown as the deciding difference between the way the Civil War was

⁴⁰ Ibid., 182.

⁴¹ Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (New York: Mariner Books, 1989), 92. (Emphasis added).

initially fought and how it ultimately was brought to a close. This rationale of inflicting punishing methods of warfare for the sake of re-establishing order will be explored in greater detail in the chapter on the military pillar. At this point in the study it is introduced as a distinction of modern warfare present in the American Civil War. In the initial years of the war, the lines between military battlefields and civilian population centers were static and fairly well defined. Waging war on traditional population centers was regarded as barbaric because there was little to no strategic value in slaughtering citizens.⁴² Such an act would not have been permitted as a strategy for prosecuting the Civil War. This is not to suggest that an invading force need not be concerned about hostile inhabitants. The Swiss military theorist Antoine de Jomini, whose works influenced the doctrines taught to Civil War generals, was very concerned about the potential of hostile populations to derail military operations.⁴³ Contemporary military strategy at that time was to pacify, not enrage the invaded population.

Yet as the war dragged on, warfighters incorporated the technological advancements of industrialization to gain tactical and strategic advantages on the battlefield.⁴⁴ As they did this, the war began to take on modern features: the lines between the fighting forces and the civilian population became fluid, and in some cases nonexistent.⁴⁵ This was because by the later stages of the war, Northern and Southern institutions had become sufficiently wedded to industrialization. Consequently, the center of gravity shifted from battlefields to industrial centers. At the beginning of the war, the enemy army was the center of gravity: to defeat the enemy's army meant that he could no

⁴² Antoine Baron de Jomini, *The Art of War* (Virginia: Wilder Publications, 2008), 24.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁴⁴ Weir, *Turning Points in Military History*, 133-140. Here Weir breaks down the impact of new small arms technologies such as breech-loading rifles, repeating carbines, and rifled artillery. For further background on civil war weapons see Jack Coggins, *Arms and Equipment of the Civil War* (New York: Dover Publications, 1962); Shane MountJoy, *Technology and the Civil War*, ed. Tim McNeese (New York: Chelsea House InfoBase Publishing, 2009), 14-15; Earl J. Coates and Dean S. Thomas, *An Introduction to Civil War Small Arms* (Philadelphia: Thomas Publications, 1990); and Joseph G. Bilby, *Civil War Firearms: Their Historical Background, Tactical Use and Modern Collecting and Shooting* (Conshohocken: Combined Books, Inc., 1996).

⁴⁵ Charles Royster, *The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 354-59. Royster identifies the changes in General William Tecumseh Sherman's approach to war. Although he takes issue with the scope of B. H. Liddel Hart's characterization of Sherman as the creator of modern war, he identifies Sherman's willingness to wage war on civilian populations as a key feature of the latter half of the war. His main concern with Hart's argument is that unlike modern wars of the twentieth century, Sherman did not implement mass killings as a part of his warfighting strategy.

longer continue the war. As the war became more modern, the maxim changed: to defeat the enemy' army, you must first defeat his industrial population centers.⁴⁶

Within the context of large-scale war, which includes civilian population centers, the term "hard war" describes the strategy employed by the Union in the latter half of the war. The Civil War military historian Mark Grimsley identifies two main attributes of hard war as practiced during this conflict. First, the Union waged war against Southern civilians and property for the purpose of ruining the Confederate economy, industries, and transportation infrastructure. Second, the Union allocated substantial military resources to destroy Southern critical infrastructure.⁴⁷ The purpose of both was to decisively defeat the Confederate army. Although precisely tailored to Union military strategy, Grimsley's definition of hard war aligns with Eksteins' definition of modern war. These concepts will inform the discussion on the military pillar and clarify the impact industrial modernization had on the war fighters and ultimately the war itself.

Let us briefly sum up this chapter. We have defined traditionalism, industrial modernization, modern warfare, and hard-war. The pillars of the ideological framework are traditionalism and industrial modernization. Both pillars are sociological phenomena. The main attributes of traditionalism are stability and communion with the past to understand the present. The main attributes of modernization are change and individual rationalism. Traditionalism and modernization function in a manner that is mutually exclusive. The adversarial relationship between the two pillars triggers a distinct three phase action. The three phases are cohesion, disruption, and fracture. The entire ideological framework functions within the social, political, and military pillars of the institutional framework, which form the multi-disciplinary backdrop for this argument. Understanding the interaction between these two frameworks and the concept of hard war begins the explanation for how the American Industrial Revolution significantly impacted the American Civil War. Now that the key terms and concepts have been established, let us begin the study by reviewing the Social Pillar.

⁴⁶ Flood, *Grant and Sherman*, 400.

⁴⁷ Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians 1861-1865* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SOCIAL PILLAR

Social Cohesion

In the early Nineteenth-Century, traditionalism anchored American society. The commonalities that social unified the nation centered on strong connections to both religion and agricultural labor.⁴⁸ In his seminal work, *Democracy in America*, French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville commented on America's social solidity. He noted a collective respect for religion, a strong agricultural work ethic, and a seemingly boundless supply of natural resources.⁴⁹ Tocqueville's observation of a uniform respect for religion rooted in antiquity and agriculture were particularly instructive because it identified the hallmarks of traditionalism as the bedrock of America's social and cultural unity.⁵⁰

Traditionalism, Religion, and Agriculture

Nineteenth-Century traditionalism was solidified by religion and agricultural labor because they mutually reinforced each other. Together they created a complete picture of the mores and guidelines for social behavior.⁵¹ They defined the lens through which

⁴⁸ Rex Burns, *Success in America: The Yeoman Dream and the Industrial Revolution* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1976), 46; and Reginald Horsman, *The New Republic: The United States of America 1789-1815* (England: Pearson Education Ltd., 2000), 89; and Maury Klein, *The Genesis of Industrial America, 1870-1920* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 6.

⁴⁹ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. Henry Reeve (New York: Random House, Inc., 2000), 204-205. This point is also made by James McPherson, who analyzes why the American capitalist system became dominant so quickly. He, too, attributes an abundance of resources as a primary contributor to success in the American system. James M. McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 17. See Klein, *The Genesis of Industrial America*, 2; and Carrol Pursell, *The Machine in America: A Social History of Technology*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 109.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 352-53. Here, Tocqueville outlines how religion was the de facto governing institution in America. He argues that it framed every aspect of life from politics to social interactions. The core power of religion was that it had central Christian tenets that were ubiquitous to the various denominations. See Outhwaite, *The Blackwell Dictionary of Modern Social Thought*, 701; and Calhoun, *Dictionary of the Social Sciences*, 488. Although Tocqueville accurately states that there was a general respect for religion from a macro perspective, historian John Butler gives an excellent account of the complex role religion played during that time at the micro level of analysis. See John Butler, *Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 1990).

⁵¹ Burns, *Success in America*, 2.

individuals viewed themselves, nature, and the supernatural.⁵² Prior to industrialization, people's lives were governed by seasons, climates, and the land they cultivated.⁵³ Before the advent of the clock, for example, time was generally based on the position of the sun or the moon.⁵⁴ Much of this would change with the advent of cheap mass-produced clocks early in the century.⁵⁵ Technology played little role however, in preindustrial America culture. Agriculture provided the social structure. In the various seasons, for example, the duration of sunlight dictated sleep, work, and leisure.⁵⁶ The social structure was complimented by religion. Up to the late eighteenth century, state sponsored churches provided the moral and institutional structure.⁵⁷ In Voltaire's words, "The institution of religion exist[ed] only to keep mankind in order, and to make men merit the goodness of God by their virtue."⁵⁸

The drawbacks of relying on agricultural nature also facilitated the symbiotic relationship between agricultural labor and religion. The points of convergence were in instances where the unpredictability of nature created unexpected hardships or provided metaphors for the unexplainable events of life. To remain relevant, the sermons reflected the geographical political concerns of their congregations.⁵⁹ Religious institutions codified and reinforced social norms based on the struggles of agricultural labor in lessons and sermons, particularly in the South and newly-populating West.⁶⁰ As we will see, this practice would become problematic as a divergence developed between industrial and

⁵² *The American Gospel of Success: Individualism and Beyond*, ed. Moses Rischin (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), 23-24. The term supernatural is used here rather than spirituality or God, which may be defined and interpreted in a plethora of ways. The intent here is to provide the reader with a term that signals beyond "religion," Americans of the time interpreted unexplainable events based on their perception of religion that was intimately connected to agriculture.

⁵³ John Wilmerding, *Compass and Clock: Defining Moments in American Culture, 1800, 1850, 1900* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc. Publishers, 1999), 20.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 87. Wilmerding illustrates the transformational impact that the clock had on standardizing time and space in early American agricultural society. See, for example, David S. Landes, *Revolution in Time: Clocks and the Making of the Modern World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).

⁵⁵ Pursell, *The Machine in America*, 184.

⁵⁶ Ian Dartyk, *Selling the True Time: Nineteenth Century Time Keeping in America* (California: Stanford University Press, 2000), 7; and Klein, *The Genesis of Industrial America*, 28-29.

⁵⁷ Butler, *Awash in a Sea of Faith*, 165-169.

⁵⁸ François-Maria Arouet De Voltaire, *The Portable Voltaire*, ed. Ben Ray Redman (New York: Penguin Books, 1949), 109-110.

⁵⁹ Butler, *Awash in a Sea of Faith*, 195-202.

⁶⁰ Louis Wright, *Culture on the Moving Frontier* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1955), 84.

agricultural areas. As the century progressed, the connection between agriculture and the supernatural grew stronger in rural areas as it progressively diminished in the industrializing ones. As we will explore in the next section, the primary reason for divergence in the North was because of the spread of industry. It made people less dependent on the vagaries of nature. During the course of the century traditionalism solidified its hold of the South and West while a new ideology began to take hold in the North—industrial modernization.⁶¹

Industrialization and a New Nature

Tocqueville's observations of a relatively close-knit American society changed as industrialization took hold in northern cities. Prior to industrialization, people living in urban areas looked to agricultural traditionalism for answers in the same way their rural counterparts did.⁶² But as industrialization waxed in cities, their population's connection to agriculture waned.⁶³ To illustrate, unlike in agriculture areas, factories filled with machines were much less vulnerable to the unpredictable nature of the weather. This in-turn severed the mutually reinforcing relationship between religion, the supernatural, and agriculture. Decoupling nature from agriculture had a destabilizing effect on America's cohesive social fabric. This is because the governing concepts of agricultural nature and morality became isolated from one another in industrial regions, allowing industrial nature to be coupled with morality.⁶⁴ Consequently, the concept of nature in cities began to reflect its new industrial environment, which had a very different look and feel than the long-established views of nature in rural areas.⁶⁵

A major factor in the shift away from agricultural nature that took place in cities was the explosion of immigration that took place from the turn of the century up to the mid-1840s.⁶⁶ European immigrants moved to emerging industrial cities in the hopes of creating

⁶¹ Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 204.

⁶² Stearns, *The Industrial Revolution in World History*, 58.

⁶³ James M. McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom*, 78.

⁶⁴ Henry D. Thoreau, "Walden," in *The Northern Anthology of American Literature*, 4th ed., ed. Nina Baym, et al. (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1995), 793.

⁶⁵ Klein, *The Genesis of Industrial America*, 1.

⁶⁶ Potter, *The Impending Crisis*, 241-242.

a better life for themselves and their families.⁶⁷ The massive influx shook up the traditional common ground of religion and agriculture because of the group's size and diversity.⁶⁸ The combination of diversity and a new environment pushed city-dwellers toward commonalities based on secular issues instead of religious ones.⁶⁹ In so doing, they forged an understanding of nature based on their shared experiences with industrialization and work in factories.

The initial anchor to this emerging culture was a belief in being paid a fair wage for their labor. Historian Eric Foner characterizes the fair wage labor argument as “free labor”, emphasizing the underlying political focal point—freedom for all laborers.⁷⁰ Wage labor as a social phenomenon sowed the first seeds discord between the North and South in the buildup to the war. Yet, at this point in the study, fair wages forged a workable point of emphasis in industrializing areas because it was an issue that affected so many of their lives.* The fair wage labor rally point was made practicable by the fact the by the mid-1820s, labor in factories could be measured and quantified in terms of pay in relation to production.⁷¹ When time, labor, and production became predictable, the expectation of predictable wages came with it. These seemingly subtle changes, disconnecting agriculture from religion, and forming a new culture based on fair wage labor, came to have big consequences on the nation's social stability.

Industrialization and Population Growth

Reviewing the size, scope, and speed with which urban population centers grew during that period will make the significance of the social fissures that followed industrialization more concrete. This review is also critical to our understanding of how and why the fallout from industrialization directly contributed to the social, political, and

⁶⁷ This point is excellently portrayed in Upton Sinclair's *The Jungle* where a young immigrant and his family travel to Chicago in search of a better life and discover the new realities of industrialization. During his quest for employment Jurgis sees the accepted brutality of the slaughter house, living in abject poverty in the midst of a wealthy city, and the force of the worker's union. Upton Sinclair, *The Jungle* (New York: New American Library, 1990).

⁶⁸ Butler, *Awash in a Sea of Faith*, 282.

⁶⁹ Phillip Paludan, *The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 7.

⁷⁰ Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 11.

* It is relevant to note here that the wage labor argument only applied to white males.

⁷¹ Friedland and Boden, *Nowhere*, 8.

military clashes that followed. The combination of mass immigration and industrial innovation unleashed unprecedented growth in American cities, which brought forth a new concept of nature. Let us first frame this aspect of the discussion by putting early Nineteenth-Century population growth and mass immigration in perspective. From 1800 to 1850, America's population grew from 5 million to 23 million.⁷² The overwhelming majority of that growth occurred in northeastern areas. The population in New York, for example, expanded from roughly 340,000 people in 1790 to over 3 million in 1850, while South Carolina grew from only 250,000 people to 670,000 during that same period.⁷³ This number is even more compelling when we consider that black slaves were included in the South Carolina total.⁷⁴

As people flowed into industrial areas to find work they internalized the ideology of industrial modernization.⁷⁵ As they did so, urban areas lost their connection on agricultural nature.⁷⁶ City-dwellers, like their European counterparts that experienced the industrial revolution, developed a new sense of nature that reflected their industrial environment and the rationalities they used to understand.⁷⁷ This is not meant to suggest that the transition smooth or uniform. Herbert Gutman argues that the assimilation from farm life to factory life was a highly disruptive transition. Rather than establishing a new nature, he argues that assimilation to factory life was a result of owners implementing regulations aimed at producing an efficient work-force.⁷⁸ His argument is not without merit. It is certainly conceivable that factory owners cared little about the sociological impact of factory life on their workers. Yet the sociological impact of laboring in factories and living in industrial areas had an impact that far exceeds the scope of merely producing an

⁷² U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor Bureau of the Census. "A Century of Population Growth From the First Census of the United States to the Twelfth—1790-1900." (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1909), 57.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁷⁴ Horsman, *The New Republic*, 9.

⁷⁵ Harvey Wish, *Society and Thought in Early America: A Social and Intellectual History of the American People Through 1865* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1950), 121; Marx, *The Machine in the Garden*, 170-172; and Herbert G. Gutman, *Work, Culture & Society In Industrializing America: Essays In American Working Class and Social History* (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 79-80.

⁷⁶ Marx, *The Machine in the Garden*, 173-174.

⁷⁷ Jennifer Hect, *The End of the Soul: Scientific Modernity, Atheism, and Anthropology in France* (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2003), 92.

⁷⁸ Gutman, *Work, Culture & Society In Industrializing America*, 19-29, 69. Gutman is particularly effective in driving his point home in his illustration of 500 factory workers petitioning factory owners not to cut down a tree that reminded them of the agricultural nature that had been replaced by factories in the city.

efficient group of factory workers.⁷⁹ There became a relatability gap between industrial factory workers in the north and the staple crops farmhands of the southeast.⁸⁰ The critical point here is not that there was a population explosion or that there were emerging differences between farms and factories. The issue is that the number of people embracing a rival view of nature and morality multiplied almost exponentially in a very short time. The population growth accelerated the rate that the rival culture grew, which left traditionalists little time to react or assimilate the new culture. The result was a loss of social cohesion.

Rift in the Cohesion

At this time we can see the nascent stages of an immerging industrial interpretation of nature. It arose from a secular foundation of wages, commoditization, and production—a sharp contrast to the nature borne from agriculture.⁸¹ The historian Joyce Appleby would likely take this presentation of how wages and commoditization took root in the industrializing areas as little more than creative repackaging of the process by which capitalism supplants inferior established orders.⁸² Although her presentation of capitalism similarly aligns with a form of ideology and culture presented in this study, it fails to explain why a split developed between the North and the South in the first place. Indeed, America had already embraced capitalism before industrialization took hold. Appleby misses the mark because the core of the struggle was ideological rather than monetary at its core. Apart from these distinctions, we see that the raw size, scope, and speed with which industrialization emerged were disruptive to America's previously uniform social and religious norms.

In summary, at the turn of the Nineteenth-Century religion and agricultural labor worked together to create a sense of social stability. Industrialization challenged the old order by rejecting agricultural labor and inserting itself in its place. Once agricultural labor was discarded, city-dwellers molded religion to mutually reinforce the form of labor they

⁷⁹ Ibid., 13.

⁸⁰ Avery Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War* (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 6.

⁸¹ Butler, *Awash in a Sea of Faith*, 257-258.

⁸² Joyce Appleby, *The Relentless Revolution: A History of Capitalism* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2010), 119.

were experiencing—industrialization.⁸³ The result was a culture that began looking towards the future progress of man, rather than to the past and interpretations by the supernatural. Industrialization and modernization grew at rapid rates because of a massive influx of immigration. Because of their various religious backgrounds, immigrants in cities found greater commonality on secular grounds, which separated them further from agriculturalists. One of the first secular issues people who worked in cities rallied behind was getting paid a fair wage for their labor, which became calculable and reliable to a dependable degree by industrialization and specialization. Each technological advancement and rational theory for improvement further divorced cities from rural areas, which would have significant consequences as the century unfolded. It is at this point that we transition from a period of relative social cohesion to a period of social disruption.

Social Disruption

The Cultural Divide

The effect modernization had on American city dwellers was noticeable as early as the 1820s.⁸⁴ This is not to suggest that the transformation happened seamlessly or that it happened in all places at the same time.⁸⁵ These historical events occurred in fits and starts as cities transitioned from traditionalism to industrial modernization. Yet in the main, city-dwelling modernists began to abandon the supernatural for the pursuit of progress, logic, and science.⁸⁶ People in industrial centers began to assert that all could be explained through man-made constructs like, science and reason.⁸⁷ This sentiment is reflected in

⁸³ Mark A. Noll, *The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994), 67-68.

⁸⁴ Pursell, *The Machine in America*, 107; Mark R. Wilson, *The Business of Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861-1865* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 26; and Gutman, *Work, Culture & Society In Industrializing America*, 236-237.

⁸⁵ Marx, *The Machine in the Garden*, 175-179. Here Marx explores the contemporary phenomenon of self-estrangement, alienation, and the corresponding internal conflict many Americans in industrial regions felt between the social and the natural self.

⁸⁶ Jeremy David, *Transatlantic Industrial Revolution: The Diffusion of Textile Technologies Between Britain and America, 1790- 1830s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 14; and Andrew Jewett, *Science, Democracy, and The American University: From the Civil War to the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 22-24. Here Jewett shows that proponents of science in the early eighteenth hundreds proposed it as a substitute for religion, complete with its own set of morality that should govern citizenship in America; and Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 13.

⁸⁷ Hect, *The End of the Soul*, 96.

writer and poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's *Faust*. Although not directly tied to modernization, *Faust* captured the feeling of many in the industrial regions adopted: the power of industry, politics, and the individuality of man would inevitably lead to the liberation of the mind.⁸⁸ Once liberated, the mind would transcend the trappings of traditional faith-based morality and define new boundaries.⁸⁹ The new boundaries of morality and reason would be formed based on man's understanding of science.⁹⁰ This way of thinking offered a stark contrast to the traditional approach. It signaled that past experiences were no longer a guide for the understanding the present, and that the present was subject to perpetual transformation. In industrial cities, therefore, the cornerstone of stability was being replaced by the lodestar of progress.

Over time traditionalists came to view modernization as a threat to the very core of what, in their view, had made America a superior nation: its moral and religious core.⁹¹ They considered industrial modernization dangerous because it offered a new purpose for labor that negated the traditional purpose of nature. The modern purpose of labor was to gain wealth and acquire objects—consume and produce. Industrial labor rejected the traditions of agricultural labor and its appeals to the supernatural as antiquated and unnecessary.⁹² Karl Marx captured the sentiment many rural Americans felt when he stated, “the worker is related to the product of his labor as to an alien object.”⁹³ Marx was speaking to the impact of mass production on the labor force, a key trait of

⁸⁸ Berman, *All that is Solid Melts into Air*, 111. Interestingly, Weber comments that Faust's realization required a rejection of everything that man had come to know as beautiful. For the sake of transcendence and enlightenment, man would be required to give up his connection to the world he had known in order to embrace an entirely new reality. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, 181. In the pursuit of transcendence and self-reliance man would exchange the known for the unknown. Neither of these works fully explores what life would be like fully realized by man on the other side of transcendence. It is precisely this uncertainty that traditionalists rejected. It is perhaps Durkheim that comes closest by acknowledging modernization is a perpetual state of evolution with no place for the traditional concept of stability or social regulation. Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, 242.

⁸⁹ Noll, *The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind*, 31; and Berman, *All that is Solid Melts into Air*, 61.

⁹⁰ Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, 47.

⁹¹ Nisbet, *The Sociological Tradition*, 26; and Klein, *The Genesis of Industrial America, 1870- 1920*, 137.

⁹² Burns, *Success in America*, 17; and Marx, *The Machine in the Garden*, 183.

⁹³ Engels and Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, 133.

modernization.⁹⁴ Traditionalists feared that if left unchecked, industrial modernization would produce both an alienated workforce and an alienated society as well.

As rural Americans encountered alienation, they also experienced what Weber described as the irresistible binding effect of modernization.⁹⁵ They witnessed its machine-like aura of compulsive consumption and production. In order to participate in an industrial society, one had to produce and consume. The more one produced and consumed, the more one became wedded to the vicious cycle of production and consumption. Nisbet underscored this Nineteenth-Century American sentiment with the statement, “[B]etween man and machine there was occurring, it seemed, a transfer of, first strength and dexterity, and then intelligence, that boded ill for creatures made in the image and likeness of God.”⁹⁶ At the crux of it, modernists came to believe they needed to replace traditionalism with something better.⁹⁷ When morality was brought into the debate, it took things to a whole new level and widened the division between the two sides.

The debate over which ideology was superior was polarizing because the two sides had come to view morality so differently. In the South and in the West, morality was viewed in terms of absolute right and wrong.⁹⁸ By the mid-1850s the North, however, came to view traditional norms in a much more nuanced fashion. They would readily jettison them as inapplicable if they conflicted with industrial norms. In his work *The Protestant Work Ethic*, Durkheim gives a perfect example of the rationale industrialists employed to justify their views that conflicted with traditional norms. He acknowledges that the traditional signs of an immoral society, like crime and suicide, point to the general unhappiness of a modernizing society, yet he eschews these indicators as inconclusive. Instead, he cast his lot in favor of a modern morality that looked to economic productivity. He ultimately concludes that morality is relative and that industrial modernization cannot be judged by traditional standards. Science, not tradition, he suggests, is the yardstick by

⁹⁴ The large-scale production and monetization of labor are central components of 19th century modernization. Michie, *Reader's Guide to Social Sciences*, 1058. The focus of not only working to produce mass-scale products but also the goal of accumulating wealth are a stark departure from the previously established agricultural ideology.

⁹⁵ Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, 181.

⁹⁶ Nisbet, *The Sociological Tradition*, 30.

⁹⁷ Simpson and Weiner, *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 948.

⁹⁸ Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War*, 15.

which morality is measured because it is the highest form of human clarity.⁹⁹ This view negates the role of the supernatural altogether and relegates morality to the judgment of the individual's ability to rationalize their actions.

The perceptions of right and wrong branched from general axioms to specifics such as into whether the new industrial role of labor was building up or tearing down the social fabric of the nation. On the one hand, rural populations reflected contemporary poet Henry David Thoreau's sentiment that "superfluous wealth can buy superfluities only. Money is not required to buy one necessity of the soul."¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, those in the northeast strongly disagreed. Viewing their position as superior, industrialists regarded wage labor and social mobility as a necessary and better way of enjoying life.¹⁰¹ Ralph Waldo Emerson's work, *Wealth*, illustrates the superiority urban modernists felt towards rural agriculturalists, stating:

[B]etter order is equivalent to vast amounts of brute labor...and in wise combining, in directing the practice of the useful arts, and the creation of finer values by fine art, by eloquence, by song or reproductions of memory.¹⁰²

Hardly fighting words, but the tension reflected between these two contemporary authors is directly at odds with Historian Leo Marx. Marx argues that there was little to no resistance to the advances of industrialization outside of apologists in the South.¹⁰³ This view is derived from a myopic sociological view of history that is deterministic based on the self-imposed constraints of his analysis. Marx merely glides over the economic and political tensions that set the conditions for war by stating that traditionalist did not produce an alternative theory of society capable of enlisting effective political support.¹⁰⁴ As we will explore in the next chapter, Andrew Jackson and the Democrats would certainly take issue with Marx's views and their ability to mobilize popular support to their cause bears that out. As illustrated by Thoreau and Emerson, the literary works of the time

⁹⁹ Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, 47, 156-157.

¹⁰⁰ Thoreau, *Walden*, 881.

¹⁰¹ Stearns, *The Industrial Revolution in World History*, 60; and Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 53.

¹⁰² *The American Gospel of Success*, ed. Rischin, 39. Emerson's focus on the creation of finer values links directly to the role of the arts in a modernizing society where the creation of new styles and forms serve to reject the traditional notions of art. Flexner, *Random House Unabridged Dictionary*, 1236.

¹⁰³ Marx, *The Machine in the Garden*, 180.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 181; 219-220.

reflected that by the mid-1800s America had become socially divided on several ideological issues that were fundamental to its unity: religion, labor, and morality.

Up to this point, the presentation of how industrialization facilitated the split between the industrializing north and the agricultural south has been fairly abstract. Now that we have established the distinction between the preindustrial and postindustrial ideologies of traditionalism and industrial modernization, we look for proof of their existence. The remainder of this section is dedicated to making these abstract concepts more concrete by overlaying them with practical examples from the period. The examples that follow will show that industrialization was socially destabilizing and that the ideology that emerged in cities was diametrically opposed to the ideology the prevalent in agricultural areas. The examples chosen reflect transformations in social norms that point directly to the growing separation between those who lived in industrial areas and those who did not. This illustrative list of examples is not meant to be exhaustive or authoritative for what events where or were not important. It is meant, however, to drive home the point that industrialization formed the basis for the ideological wedge that developed between modernists and traditionalists. We begin by reviewing the impact industrialization had on relations between men and women.

Industrialization and Women

Urban populations increasingly chose modernization to traditionalism. This preference caused them to turn away from agricultural traditionalists. In the wake of the distance created between the two sides, a new urban social structure came into being. One example of this the new structure can be seen in the relationships between men and women in the home and in the work place. Industrialization so dramatically altered the roles in urban areas that traditionalists feared the institution of family itself was being destroyed.¹⁰⁵ Modernists' thoughts on individualism, privatization, and specialization allowed the role of women in marriage to transform from one of abject subordination to one of fledgling partnership.¹⁰⁶ Prior to industrialization, women married and reared

¹⁰⁵ Nisbet, *The Sociological Tradition*, 29.

¹⁰⁶ Stearns, *The Industrial Revolution in World History*, 61; There are several aspects to the evolution in gender roles in America during that time that are directly attributable to modernization. First is the decline of traditional social roles between genders and the introduction of a new gender dynamic. The second is the rise

children until they were barren or succumbed to poor health.¹⁰⁷ This grim cycle began to be broken in cities. This was largely because industrialization created a need for specialization, which was often not regarded as gender-specific.¹⁰⁸ In cities, women worked in mills and factories, earned wages, and helped financially support their families alongside men.¹⁰⁹ Industrialization not only reshaped women's roles in the workforce, it began to transform their roles in the home as well.

Woman's roles in the home changed as they started to mirror men's roles in the workplace.¹¹⁰ For example, women in cities became more inclined to purchase basic household necessities from markets rather than create them at home.¹¹¹ Additionally, women started to make goods in their homes for the purpose of selling them rather than consuming them as an additional source of household income.¹¹² This newfound autonomy women experienced extended beyond the marketplace of goods and services and into the marketplace of ideas. In the early Nineteenth-Century it was also becoming socially acceptable for women, largely in industrial regions, to attend college. One example of this was Oberlin College, established in 1833, as one of the first co-educational colleges in the world.¹¹³ Gradually, some women achieved levels of acceptance among male intellectuals.¹¹⁴ As women's literacy rates improved, they began to influence the ongoing debate between traditionalists and modernists. A key example of these points was Harriet Beecher Stowe, who will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter.

of individualism and rationalism. As individualism and rationalism grew based on economic needs the traditional roles between men and women changed. Both the decline in gender roles and the rise of individualism and rationalism are direct indicators of how the growing momentum of modernization was causing social disruption in America. Michie, *Reader's Guide to Social Sciences*, 1058.

¹⁰⁷ Horsman, *The New Republic*, 10.

¹⁰⁸ Wish, *Society and Thought in Early America*, 395.

¹⁰⁹ David, *Transatlantic Industrial Revolution*, 10; and Klein, *The Genesis of Industrial America, 1870-1920*, 137; and Pursell, *The Machine in America*, 97.

¹¹⁰ *Family and Society in American History*, ed. Joseph M. Hawes and Elizabeth Nybakken I. (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 18.

¹¹¹ McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom*, 27.

¹¹² Horsman, *The New Republic*, 98.

¹¹³ Walker Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 174-175.

¹¹⁴ Wright, *Culture on the Moving Frontier*, 224.

Industrialization and Literacy

American literacy rates jumped markedly in the 1800s, which coincided with a hefty increase in publishing and literature consumption.¹¹⁵ Largely because of the printing press, reading was becoming commonplace in America at that time.¹¹⁶ Industrialized areas even developed a culture of reading. This culture was particularly fostered in urban areas because leisure time was partly made possible and structured by standardized working hours.¹¹⁷ People had set times for work and for leisure. Another contributor to the massive growth in literacy rates was the implementation of mass education, a thoroughly modern concept.¹¹⁸ Mass education was particularly important to this rise in literacy rates in part because it replaced the traditional practice of apprenticeship. Rather than learning from hands-on experience, students were required to gain knowledge from reading. Most important to this study is that improved literacy allowed the country to be interconnected in a new way.¹¹⁹ Widespread literacy allowed Americans from all parts of the country to express themselves to one another and to be heard by one another. It also magnified the ongoing discussion about the rapid social changes brought on by industrialization. One of the first literary forms to explore what Americans were experiencing at that time was the

¹¹⁵ Wish, *Society and Thought in Early America*, 460; and Butler, *Awash in a Sea of Faith*, 277-278.

¹¹⁶ *Sensationalist Literature and Popular Culture in the Early American Republic: An Anthology of Exotic Nonfiction, Wonder Tales, and Whoppers*, ed. Edward W. R. Pitcher and Sean Hartigan, (UK: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), 1.

¹¹⁷ Wish, *Society and Thought in Early America*, 275.

¹¹⁸ Jewitt, *Science, Democracy, and the American University*, 30; McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom*, 17; and Howe, *The Political Culture of American the Whigs*, 36. Although mass education was implemented throughout America at that time, it was far from uniform. See *Recollections of the Early Republic: Selected Autobiographies*, ed. Joyce Appleby (Pennsylvania: Northeastern University Press, 1997), 117-120. Through his short autobiography Charles Ball, a Maryland slave, laments the great scarcity of schools in the South compared to the North and the ignorant idleness of southern young men compared with those in the North. Although a modern concept, agricultural regions also sought to improve themselves by advocating for agricultural and mechanical schools that promoted the welfare of "the people." A. Hunter Dupree, *Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies and Activities* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 113. See Marx, *The Machine in the Garden*, 189-190. Here Marx discusses the argument for and against Machines, technology, and progress between Thomas Carlyle and Timothy Walker. Carlyle condemns what he terms "the age of machinery" and is answered by Walker. Marx contrasts Carlyle's European view to "young" Walker's "American" view by emphasizing that Carlyle's views of industrialization as negative phenomenon is from the position of the privileged. In the new era of industrialization, technology had a huge potential to liberate those previously oppressed. One example Marx posits was Walker's idea of using education to liberate those who were previously oppressed.

¹¹⁹ Wright, *Culture on the Moving Frontier*, 120.

novel. As we will see, the advent of new technologies coupled with social mediums paved the way for new forms of expression and discord to foment the growing cultural debate.

Modernization as a Megaphone

During the early eighteenth century Americans used the arts to express the experiences they had with industrialization. As people living and working in cities became more familiar with industrialization and the ideology of modernization, they wrote about the conflicted realities brought on by industrial modernization. Novels were one medium that offer evidence of the presence of modernization early in the century. The novel arose as a new form of literature that became very popular in the early 1800s. Novels were modern inventions. Before novels, the most preindustrial literary art forms consisted of ghost stories, morality tales, and tales of exploration.¹²⁰ The novel bucked that trend in favor of original storylines steeped in the reality of individual experiences.¹²¹ Several literary works that both formed and reflected those times were *Moby Dick*, *The Scarlet Letter*, *Walden*, and *Uncle Tom's Cabin*.¹²² These novels were written on multiple levels to tell complex stories that encouraged readers to ponder deeper social issues.

Thoreau's *Walden* is a good example. In it, Thoreau narrates his time spent in the woods while weaving into the storyline his dilemma with the modern rationale. The essential point of the work is to persuade modernists to re-examine whether a modern life is better than a traditional one. Gently prodding his readers with occasional prose and verse, he sings a song to himself, chiding the modern rationale:

*Men say they know many things;
But lo! They have taken wings—
The arts and sciences,
And a thousand appliances;
The wind that blows
Is all that anybody knows.*¹²³

Walden presented a traditionalist view of individuality free from the trappings of modernity. It presented the goodness of agricultural nature and its interconnection with

¹²⁰ *Sensationalist Literature and Popular Culture in the Early American Republic*, ed. Pitcher and Hartigan, 12.

¹²¹ Taylor, *Modernities*, 48.

¹²² Wilmerding, *Compass and Clock*, 127.

¹²³ Thoreau, *Walden*, 809.

peace, harmony, and stability. *Walden* spoke directly to a growing concern for all Americans: where was modernity taking them? Although modernization touted the potential the future offered, it could not guarantee that the future would be better than the present. This uncertainty created a sense of anxiety of a foreboding future that remained opaque and just past the horizon of the imagination.¹²⁴ That anxiety became a one of the pronounced features of modern literature.¹²⁵ While many people championed the future as a time that would be inevitably brighter than the past, a growing contingent came to interpret their anxiety about it as an ominous sign that mankind would confront an inevitable dark end.¹²⁶ The anxiety of the unknown created an aura of suspense, which was also reflected in literature.

Suspense novels that expressed anxiety and fear grew in popularity. The so-called train novels were among the most prevalent. Train novels metaphorically expressed the anxiety and impending doom city-dwellers felt about the inevitable progress of machines.¹²⁷ The train was depicted as a villain, a metaphor for the dark side of modernization. The victim—man—was bound to the railroad tracks. In order for the hero to rescue the bound victim, he had to untie him before they were both dashed to pieces by the fast-approaching train. The train could not be defeated in the traditional sense, i.e., derailed. It could only be narrowly escaped by performing a herculean act. Man could not defeat progress; his only victory was to get off the tracks in time only to find himself back on them again, and again, and again. The train could be delayed, but it could not be stopped. This idea will continue on into the next chapter in the build up to secession and the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860. At this point in the study we can see that the dark side of modernization reflected in these wildly popular suspense novels was a direct indication of the impact modernization had on America in the years leading up to the war.

The dark themes of modernization were expressed in literature as well. Many of these themes included images of diabolical machines killing people and cities filled with

¹²⁴ Marx, *The Machine in the Garden*, 207.

¹²⁵ Friedland and Boden, *Nowhere*, 10.

¹²⁶ Daly, *Literature, Technology and Modernity*, 32.

¹²⁷ Daly, *Literature, Technology and Modernity*, 17, 27; and Marx, *The Machine in the Garden*, 31-32.

people with no moral compass.¹²⁸ One example was a sermon titled “Murderers of Fathers and Mothers” by Rev. Edward Hitchcock. In his first point about children in cities, Rev. Hitchcock states, “The young man may become the murderer of his father and his mother by making the idle and the immoral, the unprincipled or the irreligious his chosen companions.”¹²⁹ Foreshadowing citizens devoid of moral character, the reverend points to an inevitable dark conclusion: societies that adhere to industrial modernization would ultimately produce children so devoid of moral character that they will murder their parents. Another foreboding example comes from a popular contemporary excerpt from an anonymous author in the early 1800s. Titled *Improvement*, the story uncannily predicts a man creating a machine that, “...when placed in any point of contact against an invading force, is capable of destroying a thousand men in a minute.”¹³⁰

The examples from the literature so far presented offer validity to what Weber lamented as the cost of modern progress. In his estimation, the cost of modernization was the loss of man’s beautiful humanity.¹³¹ The tone of the writing of the time reinforces the reality that there was an ongoing sociological friction spurred by a period of rapid transition taking place within the collective American psyche before the Civil War began.¹³² Novels were not, however, the only art platform contemporary Nineteenth-Century Americans used to express their interactions with industrialization. We now review how the effects of modernization was shown in another popular art form of the time—the theater.

The theater was another insightful art form that urban Americans used to express what they saw and felt in cities. During the early 1800s they became accustomed to the arts as a way of understanding and expressing how they felt about the new realities of industrialization.¹³³ Interestingly, De Tocqueville noted that “When I arrive in a country

¹²⁸ Marx, *The Machine in the Garden*, 170. Here Marx looks to the literature of Thomas Carlyle to establish that the machines are the cornerstone of industrialization and are perhaps the most determinative factors in establishing the modernity in the Nineteenth Century.

¹²⁹ *Popular American Literature of the 19th Century*, ed. Paul Gutjahr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 62.

¹³⁰ *Sensationalist Literature and Popular Culture in the Early American Republic*, ed. Pitcher and Hartigan, 321.

¹³¹ Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, 181.

¹³² John W. Frick, *Theatre, Culture and Temperance Reform in Nineteenth Century America* (University of Virginia: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 141.

¹³³ Wish, *Society and Thought in Early America*, 127.

where I find some of the finest productions of arts, I learn from this fact nothing of the social condition or political constitution of the country.”¹³⁴ His downplaying of the significance of the arts in America completely misses the mark for America in during its industrializing years. Tocqueville’s statements reflect a traditionalist’s view that art was merely a form of superfluous entertainment. For those living in a modernizing world, the arts give direct insight into the complexities of living in those times.

Theaters gave much insight into urban contemporary social conditions. One development of industrialization that the theater explored was the growing disparity between the wealthy and the poor in cities. The theater reflected a concern that factory life produced a growing sense of cold indifference to one’s fellow man.¹³⁵ The theater showed this reality through a recurring theme that depicted extremely wealthy people living in the same space as people living in extreme poverty and not offering to help.¹³⁶ Many felt they were experiencing two Americas residing in the same city.¹³⁷

Another area theaters explored was the increase in alcohol consumption in cities. A popular contemporary production, *Ten Nights in a Bar Room*, is an example of theatre being used to warn viewers of the dangers of alcohol abuse in cities.¹³⁸ As city taverns became popular, men and women consumed alcohol after work as a way of bonding and coping with the new stresses of industry. In the play, a time-altering device depicted the depravity of man while intoxicated in a bar to show the audience the evils of drunkenness.¹³⁹

These works are evidence of Gutman’s observations about America in the mid Nineteenth-Century. He argues that Americans were encountering a complex array of social

¹³⁴ Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 563.

¹³⁵ Daly, *Literature, Technology and Modernity*, 15. Eric Foner also notes the indifference industrialists felt towards the poor in cities. Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 25.

¹³⁶ Rudiger Bering, *Musicals: An illustrated Historical Overview* (Germany: Barron’s: Germany. 1998), 21. This scene is also depicted in *The Jungle* where Jurgis is unemployed. He has to beg for money to make his nightly rent quota. Moving from business to business he realizes that he is stuck in a world of the wealthy with no opportunity to get out. He finally reaches out to an inebriated wealthy young man and acquires money only to have it stolen from him and to be thrown in jail. Sinclair, *The Jungle*, 229-245.

¹³⁷ This scene is excellently depicted in *The Jungle* where Jurgis is unemployed. He has to beg for money to make his nightly rent quota. Moving from business to business he realizes that he is stuck in a world of the wealthy with no opportunity to get out. He finally reaches out to an inebriated wealthy young man and acquires money only to have it stolen from him and to be thrown in jail. Ibid., 229-245.

¹³⁸ Stearns, *The Industrial Revolution in World History*, 61.

¹³⁹ Frick, *Theatre, Culture and Temperance Reform in Nineteenth Century America*, 132.

issues brought on by the advancement of industrialization.¹⁴⁰ Specifically, he looks to the level of drunkenness, rioting, and general uneasiness with which Americans approached factory life and the changing moral code in industrial areas. Exploring arts reveals the struggle those living in industrializing areas had in assimilating to their new environment. Looking to the arts as a gauge for whether modernization was present in industrial areas also exposes the growing divide between industrial regions and their agricultural counterparts whose lives changed very little during that time.

In sum, a review of the arts has revealed that industrial modernization had begun to take hold in American cities in the early Nineteenth-Century. Evidence of modernization is shown in two distinct ways. First is in the manner the arts changed. Literature transformed from morality tales that featured man and the supernatural, to suspense novels that centered on the inevitability of machines dominating man. The second way modernization is evident is in the characteristics of change, suspense, and the lamenting of the old nature. The sharp divergence shown in emerging art forms would become the epicenter of the seismic split between traditionalists and modernists. We have now seen how people living in industrial areas used new platforms to express their struggles with modernization. We now turn to see how those same people harnessed the power of industrialization to promote modernization and condemn traditionalism. Trepidation gave way to fury.

Modernization as a Sword

During the 1840s and 1850s, modernists moved beyond using literature to express their anxieties. They learned to channel the power of industrialization into media forms in order to promote their ideological agendas. The printing press, a product of industrialization, allowed forms of media to become more accessible. It gave individuals and groups the ability to project their ideas all across the country.¹⁴¹ One group that effectively exploited the medium was the anti-slavery abolitionist movement. The most pronounced example was Harriet Beecher Stowe's novel, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, published in

¹⁴⁰ Gutman, *Work, Culture & Society In Industrializing America*, 19-20; and McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom*, 76.

¹⁴¹ Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 209.

1852. It became the most widely read book issued in America up to that point.¹⁴² Stowe used a popular traditional writing style to tell the story of the life of a slave, John Van Trompe, in modern terms.¹⁴³ The story was based in part on a popular court case about a fugitive slave who ran away in an attempt to attain his freedom.¹⁴⁴ She wrote using terms that conveyed an intensely individual story that resonated with all who read it.

Stowe captured the modern sentiment of free labor and combined it with traditional notions of religion to drive home her essential point: slavery was morally wrong. The hallmarks of the modern ideology are strikingly evident in her book:

The scenes of this story, as its title indicates, lie among a race hitherto ignored by the associations of polite and refined society; an exotic race, whose ancestors, born beneath a tropic sun, brought with them, and perpetuated to their descendants, a character so essentially unlike the hard and dominant Anglo-Saxon race, as for many years to have won from it only misunderstanding and contempt...But another and better day is dawning; every influence of literature, of poetry and of art, in our times, is becoming more and more in unison with the great master chord of Christianity, "good will to man."¹⁴⁵

Stowe masterfully frames the discussion in traditional terms of emotion and religion. She then subtly chides those who ignored what she considers to be morally wrong by establishing that black slaves were actually people. She then transitioned from a traditional appeal to a modern one by emphasizing the future over the past. By describing tomorrow as better, she argues that the past must be rejected in favor of the future. Interestingly, she pointed to the momentum that modernity had built up by emphasizing the arts. She suggested that her views were the true views of Christianity and that the various art forms were marching in unison with the power of the supernatural. In essence, God was on the side of the modernists. Stowe's work is a perfect example of why divorcing agricultural labor from religion was so destabilizing, now modernists were free to attach industrial labor to religion. This process created a hermetically sealed ideology complete

¹⁴² *The New York Times Complete Civil War: 1861- 1865*, ed. Harold Holzer and Craig L. Symonds (New York: Black Dog & Leventhal Publishers, 2010), 22. The article was published on June 22, 1853 by the *New York Times* approximately one year after it was published. It chronicles the speed with which the novel captured the nation's attention and how it polarized those who read it.

¹⁴³ McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom*, 32.

¹⁴⁴ Doris K. Goodwin, *Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln* (New York: NY Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2005), 112.

¹⁴⁵ Harriet Beecher Stowe, *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (New York: NY Amereon House Ltd., 1994), xi.

with a moral force capable of checking traditionalists in their tracks. So riveting was Stowe's accounting that southerner Mary Chesnut stated, "After all this—tried to read *Uncle Tom*. Could not. Too sickening. A man send his little son to beat a human being tied to a tree?"¹⁴⁶ The impact of Stowe's work on Nineteenth-Century America is truly difficult to overstate.

Indeed, Stowe's novel had an unprecedented social impact. So potent was the novel that when Abraham Lincoln met her after it was published, he famously stated "so you're the little woman who wrote the book that started this great war."¹⁴⁷ Accordingly, many historians cite slavery as the root cause of the war. But as has been shown throughout this work, industrialization can be viewed as a catalyst that spurred on the slavery argument as well as for other arguments that caused the war; Stowe's work certainly made a contribution. As the novel spread like wildfire, the debate over freedom versus slavery further polarized the nation.¹⁴⁸

Uncle Tom's Cabin is one of the first instances of industrial modernization being used as a sword against traditionalists. Stowe's work used a new platform provided by industrialization and coupled it with a modern rationale to form a powerful argument that reached the masses. The ripple effects of her work transcended the social pillar into the political pillar as the abolitionist movement rallied around Stowe's novel to urge political action against allowing future slave states to join the Union.¹⁴⁹ I offer more evidence on this point in the examination of the political pillar in the following chapter.

Other writers would follow Stowe's example of using mass-produced literature to promote their messages. Frederick Douglass and David Walker are also examples of how industrialization gave a powerful voice to those who were traditionally powerless.¹⁵⁰ They

¹⁴⁶ Mary B. Chesnut, *Mary Chesnut's Civil War*, ed. Vann Woodward (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1981), 381.

¹⁴⁷ McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom*, 73.

¹⁴⁸ Goodwin, *Team of Rivals*, 161.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 163.

¹⁵⁰ Wilmerding, *Compass and Clock*, 100-102. This point can undoubtedly be shown in many examples of Frederick Douglass' speeches on slavery. One example in particular that drives home the point that Douglass had indeed become powerful in the modern environment is a lectures he gave at New York's Cooper Institute on February 13, 1862 and February 7, 1863 as captured by the *New York Times*. There he lectured on topics ranging from the setbacks experienced in the early stages of the war to the significance of the Emancipation Proclamation. Douglass' lectures reflect his importance during such a troubling time in the nation's history

too leveraged traditional notions of emotion and religion to present modern ideas. Their two works, *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass* and *David Walker's Appeal* respectively, expanded upon Stowe's work by providing accounts from black slaves.¹⁵¹ Together, they were equally powerful because they were appeals directly from the black population.

Douglass skillfully portrayed his personal experience with slavery by writing an autobiography. He humanized slaves by linking his story to traditional biblical and emotional themes. His work also added a moral dimension to the wage labor argument that enslaving a fellow man for economic advantage was morally wrong. One compelling excerpt was a detailed account of his mother sneaking out and walking twelve miles just to see him.¹⁵² He presented the heartbreak of being separated from his family; the fear of punishment if he was caught; and the determination to reunite despite the potential repercussions anchored his story in gripping reality. It left the reader, particularly those in industrial areas, to ponder who could reasonably endure such hardship solely for the purpose of making another person wealthy.

Another compelling illustration from his autobiography was the cruel whipping of his Aunt Hester. Douglass recalled that:

I have often been awakened at the dawn of day by the most heart-rendering shrieks of an own aunt of mine who he used to tie up to a joist, and whip upon her naked back till she was literally covered with blood. The louder she screamed the harder he whipped; and where the blood ran fastest, there he whipped longest.¹⁵³

The harrowing tale of his life helped to energize the nascent modernist movement and to transform wage labor from a purely social position into a moral one. The accounts of brutality and human suffering shocked the conscious of many in the industrialized region and became a formidable narrative to combat for those in the agricultural regions. Yet, for abolitionists like Douglass, modernity offered the powerful attraction of hope in the future

and that he was a voice many modernists listened to for approval and guidance. *The New York Times Complete Civil War*, ed. Holzer and Symonds, 137, 214.

¹⁵¹ Ann Fabian, *The Unvarnished Truth: Personal Narratives in Nineteenth Century America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 6.

¹⁵² Frederick Douglass, *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass: An American Slave Written by Himself* ed. F. Douglass and David W. Blight (Boston: Bedford Books, 1993), 40.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 42.

because it offered the prospect of freedom.¹⁵⁴ Hope for a nation free of slavery, where every person would be compensated for the value of his work, provided a moral narrative that modernists could rally behind.

Other writers, like David Walker, added a spiritual dimension to the modernist argument. Walker appealed to the moral core of religion to condemn the oppression of slavery and those who supported it. He laid out a moral and religious argument that explained why Blacks should be free, and why slavery was a corrupt and evil institution.¹⁵⁵ In *David Walker's Appeal*, he stated:

America is more our country, than it is the whites—we have enriched it with our blood and tears. The greatest riches in all America have arisen from our blood and tears—and they will drive us from our property and homes, which we have earned with our blood? They must look sharp or this very thing will bring swift destruction upon them.¹⁵⁶

Walker reflected the abolitionist sentiment, which was ultimately grafted onto the larger modernist argument. He and figures like John Brown and Nat Turner came to represent a more militant arm of the anti-slavery movement, which galvanized the North and caused great consternation within slaveholding states.¹⁵⁷ Those active in the early stages of the anti-slavery movement insisted that slavery was morally wrong, irrespective of the wage labor argument.¹⁵⁸ Not surprisingly, the anti-slavery movement sparked a series of uprisings against slavery in the years leading up to the war.¹⁵⁹ The critical point here is that David Walker, an African American, was able to use the printing press to amplify his message in a way that would never have been possible without industrial modernization. His anti-slavery position was ultimately embraced by modernists in the years leading up to the war.

The fame that Stowe, Douglass, and Walker attained illustrates how modernization provided opportunities for non-traditional actors to influence the social environment. It is

¹⁵⁴ Goodwin, *Team of Rivals*, 331.

¹⁵⁵ David Walker, *David Walker's Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World*, ed. Peter P. Hinks (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2000), 39.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 67.

¹⁵⁷ Potter, *The Impending Crisis*, 39; and Louis Menand, *The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America* (New York: Farrar, Staus and Giroux, 2001), 29.

¹⁵⁸ Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 40-41.

¹⁵⁹ *The New York Times Complete Civil War*, ed. Holzer and Symonds 31.

also evidence of how influential mass-produced literature had become in America.¹⁶⁰ These figures are examples of how the printing press projected local stories and literature onto the national consciousness.¹⁶¹ It is important to note here that the instruments of industrialization in and of themselves did not advance causes. Instead, it was the application of the modern ideology combined with technological advancements that advanced modernity in America. As industrialists used new platforms and media to spread their messages across the country it unified modernists and traditionalists alike. Each side read and listened to those stories and drew opposite conclusions. The critical factor here is that industrialization was a central reason for why the northern population grew ashamed of slavery and the southern population grew emboldened enough to entrench it. We turn now to another influential product of industrialization—railroads.

The Railroad

While the railroad does not fit neatly into the flow of the argument, this product of industrialization had as transformational an impact on the American social landscape as any other industrial invention.¹⁶² With a similar effect as the rise in literacy rates literacy rates, railroads physically networked the country.¹⁶³ This increased interconnectedness fostered a new depth of social and economic interaction. Railroads vastly improved mobility with speed and efficiency.¹⁶⁴ Technology, ideas, and goods began to flow from industrial areas to rural areas at an unprecedented pace.¹⁶⁵ The newfound interaction created unique issues and challenges in the South and in the West as they struggled to digest the speed with which transformation was occurring.

The cowboys of the West are one example of where the degree of change brought on by the railroad can be seen in. Cowboys were cattle herders for large ranches whose owners generally lived in the East.¹⁶⁶ They were accustomed the freedom of the open

¹⁶⁰ McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom*, 73.

¹⁶¹ Fabian, *The Unvarnished Truth*, 5.

¹⁶² Ian Bartky, *Selling the True Time: Nineteenth Century Time Keeping in America* (California: Stanford University Press, 2000), 19; and Marx, *The Machine in the Garden*, 194-195.

¹⁶³ McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom*, 11.

¹⁶⁴ Pursell, *The Machine in America*, 79.

¹⁶⁵ Wright, *Culture on the Moving Frontier*, 107.

¹⁶⁶ Freidland and Boden, *Nowhere*, 8.

range. The railroads changed the way they operated once owners could send representatives to meet with cowboys on short notice and inspect their work. They eventually became wage-laborers with fixed schedules, held accountable by cattle-barons many miles away.¹⁶⁷ This is one example of how railroads reached into the once faraway regions on the nation and brought modernization along with it. Nathaniel Hawthorne captured the agitation brought on by the far-reaching railways by illustrating how they destroyed the tranquil silence of agricultural nature:

It tells of human labor; but being so solitary now, it seems as if it were so on account of the sacredness of the Sabbath. Yet it is not; for we hear at a distance mowers whetting their scythes; but these sounds of labor, when at a proper remoteness, do but increase the quiet of one who lies at his ease, all in a mist of his own musings. There is the tinkling of a cowbell—a noise now peevishly discordant where it close at hand, but even musical now. But hark! *There is the whistle of the locomotive*,—the long shriek, heard above all other harshness; for the space of a mile cannot mollify it into harmony. It tells the story of busy men, citizens from the hot street, who have come to spend a day in a country village,—men of business,—in short, *of all unquietness; an no wonder that it gives such a startling scream, since it brings the noisy world into the midst of our slumberous peace.*¹⁶⁸

In this writing Hawthorne captures the essence of the conflict traditionalists felt towards the forceful advancement of new technologies. As the products of industrialization expanded further and further into long-held traditional spaces, it left many wondering whether any sacred traditional space could escape the noise of progress. Durkheim's assessment of modernization succinctly sums up America in the mid-1800s when he stated, "profound changes have been produced in the structure of our societies in a very short time; they have been freed from the segmental type of rapidity and in proportions such as have never before been seen in history...tradition has lost its sway."¹⁶⁹ The railroads not

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 8.

¹⁶⁸ Nathaniel Hawthorne, *The Works of Nathaniel Hawthorne: Nathaniel Hawthorne and His Wife* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company 1884), 502-503. For more on Hawthorne's satirical view on the faith in progress and the advent of machines see Nathaniel Hawthorne, *The Celestial Railroad and Other Stories* (New York: Signet Classic, 1963), 185-202.

¹⁶⁹ Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, 243 (emphasis added). Durkheim's assessment speaks directly to the comprehensive transformation that occurs following modernization. It is a rapid period of massive transition that affects all social, economic, and political levels of society, all at the same time. See Michie, *Reader's Guide to Social Sciences*, 1058.

only reached into traditional sanctuaries by compressing the concept of geographic space, it also had a shackling effect on time.

Industrial modernization dominated the concept of time and space with the advent of the railroad, which led to the standardization of time nationwide.¹⁷⁰ Even in rural areas, it became necessary to have a timepiece because the trains ran on a schedule. This new timetable was a stark contrast to when time was established by the position of the sun or the moon. With industrialization taming the concept of time and space the sense of the inevitability of modernity was setting in across the country. Even the most remote areas could not escape it. Although traditionalists generally rejected industrialization in instances where its effects proved to be highly disruptive, they openly accepted technological advancements when they could be molded into the image they desired.¹⁷¹

Agricultural traditionalists were willing to accept modern technology and concepts that made tasks within the traditional framework easier to accomplish.¹⁷² This was particularly the case in areas that helped them maximize their profits by cultivating the land and exporting goods.¹⁷³ To that point, many rural inhabitants had visions of industrializing the South within the already established agricultural framework.¹⁷⁴ One example was the rise of cotton factories in the South. As spinning mills became more efficient, owners employed more workers to fill them. Many of those workers were women and children.¹⁷⁵ Agricultural areas were comfortable incorporating aspects of modernity so long as they fit into the existing way of life. Conflict arose, however, when modernity refused to be restrained by the confines of tradition. As we will see later in the next section, rather than seeing technology used to perpetuate tradition, modernists seemingly would not be satisfied until the traditional slave-labor method was abolished altogether.

¹⁷⁰ Bartky, *Selling the True Time*, 28.

¹⁷¹ Seligan, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 67. This definition of traditionalism establishes that traditionalism rejects radical change, not all change.

¹⁷² Pursell, *The Machine in America*, 110-113.

¹⁷³ Wilmerding, *Compass and Clock*, 89; and Dupree, *Science in the Federal Government*, 111. Here Dupree illustrates the exploration of chemical soil analysis for agriculture prior to the Civil War. See also Pursell, *The Machine in America*, 172-175. Here Pursell describes the use of technology to cultivate soil.

¹⁷⁴ Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich Publishers, 1991), 180.

¹⁷⁵ Horsman, *The New Republic*, 103.

The railroad is yet another example of the revolutionary impact industrialization had on America in the early to mid-1800s. In a larger context, industrialization disrupted not only those who embraced it, but also those who resisted it. Touching almost every aspect of the social pillar, the use of rail foreshadowed the impact it would later have on the war.¹⁷⁶ In the early stages those who embraced the ideology of modernization used the technological advances of industrialization to advance a new culture that beat back traditionalism. Traditionalists eventually regrouped and elevated the conflict from a social conflict to a political conflict. The road to sectionalism was being paved.

Social Fracture

The fabric of America's social pillar was being torn apart by the friction between modernity and tradition in the mid-1800s. As modernity advanced within the social pillar, the rift between the industrial and agricultural sections became irreconcilable. Fearing a societal fracture, many turned to the supernatural for guidance. Religious revivals in the North and South attempted to pull people back to the commonalities they once shared, but nothing seemed to work.¹⁷⁷ The problem with the revivals was that the two sides had already become irrevocably separated. Attempts at unity were based on each side's view of what solidarity should be. The attempts were inherently polarizing, often devolving into sectional debates or ideological pep rallies.¹⁷⁸ Traditionalists and modernists had become divided over morality, spirituality, labor, and the very meaning of a meaningful life.¹⁷⁹ The core of traditionalism, thus the bedrock of the nation's stability, had been thoroughly destabilized. This was a much larger issue than an analysis of slavery or economics can adequately explain. As traditionalists tried to defend previously accepted norms, modernists in turn viewed them as antiquated and irrational.¹⁸⁰ Conversely, those in rural

¹⁷⁶ For an excellent description on the overall impact railroads had on America during the Civil War see John E. Clark, *Railroads in the Civil War: The Impact of Management on Victory and Defeat* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001).

¹⁷⁷ Walker, *David Walker's Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World*, xix.

¹⁷⁸ Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War*, 13.

¹⁷⁹ Burns, *Success in America*, 64.

¹⁸⁰ Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection: The Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life* (London: Penguin Books, 1968), 456.

areas viewed modernists as the godless and the coming of the end of mankind.¹⁸¹ The two sides alienated each other to the point that the chasm between them became irreconcilable.¹⁸²

With the two sides growing ever more socially polarized, the next coal on the fire would come in the form of economics. Although the economic impact of industrialization will be explored in detail in the next chapter, I mention it here briefly to book-end the social divisions that developed after industrialization and to set the stage for the even more visceral political confrontations that will follow. While everyday citizens struggled to cope with the social fallout from industrialization, politicians were simultaneously forced to grapple with emerging regional economic pressures.¹⁸³ The issue was so massive that by the 1840s economic sectionalism had eclipsed social issues as the primary threat to the nation's stability.¹⁸⁴ This struggle occurred because growing industrial sections required large investments. Those investments in-turn took sliced into subsidies that had long been earmarked for agricultural sections.¹⁸⁵ What little remained of social relationships between industrial and agricultural areas dissolved over the fight for economic resources.¹⁸⁶ To this point, many historians argue that economic pressure was the core cause of the American Civil War.¹⁸⁷ Yet, as we will see in the following chapter, economic issue was only one of many political factors that contributed to the war. Economic strains did, however, substantially contribute to the erosion of the social ties between traditionalists and modernists and led to a bitter political confrontation.

¹⁸¹ Thoreau, *Walden*, 799.

¹⁸² Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War*, 173-174.

¹⁸³ Wilmerding, *Compass and Clock*, 89; and Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 43-44.

¹⁸⁴ John Ashworth, "The Sectionalization of Politics," in *Companion to Nineteenth Century America*, ed. William L Barney, (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 33.

¹⁸⁵ McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom*, 14.

¹⁸⁶ Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 115.

¹⁸⁷ Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War*, 10.

Summary of the Social Pillar

America at the turn of the Nineteenth-Century was a cohesive social unit. Industrialization at that point had not yet exploded. By the 1820s, America's social cohesion begins to have a noticeable fray. There was an emerging culture and ideology that challenged previously accepted norms. Evidence of this emerging ideology manifested itself in changes in social structures and was widely expressed in the arts.

As the new culture matured it looked to reject and ultimately to replace the traditions that once unified the country. Traditionalists pushed back as the two sides sparred over which way of viewing and interacting with the world was most beneficial. The debate became utterly divisive when the concept of morality was injected, making the debate irreconcilable. Within that growing debate the issues of wage labor and slavery became rallying points. Each side took an opposing stance.

This chapter's view of the social events that took place in the beginning of the century from the perspective of industrialization begins to set the argument slavery and economics within the context of a larger narrative. By beginning with social events we can see that America was in a period of transformation before the conflicting viewpoints were elevated to the realm of politics. It also allows us to see that by the mid Nineteenth-Century that a singular concept like slavery and the economy cannot in and of themselves adequately explain the cause of the war. The examples used throughout this chapter are raised to show significance of industrialization and the social conflicts that followed separate and apart from the roles that slavery or economics played. From this perspective, slavery and economics become complementary explanations within the larger narrative of how the American Industrial Revolution explains what caused of the American Civil War. We now begin our review of the political pillar.

CHAPTER THREE

THE POLITICAL PILLAR

Political Cohesion

The period of cohesion spanned from the turn of the Nineteenth-Century to the end of the Andrew Jackson presidency in 1836. Although the previous chapter outlined the growing tensions in the social sector, it was a different story politically. Americans were relatively uninvolved politically in the early 1800s. This was due in large part to the fact that political parties did not exist at the turn of the century.¹⁸⁸ Because Americans felt they were experiencing a period of social solidarity at that time, they had little need for political representation and viewed politics with a degree of hostility and suspicion.¹⁸⁹ They did not see a need for them. They were also uneasy about the potential for political groups to create social divisions that swayed people away from long-held religious norms.¹⁹⁰ Economically, the preindustrial agrarian-based system was relatively uniform throughout the country, which further quelled the need for political advocacy in the priorities of resource distribution.¹⁹¹ This point would drastically change once the economic impact of industrialization took hold.¹⁹²

The nearly universal sentiment of the era was that political parties were nothing more than factions by another name. Factions were feared because they gave rise to demagogues, those outspoken public firebrands who had no vested interest in the whole beyond their own singular objectives.¹⁹³ On this point Foner misses the mark by

¹⁸⁸ Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 202-205. While Tocqueville's assertion that political parties were nonexistent in America was correct, his proposition that America had only pitiful trifles conjured up by those seeking power was overly dismissive and his projection that there were no real issues that could split the Union was flatly incorrect. Tocqueville's assertion is derived from a Eurocentric view that political parties could be "great" and that they subordinated the passions of the individual for the sake of the greater whole.

¹⁸⁹ Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs*, 51.

¹⁹⁰ Michael Holt *The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 31; and Noll, *The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind*, 71-72.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁹² Noll, *The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind*, 76.

¹⁹³ Jon Meacham, *American Lion: Andrew Jackson in the White House* (New York: Random House, 2008), 133 (quoting Edward Livingston's 1830 speech to Congress warning of the dangers of political party factions, "[the demagogue] creates imaginary and magnifies real causes of complaint; arrogates to himself every virtue-denies every merit to his opponents; secretly entertains the worse designs... mounts the pulpit, and, in the

characterizing politics of the era as merely a form of mass entertainment.¹⁹⁴ To many of the era the rise of political parties was an ominous sign that the Union was in danger of falling apart.¹⁹⁵ Although this viewpoint would later prove to have some merit, the general perception of political parties changed following the election of President Andrew Jackson.

Governing Philosophies

In order to better understand the political parties that emerged as a result of the Jackson presidency, let us first briefly review the two political philosophies of governance that preceded them. Amongst the governing elite, the politics were contentious from the moment the colonies banded together to repel the British. There were two opposing sides: one side was represented by Hamiltonian Federalists and the other by Jeffersonian Republicans. Federalists believed the power of industrialization would enable them to create government institutions that promoted stability, unity, and, when required, change.¹⁹⁶ In contrast, Republicans believed less in the value of government institutions and more in the power of ordinary people to create solutions to their problems.¹⁹⁷ They believed the individual states, and by extension the people, would create institutions as they were required.

Federalists and Republicans were not political parties, but rather governing philosophies.¹⁹⁸ The distinction drawn here is that the governing philosophies, unlike the political parties that followed, were not intimately connected to the masses. Another distinguishing characteristic is that when conflict arose between the two governing philosophies, the result was generally compromise. Amicable conflict resolution was virtually nonexistent for the political parties that emerged later in the century. As we will

name of God of mercy and peace, preaches discord and vengeance, invokes the worse scourges of Heaven, war, pestilence, and famine, as preferable alternatives to party defeat; blind vindictive cruel, remorseless, unprincipled, and last frantic, it communicates its madness to friends as well as foes; respects nothing; fears nothing.”

¹⁹⁴ Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 7.

¹⁹⁵ Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs*, 52-53.

¹⁹⁶ Nisbet, *History of the Idea of Progress*, 300-301. Nisbet not only speaks to the “near-religious” faith in progress industrialization spurred, but also speaks to the Federalist ideology of government through planning, regulating, and directing the lives of the people; Marx, *The Machine in the Garden*, 164-169; and; Foner, *The Fiery Trial*, 39.

¹⁹⁷ Meacham, *American Lion*, 48.

¹⁹⁸ Horsman, *The New Republic*, 24-34.

explore in greater detail later in this chapter, the political parties actually worked to undue the compromises put together early in the century. Such actions only inflamed the already headed division between modernist and traditionalists.

Those who observe Nineteenth-Century politics in America often fail to grasp the relationship between industrialization and the then existing political realities. Tocqueville for example, pitied the state of American politics because he could not comprehend why the “minor” parties had divided the people over “questions of very little moment.”¹⁹⁹ He failed to comprehend that parties were formed as a reaction to the consequences of industrialization. This distinction is a major one because Tocqueville was not alone in this point of view. The political scientist Louis Hartz concluded that the Whig political party failed for two reasons. The first reason, he states, was because it had no aristocracy to fight. The second reason, he concludes, is that it erroneously characterized Democrats in the foil of a European enemy that did not exist in America.²⁰⁰ We will discuss in the destruction of the Whig Party in greater detail later and expose the error Hartz’s assessment. As will be shown, his error is the fact that his assessment stems from a top-down view of the political situation that fails to take into account the grass-roots socio-economic conflicts that industrialization created in the mid Nineteenth-Century. Both Tocqueville and Hartz’s view of the American political landscape allows them to be overly critical because their observations fail to include one of the most significant events in American history— industrialization.²⁰¹

In addition to the governing philosophies, there were two additional issues that shaped the political landscape in the early Nineteenth-Century. The first, and most pronounced, issue was slavery. Slavery was the great unanswered question that had been brewing since the inception of the nation. It loomed large over the American political landscape. The second issue, which I will discuss alongside the establishment of the first political parties, was economics. In the last chapter we looked at the social implications of

¹⁹⁹ Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 204-205; and Howe, *Political Culture of the American Whigs*, 11-12. Howe points to progressive and consensus historians’ view of the Whig Party as nothing more than a group of unprincipled opportunists at best.

²⁰⁰ Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America*, 96-101.

²⁰¹ Perhaps Tocqueville said it best when he declared, “[T]he fact of the Union being composed of different confederate communities is sufficient to baffle all the inferences which might be drawn from analogous circumstances. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 469.

slavery and industrialization, let us now briefly review the political implications of slavery. Once established, we will see that industrialization's impact on slavery as a political issue was different than its effect on slavery as a social issue. As a social issue, slavery became an issue of morality and justice; as a political issue, it became about maintaining a balance of power and ensuring regional economic stability.²⁰²

Slavery as a Political Problem

Slavery had been an unresolved and potentially explosive question since the earliest talks to establish the nation. Strong voices existed on both sides. This split is reflected in the tortured language found in the U.S. Constitution that both validated the institution of slavery and limited the scope of its application.²⁰³ This compromise underscores the strong feelings Americans had about slavery's place in America's future. The issue of a state's right to self-governance lay at the core of the debate. The proponents of slavery questioned by what authority one sovereign state could impose a duty onto another sovereign state.²⁰⁴ Today, this argument may seem anachronistic, but within the context of the early 1800s, each colony viewed its relationship to the Union as one sovereign to another.

²⁰² Davis, *The Lost Cause*, 180-84; and Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 465-466.

²⁰³ U.S. Constitution. art. V, sec. 1-9 (stating "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution. . . shall be valid to all intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures. . . Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses of the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate." By referencing article one, which deals with the migration or importation of slaves and article four, which deals with census, representation, and taxes, the framers sought to ensure the 3/5 compromise and the institution of slavery remained untouched until the year 1808. U.S. Const. art I sect. 1, 4. The 3/5 compromise states that representation in the Congress is based upon population size. Each state's number of representatives was determined by adding the number of free and bounded persons for a term of years to 3/5 of all slaves. U.S. Constitution. art. I, sect. 2, cl.3. The net effect of this somewhat cryptic language was two-fold: First, slavery was secure in America until at least 1808 because no amendments could be made to eradicate it or amend the number of votes held by Southern states. Secondly, Southern states got an artificial inflation to their representation in the Congress, as exemplified by Virginia (representatives) in comparison to New York (six representatives).

²⁰⁴ This question was pondered by many observers during the period as illustrated by Tocqueville when he stated, "The Union was formed by the voluntary agreement of the States; and in uniting together, they have not forfeited their nationality, nor have they been reduced to the condition of one and the same people. . . [By] enforcing the obedience of the others. . . the government would then be exerting a force not derived from itself, but from a principle contrary to its nature." This would in essence become the argument Southerners used to justify grounds for seceding from the Union after the presidential election of 1861. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 450-451.

Slavery was a hot-button issue that permeated the question of western expansion.²⁰⁵ Sometimes it was on the forefront and sometimes it was in the background—but it was always there. Leading up to the Missouri Compromise of 1820, slave-holding states and free-states were at an impasse. In an attempt to deal with the question of slavery in the western territories, the compromise bifurcated the Union by prohibiting slavery north of the 36° 30' longitudinal line of the Louisiana Purchase.²⁰⁶ The Missouri Compromise would become a significant political factor in the lead up to the Civil War. As we will see, the pressures arising from industrialization would eventually undo the compromise and expose the heated passions it attempted to quell. We now that we have briefly unpacked slavery, the economy, and the first governing philosophies, we now transition to how industrialization impacted the creation of America's first political parties.

Andrew Jackson and the Democratic Party

Jackson was the first peoples' president.²⁰⁷ During the 1828 presidential election between Jackson and incumbent John Quincy Adams, an unprecedented 1,143,450 votes were cast.²⁰⁸ Jackson ran on a platform of traditionalism. He promised of returning America to the agrarian values and virtues of the last century and returning government power to the hands of the governed.²⁰⁹ Symbolic of his battle to turn back the clock, Jackson reinforced his position with an ominous warning:

My experience in public concerns and the observation of a life somewhat advanced confirm the opinions long since imbibed by me, that the destruction of our state governments or the annihilation of their control over local concerns of the people would lead directly to revolution and anarchy, and finally to despotism and military domination.²¹⁰

²⁰⁵ Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 28.

²⁰⁶ Bernard Schwartz, *A History of the Supreme Court* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 106.

²⁰⁷ Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States: 1492-Present* (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), 217.

²⁰⁸ Library of Congress. "Presidential Election of 1828: A Resource Guide, Accessed June 7, 2015

<http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/elections/election1828.html>; Library of Congress. "Presidential Election of 1824: A Resource Guide, Accessed June 7, 2015,

<http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/elections/election1824.html>. In comparing the two elections there is a nearly three-fold rise in voter participation. 352,780 votes were cast in 1824 where by John Quincy Adams was elected by the Senate. This is compared to 1,143,450 votes cast in 1828 for Jackson.

²⁰⁹ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 250.

²¹⁰ Meacham, *American Lion*, 248.

Jackson was not a traditional political elite. He made his way into politics by way of the law and the military. He became a renowned national figure after his leadership in America's lop-sided victory in the iconic Battle for New Orleans.²¹¹ From there he was catapulted into the politics of the ruling elites. His tough-nosed roots of common stock shaped the way he viewed his role as president.

While in office Jackson expanded the office of the presidency beyond anything seen before in American politics by political appointments and his use of the veto power. Prior to Jackson, the locus of power of the federal government lay in both houses of the Congress. It was in the houses of Congress that the ruling elites created policies and institutions that governed America. Jackson expanded the powers of the presidency and checked the Congress by leveraging his connection to the American people. He took his debates with the Congress to the people, and consequently his popularity soared. Through a string of bureaucratic maneuvers, he replaced cabinet members, made appointments, and used the veto power to check the Congress. Although his actions were unprecedented, his popularity made it difficult for his political opponents to oppose his maneuvers. Jackson's style of politics gained him much recognition as a fighter for the people.

Social groups began to band together, forming a political organization in the mold of Jackson's politics. The new political energy generated by Jackson further fueled his popularity. In-turn Jackson encouraged frequent public participation in the political process in order to sustain his political reforms.²¹² Jackson disagreed with the notion that political parties were merely a device for demagogues. To him, parties were a necessary tool of the people to check the powers of the governing elites. Out of those sentiments came the Democratic Party. Although Democrats were mainly in the South, they represented a broad cross section of the entire country. Jacksonian Democrats became the political representation of traditionalism. Staunch critics of social and economic modernization, they emphasized empowering the people, rather than institutions.²¹³ The one institution

²¹¹ Ibid.,136.

²¹² Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 280-81 (citing Voter participation figures given at www.multied.com/elections /1828.html) (viewed March 2015). Voting participation nearly tripled during that period; Meacham, *American Lion*, 188.

²¹³ Holt, *The Rise of the American Whig Party*, 20.

Jacksonian Democrats thought represented the evils of modernization most was the banking sector.

The Democrats opposition to the Federal Bank of the United States was fierce during Jackson's presidency.²¹⁴ At the national level, Democrats believed that American banks represented a form of unelected government prone to manipulation by political elites.²¹⁵ They opposed the Federal Bank because its functions could not be checked by government control or oversight.²¹⁶ Democrats feared that bankers would cut deals with politicians in industrializing areas that would unfairly influence economic policies.²¹⁷ At the core of their concerns was the perceived imbalance of opportunities afforded to the rich over the middle-class.²¹⁸

There was some cause for their concern. From the national perspective, there was a sense that large private corporations in industrial areas were getting unfairly securing subsidies at the expense of agricultural areas.²¹⁹ Locally, there was a growing concern about predatory lending practices. Many rural Americans were purchasing homes and land with high interest rate loans from banks. Upon default, some were losing their homes and land. Yet ultimately the scuffle was over traditionalists losing ground to industrialists in the banking sector that elevated the importance of the Democratic Party in America.²²⁰ As the Democrats moved to create political reforms that in their estimation leveled the playing field, their moves were being mutually supported by reforms adopted by the Supreme Court.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 77.

²¹⁵ Meacham, *American Lion*, 75.

²¹⁶ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. *The Age of Jackson* (New York: Konecky and Konecky Press, 1971), 74; and Meacham, *American Lion*, 212.

²¹⁷ Paludan, *The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln*, 6; and Meacham, *American Lion*, 127.

²¹⁸ Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 18-19.

²¹⁹ Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs*, 120-21.

²²⁰ Wish, *Society and Thought in Early America*, 508.

The U.S. Supreme Court and the Democratic Party Agenda

Jackson's appointments to the Supreme Court were a significant factor in Democrats' ability to push their agenda. In 1836, Jackson appointed Roger Brooke Taney as chief justice to replace the venerable Chief Justice John Marshall.²²¹ Taney was a close friend and advocate for Jackson, serving as his attorney general and secretary of the treasury. Chief Justice Taney leveraged the Democrats' majority in the court to provide a constitutional framework for Democrat policies. One of the most effective constitutional interpretations Taney established was the codification of the state police power.²²² By coupling the states rights' to the Tenth Amendment, Democrats had constitutional backing that the states were sovereign powers in all areas not expressly enumerated under the constitution. By codifying the state police power within the Constitution, Taney added constitutional force to the sovereignty of states' rights argument. This essentially entrenched the institution of slavery further, and to some perhaps opened the door for the expansion of slavery into the newly acquired Western Territories.

The court's rulings also helped pave the way for western expansion. By easing restrictions on corporations and viewing them more like people than businesses, states were limited in restrictions they could place on them.²²³ This in turn allowed investors to pool monies with confidence and invest in western expansion while significantly reducing

²²¹ Schwartz, *A History of the Supreme Court*, 70.

²²² License Cases, 46 U.S. 504, 583 (1847). During these cases Chief Justice Taney stated, "But what are the police powers of a State? They are nothing more or less than the powers of government *inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions*. And whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish offences, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same powers; that is to say, the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its dominion. It is by virtue of this power that it legislates; and its authority to make regulations of commerce is as absolute as its power to pass health laws, except in so far as it has been restricted by the constitution of the United States." This series of cases contemplates the power of the state. Chief Justice Taney relies on *Gibbons v. Ogden*, 22 U.S. 1, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824) to codify the converse of congressional preemption of the states for regulating commerce. Where the state is not preempted by either the Constitution or the US Congress it may regulate commerce within its borders.

²²³ *Bank of Augusta v. Earle* 38 U.S. 519, 584-591 (1839) (holding that where a valid corporation is established in one state, it may transact according to the precedence of comity and laws of contracts unless expressly prohibited by law). In this case the state of Alabama was attempting to unilaterally void a contract with a Georgia corporation because it was not incorporated within Alabama. One can imagine the impact this decision would have had on western expansion if the case was decided differently. Very few would have the confidence to invest in a corporation transacting business in another state that is not allowed to defend itself in the foreign state's court system.

their risk of loss. Although the Taney court provided constitutional top cover for states' rights and western expansion, it is perhaps best known for its 1857 decision on slavery.

The case *Scott v. Sandford*, commonly referred to as *Dred Scott*, had a profound social and political impact. Scott was a slave owned by Army surgeon Dr. Emerson. Emerson took Scott from Missouri to a place in the northern portion of the Louisiana Purchase above parallel 36° 30' north. According to the Missouri Compromise, Scott was in a free portion of the Union. Four years later, Scott was brought back to Missouri and sold to John Sandford. Scott sued for his freedom as a citizen based on the fact that he spent four years in a free state.²²⁴ When the case came before the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Taney's response was as devastating to those in the North as it was encouraging to those in the South. He decreed that not only was Scott not a citizen, but that he never could be one because blacks were actually property and "doomed" to slavery.²²⁵

Citing the Fifth and Tenth Amendments, Taney concluded that Sandford could not be deprived of his property without due process of law and that another state could not infringe upon his property rights unless expressly allowed under the Constitution or legislated by the Congress.²²⁶ His interpretation of the Constitution was critical because it rendered the Missouri Compromise of 1820 unconstitutional.²²⁷ According to Taney's ruling, all blacks were property and could be enslaved in every state in the Union.²²⁸ Seeing themselves in a winner take all form of high stakes politics, Federalists decided to arm themselves with a political party of their own.

The formidable opposition Democrats mounted against the banking sector, coupled with the advances they made in the Supreme Court, sent a shockwave to the other political actors. The Federalists came to the realization that by popularizing politics, Jackson had

²²⁴ *Scott v. Sandford* 60 U.S. 393,398 (1856).

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 403-405, 410. Chief Justice Taney compared slaves to Native Americans when he rhetorically asked the question, "can a negro whose ancestors were imported into this country and sold as slaves become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen?" To which he answered, "We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States."

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 450, 511.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 528-29.

²²⁸ Zinn, *A People's History of the United States*, 187; and Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*,292; and Menand, *The Metaphysical Club*, 28.

gained a significant upper hand. Perhaps once taken for granted, Federalists came to understand that they needed a way to generate popular support in order to win elections and maintain influence in the Congress. Out of that backdrop America's second major political party came into being.

The Whig Party

It took time for the Whig Party to coalesce because it lacked a popular strong man like Jackson to rally behind. Many Hamiltonian Federalists still believed political parties were bad and would lead to the destruction of the Union. Yet after suffering bitter setbacks to the banking system and in the courts, Henry Clay created the Whig Party.²²⁹ Whigs came to represent industrial modernization as presented and defined earlier in this work.²³⁰ Although located mostly in the Northeast, Whigs were more than a regional party. They represented a broad cross section of the industrializing population as they took root all across the country.²³¹ With the fledgling Whig Party now taking shape, the members set out to push their agenda.

Whigs embodied the hallmarks of modernization. They relished the idea of change and transformation. They focused on the possibilities of future rather than the practices of the past. Its members were fairly well versed in the concepts of specialization, market production, and individualization.²³² This common ground allowed Whigs to embrace industrialization and to internalize the modern ideology of progress.²³³ The Whigs the spread of technological innovations, like the railroad, the telegraph, and industrial machines were examples of the mind triumphing over the supernatural. Only effort, focus, and concentration stood in the way of self-improvement and creating a better world. Yet Whigs were different from Democrats, they did not have a common core to rally to. Even though they had a shared outlook on what government should be in the abstract, they

²²⁹ Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs*, 88.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 30, 153. Howe describes the Whigs as seeing themselves as the party of reason and order. They viewed the Democrats as beastly animals provoked by the whims of passion. His summations of the two parties' ideological viewpoints are succinct and appropriate; Democrats were premillennial and Whigs were postmillennial.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 13.

²³² Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War*, 125.

²³³ Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs*, 99-102.

lacked a central issue that they all opposed. As a result, the first touchstone for the Whig party was opposing Andrew Jackson and the Democrat Party in general.

The Whig Party did not languish for long. They quickly found common ground in supporting a new open banking system.²³⁴ Whigs were proponents of a strong federal banking system because it provided economic stability and predictability for industry investors in a rapidly-changing economy. As the industrial economy developed, Whigs became the party that opposed free-trade and championed of economic protectionism.²³⁵ They sought to promote governmental intervention to protect growing domestic industries and blunt cheap foreign competition that made it difficult for them to sell their goods domestically.²³⁶ This stance was instantly polarizing. It deeply angered those who worked in agriculture, particularly southern Democrats who relied on free trade to sell their goods and subsidize their needs.²³⁷ The rise of industrialization added a political rift that further deepened the split between traditionalists and industrial modernists. The rift would continue to grow deeper as industrial population growth exploded, giving them more political power in the Congress.

A rising industrial population in the North gave Whigs more representation in Congress. The aim of Whigs was to diversify the nation's economy by building up its industrial capacity. Yet as cotton emerged as the dominant economic product of the South, it became harder for southern Whigs to promote economic diversity.²³⁸ This new economic friction came to represent a force that could unravel the ideological binding that held the parties together.²³⁹ With their newfound representative powers in congress, the Whig Party looked to reallocate the nation's economic resources to manufacturing centers.²⁴⁰ By reallocating financial resources, the Whigs cut into financial support previously earmarked

²³⁴ Holt, *The Rise of the American Whig Party*, 79.

²³⁵ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 272.

²³⁶ Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 20-21.

²³⁷ Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 204.

²³⁸ Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs*, 238.

²³⁹ Paludan, *The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln*, 11.

²⁴⁰ Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 464.

for agricultural areas.²⁴¹ In response, Democrats redoubled their efforts to appeal to the American people to save their way of life.

The economic impact of industrialization ushered in a period of transition and immense change, which is reflected in the political parties.²⁴² Control of the political narrative became critical. Both Whigs and Democrats similarly harkened to the past in a bid to establish their own legitimacy as America's true party. Although they both claimed a similar past, they promoted very different futures. Jacksonian Democrats largely wanted to turn back the clock. They wanted to return America to how it was, allowing for modest improvements only when states deemed them necessary. For Whigs, however, America's best days lie ahead. They viewed America as destined for perpetual improvement that could be implemented by government institutions, like schools.²⁴³ As the debate grew, so did the influence and power of the parties. The parties grew to envelop the remaining independents in an effort to sway more constituents to join their cause.²⁴⁴

At this point we are able to see the distinction between the governing philosophies of the late eighteenth century and the political parties of the early Nineteenth-Century. The key distinction is that governing philosophies were carried out by political elites, where political parties depended heavily on the involvement of the people. Industrialization was a significant catalyst for the change in political approaches. Traditionalists were the first to create a political party, the Democratic Party, as a means of competing with the gains made by industrial regions. The Democrats swung the pendulum back in their favor so effectively that industrialists created a party to compete—the Whig Party. Whigs built momentum in congress by harnessing the power of representative government following the explosion in population growth. With the two parties formed, one representing traditional agriculturalist and the other representing industrial modernists²⁴⁵, we now move on to see how industrialization would further split the country into sections of North and South.

²⁴¹ Schlesinger, *The Age of Jackson*, 132.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 243.

²⁴³ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 582-83; and Taylor, *Modernities*, 16.

²⁴⁴ Wish, *Society and Thought in Early America*, 508.

²⁴⁵ Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 69-70. Foner refers to this split as the beginning of what historians often refer to as the "Irrepressible conflict."

John C. Calhoun: The Beginning of Sectional Realignment

During this period of transition, the growth of the two parties was swift, but not uniform. To highlight this point, let me briefly introduce the political actor John C. Calhoun. Calhoun's reactions to the pressures caused by industrial modernization give insight into how tumultuous the American political landscape had become. It also shows how significantly industrialization contributed to the coming Civil War. During the rise and reshaping of the Democratic Party, John C. Calhoun was a significant player. A prominent South Carolina Congressman and one of the most powerful Democrats, Calhoun served as Jackson's vice president before resigning the position in 1832.²⁴⁶

Calhoun's resignation came after a falling out between him and the president following the Tariff of 1824. Jackson supported the tariff and Calhoun vehemently opposed it. Calhoun resigned because he thought the tariff disproportionately hurt the southern economy. The tariff raised prices on imported goods, which benefited industrializing areas in the North by making competitor goods more expensive, but hurt agricultural areas in the South.²⁴⁷ When Jackson, a southerner, sided with industrialists in the North over agriculturalists in the South, Calhoun lost faith in the Democratic Party. Unable to join with Whigs, Calhoun assessed that neither party was able to represent his state's primary concern—maintaining political balance between slave-holding and free-states.²⁴⁸ He then decided to advocate for South Carolina's position above all else, even if it came at the expense of his own party.²⁴⁹

The 1824 tariff alarmed Calhoun for several reasons. The first reason was that southern states fought against the tariff and failed to block its passage. Secondly, and most important to the South, was that the tariff was drafted and imposed by industrialists without traditional agricultural support. If agriculturalists, particularly in the South, could not win the battle against this tariff, it would almost certainly lose the war to maintain slavery. Sensing the passage of tariff as a sign of things to come, Calhoun drafted a

²⁴⁶ Meacham, *American Lion*, 232.

²⁴⁷ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 250.

²⁴⁸ Schlesinger, *The Age of Jackson*, 95.

²⁴⁹ Carl Sandburg, *Lincoln: The Prairie Years and the War Years* (New York: The Reader's Digest Association, 1970), 93.

document called the *South Carolina Exposition and Protest*.²⁵⁰ It laid out an argument that would allow states to nullify Congressional actions not expressly enumerated under the Constitution if they harmed the state. He contended that if a state could not nullify an unconstitutional law, they may have valid grounds to secede.

A political crisis arose when South Carolina voted to nullify the 1824 tariff. The crisis culminated in President Jackson's preparation to take military action against South Carolina to enforce the tariff.²⁵¹ The Jackson administration was able to de-escalate the situation, however, in part by appealing directly to the other southern states and painting Calhoun as a political demagogue.²⁵² Ultimately the Congress modified the tariffs under the leadership of John Quincy Adams. The modification both protected industry interests in the North and allowed for a less onerous duty on goods used primarily in the South.²⁵³ A point of consideration here is that the compromise was largely the work of Adams, a nonpartisan. This instance underscores both the degree of political turmoil American's experienced at that time due to the economic consequences of industrialization and that political parties were rapidly approaching a point where they were unable to find grounds for compromise.

Following the nullification crisis, Calhoun looked for ways to build a new coalition that would promote the economic interests of slave-holding states. He used his stature in the Congress to exploit the newly-emerging political landscape.²⁵⁴ Recognizing that Southern states would never match Northern population growth, he planned to counter industrial representation by adding to the number of slave-holding states through western expansion.²⁵⁵ In order to succeed he would need to unify the existing slave-holding states on this common agenda. Seeing that the new political parties were out of step with existing socio-economic realities, he pushed for a sectional realignment.

At the time of Calhoun's plan, Democrats were still ideologically connected to notions of Jeffersonian Republicanism. Conversely, Whigs were ideologically connected to Hamiltonian Federalism. Although opposed to each other, neither was willing at that point

²⁵⁰ Meacham, *American Lion*, 58.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 225.

²⁵² Meacham, *American Lion*, 170.

²⁵³ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 401-06.

²⁵⁴ Holt, *The Rise of the American Whig Party*, 170.

²⁵⁵ McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom*, 42; and *supra* note 151.

to entertain Calhoun's proposition of sectionalism.²⁵⁶ Yet with each passing day, it became clearer that cotton was the economic engine of the South, whose dependence on slave labor grew as the southern economy grew. Calhoun reasoned that party affiliation would eventually give way to geographic economic interests. By this logic, he was able to compel Southern Congressmen to break from the Whigs and Democrats to sharpen their focus on slave expansion.²⁵⁷ His political calculations further divided politicians in the North and in the South, signaling the beginning of a new political era and foreshadowing the end of the Democratic and Whig parties as they were originally constituted.

In summary, this section is a bridge between the point at which the political parties are established in the late 1830s and the period of disruption that begins in the mid-1840s. The political actor John C. Calhoun was introduced to provide a background for one of the main political figures that will be featured in the next section. It was also to illustrate traditionalists' attempts to maintain a balance of power against the rapidly growing influence of industrialists in the congress. Through Calhoun's background we can see that his actions were heavily influenced by the economic consequences of industrialization. In the following section we will see how politicians like Calhoun helped couple slavery to the economic debate through the ideas of states' rights and western expansion. The consequences of this calculation would be catastrophic for the Union.

Political Disruption

The period of political disruption spans from the early 1830s to the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854. It is characterized by extreme volatility and political brinkmanship that destroyed both parties and ushered in new ones that rigidly tracked socioeconomic sectional lines. Following the presidency of Martin Van Buren (1833–1837), the country was politically splintered and in an economic down turn. The popular historian Jon Meacham characterized America's economic situation under Van Buren as a "debacle."²⁵⁸ Meacham places much of the responsibility of the slump to Jackson's policies against the banking system, of which Van Buren was a chief architect. The parties jostled to find

²⁵⁶ Steven E. Woodworth, *Manifest Destinies: America's Westward Expansion and the Road to the Civil War* (New York: Vintage, 2011), 300.

²⁵⁷ Sandburg, *Lincoln*, 93.

²⁵⁸ Meacham, *American Lion*, 342.

candidates who could both unify country and promote an economic plan that the other side could accept. Congress had become so toxic that gag orders were instituted to prevent congressmen from bringing motions on slavery or expansionism to the floor for a vote.²⁵⁹

The gag orders were nonetheless a case of too little too late, as the economic consequences of modernization had all but irrevocably divided the country between the sectional lines of North and South. Calhoun, however, continued to push his slavery agenda. He found that one of the most effective methods to advance his agenda was to couple slavery, states' rights and western expansion. He threw his political weight behind pro-expansionist candidate James K. Polk during the 1844 campaign.²⁶⁰ He chose the relatively unknown Polk over party favorite Martin Van Buren because Van Buren had begun to express anti-slavery expansion sentiments. Sensing a political opportunity, Calhoun sided with the expansionist candidate riding atop the popular wave of manifest destiny.²⁶¹ He figured that once the territories were a part of the Union, he would present his states' rights argument to allow them to elect to be slave-holding states.

Calhoun's actions during the election challenged members' allegiance to the Democratic Party. Polk campaigned on a relatively straight-forward platform of western expansion and annexation. With the support of Calhoun, Polk survived the Democrats' splintered candidate pool and became the nominee largely by being a relative unknown.²⁶² By opposing party stalwart Martin van Buren on socio-economic grounds, Calhoun forced party members to choose between party and sectional economic interests. Southerners were ultimately swayed by the prospect of slavery expansion giving Polk the victory.²⁶³

²⁵⁹ Paludan, *The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln*, 4; and Menand, *The Metaphysical Club*, 13.

²⁶⁰ Holt, *The Rise of the American Whig Party*, 164.

²⁶¹ Zinn, *A People's History of the United States*, 152-152; and Woodworth, *Manifest Destinies*, 122.

²⁶² Woodworth, *Manifest Destinies*, 132.

²⁶³ Library of Congress. "Presidential Election of 1844: A Resource Guide, Accessed November 1, 2014, <http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/elections/election1844.html>.

Manifest Destiny and States' Rights

The impact of Polk's nomination immediately fractured the Democratic Party.²⁶⁴ Infuriated by Calhoun's attempt to unite the South at the expense of the party, Van Buren and other prominent Democrats left the party to create one of their own.²⁶⁵ Polk went on to narrowly defeat the Whig nominee Henry Clay by just over 39,000 votes.²⁶⁶ Although a narrow victory, Polk's election had significant consequences as yet another irreconcilable wedge was driven between the two camps. Another line was drawn in the sand.

While the Democratic Party was fracturing, Texas had gained its independence from Mexico and had petitioned for statehood. Texas' petition, as well as the potential to annex the western territories, created a vigorous debate on slavery expansion. Ignoring the debate in Congress, Polk moved to annex Texas to prepare the way for its statehood, which subsequently led to a war with Mexico in 1846. After moving on Texas, Polk sought to complete his vision of manifest destiny by moving to acquire the Oregon Territories as well.²⁶⁷ Staunch opponents of slavery expansion did all they could to prevent Polk from carrying out his plans, but they were blunted at every turn.²⁶⁸ Under the popularity of manifest destiny, Texas and the Oregon territories were brought into the Union.

Now that the Union had been expanded, Calhoun dug in his heels on his states' rights argument. He argued that the newly-acquired territories should have the right to join the Union as slave-holding states.²⁶⁹ By coupling states' rights to western expansion, southern Democrats had Whigs caught between a rock and a hard place.²⁷⁰ Although the conflict with Mexico was unpopular with the American public, Whigs certainly did not want to be colored as siding against manifest destiny or worse, siding with Mexico over Texas

²⁶⁴ McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom*, 42.

²⁶⁵ Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War*, 141; and Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 150-153. We see in Foner's account that some Northern Democrats would later join the Republican Party.

²⁶⁶ Library of Congress. "Presidential Election of 1844: A Resource Guide, Accessed November 1, 2014, <http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/elections/election1844.html>.

²⁶⁷ William E. Geinapp, *Abraham Lincoln and Civil War America: A Biography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 38.

²⁶⁸ Zinn, *A People's History of the United States*, 154.

²⁶⁹ Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War*, 232.

²⁷⁰ Woodworth, *Manifest Destinies*, 330.

during a time of war. Whigs were desperate to find a way to allow expansion, curtail slavery, and to end the conflict with Mexico.

The arguments of states' rights and western expansion ground the Congress to a halt. In an effort to compromise, Pennsylvania Congressman David Wilmot presented a provision in 1846. Congressman Wilmot slipped a proviso into a war appropriations bill that prohibited slavery expansion into any territories acquired from Mexico.²⁷¹ Whigs and Democrats were at a stalemate when Congressman Wilmot presented his plan.²⁷² Whigs argued that adding more states created unnecessary fiscal liabilities for the country.²⁷³ Democrats, particularly Calhoun, argued that adding slave-holding states would restore its political balance. The provision was an attempt to pacify sectional radicals on both sides of the issue.

The appropriations bill was eventually passed and Calhoun's states' rights momentum was momentarily stalled. It was a compromise, and neither party was satisfied with the results. The Wilmot Proviso left politicians in the North unsatisfied and those in the South even more agitated.²⁷⁴ Those in the North were unsatisfied because the country was expanding, while politicians in the South saw it as a backdoor attempt to curb the slavery-expansion argument.

Following the acquisition of the new territories, California applied for statehood, which yet again exacerbated the slavery question. Initially, Whigs had success opposing the acceptance of California into the Union. The California gold rush in 1850, however, quashed all opposition to its statehood.²⁷⁵ Senator Henry Clay attempted to tamp down the divisions in Congress with a new bill that proposed California be admitted to the Union under specific conditions. His plan was the Compromise of 1850. It provided that California would be admitted into the Union, but as a free state.²⁷⁶ Giving a concession to the states' rights argument, he added that the other recently-acquired western territories would have the

²⁷¹ Goodwin, *Team of Rivals*, 122-23.

²⁷² Holt, *The Rise of the American Whig Party*, 251.

²⁷³ Gienapp, *Abraham Lincoln and Civil War America*, 39.

²⁷⁴ McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom*, 46.

²⁷⁵ Sandburg, *Lincoln*, 109.

²⁷⁶ Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs*, 147.

choice to join the Union as either slave-holding or free.²⁷⁷ In an effort to entice southern Democrats to accept California as a free state, he also included a provision that strengthened fugitive slave laws.²⁷⁸

Clay's plan backfired. Rather than healing divisions, the proposal agitated the volatile atmosphere in the Congress to new heights. Both sides held to what they believed were legitimate arguments and resisted any hint of compromise. True to his Federalist foundation, Clay's proposal was conceptually similar to Adams' nullification compromise in 1833. But by 1850 the two political parties had become so polarized that they were well beyond the point of compromise.

Reflective of the time, the proposal passed with almost uniform support in the North and almost no support in the South. It also created new divisions between Whigs in the North and Whigs in the South.²⁷⁹ The contentious debate over slavery expansion frayed the party as Whigs in the South advocated for expansion while those in the North advocated against it.²⁸⁰ Yet despite the heat and friction, Calhoun continued to hammer away at the growing sectional divide between the parties.²⁸¹ His ability to couple western expansion to states' rights was effectively severing the ties that held the parties together.

Where the Whig Party was frayed by the political events of 1850, the Democratic Party collapsed altogether. In the build up to the presidential election of 1850 Democrats attempted to find a representative who could counteract the dissention within their ranks. They chose Zachary Taylor, a hero of the War of 1812. The party assumed that Old Rough and Ready's status as a war hero would unify the party, but his ownership of slaves became a divisive factor.²⁸² Taylor's nomination fractured what remained of the original Democrat party for good. The socioeconomic impact of industrialization was running its course. Democrats in the North could not bring themselves to support a slave-owner—even if he was a national hero. For the first time in the nation's history, there was a bright line of

²⁷⁷ Schlesinger, *The Age of Jackson*, 472.

²⁷⁸ Sandburg, *Lincoln*, 100.

²⁷⁹ Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs*, 206.

²⁸⁰ Abraham Lincoln, *Abraham Lincoln, Slavery, and the Civil War: Selected Writings and Speeches*, ed. Michael P. Johnson (New York: Bedford/St. Martins, 2001), 37.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 38; and Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War*, 232.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, 236.

separation between northern and southern Democrats.²⁸³ With that, the Jacksonian Democratic Party was no more. It would not become a formidable opposition party until after the conclusion of the war. It self-destructed while attempting to adapt to the new realities brought on by industrialization. The Whig Party would soon follow suit.

The Whigs held together until the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 tore the party apart.²⁸⁴ The act repealed the Missouri Compromise, allowing slavery to expand north of 36° 30'.²⁸⁵ Heavily opposed in the North but supported in the South, the measure passed with the support of Cotton Whigs.²⁸⁶ Following its passage, the Whig Party suffered the same fate as their Democratic Party rivals just a few years before. It too fractured along sectional lines. Both parties were destroyed by sectional issues spurred on by the economic consequences of industrial modernization. Foner refers to the drastic change in the political environment during that period as “a fundamental reorganization of the American political system.”²⁸⁷ The transformation was indeed fundamental, but the parties system did not remain broken for long. The fragmented parties coalesced along sectional lines that mirrored the social divisions outlined in the in this study—traditionalists on one side and modernists on the other. With new political battle lines drawn and reinforced by socioeconomic interests, the country inched towards the precipice of disunion.

Political Fracture

The period of political fracture spans from the Kansas-Nebraska Act to the southern states' secession from the Union. Unlike the Democrats, the shattered Whig Party reconstituted relatively quickly. Lincoln joined the newly formed Republican Party after the Kansas-Nebraska Act.²⁸⁸ He was outraged that southerners had managed to counter what he considered the base constitutional assumption that slavery was meant to die out.²⁸⁹ Lincoln understood that the complex political maneuvers of southern politicians could be countered only by a formidable opposition. He began by persuading disenfranchised Whigs

²⁸³ Holt, *The Rise of the American Whig Party*, 253.

²⁸⁴ McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom*, 109.

²⁸⁵ *An Act to Organize the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas*, 10 Stat. 277-290, 33 Cong. Ch. 59 (1854).

²⁸⁶ Sandburg, *Lincoln*, 110.

²⁸⁷ Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 149.

²⁸⁸ Goodwin, *Team of Rivals*, 183.

²⁸⁹ Howe, *The political Culture of the American Whigs*, 278; and Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 54.

to join the newly-formed Republican Party.²⁹⁰ He then moved to persuade northern Democrats jaded by the fallout from the Kansas-Nebraska Act to join the party.²⁹¹ The newly young Republican Party presented southerners with a political foe unlike any other they had seen before. Largely made up of industrialists and supported by a rapidly growing economy and population, Republicans became a real threat to the traditionalist agenda.

The Republican Party displayed impressive momentum and strength in its initial stages. Hartz described the zeal with which Republicans hit the political scene as a “...chariot of reformed Whiggery.”²⁹² Although the Republican Party failed to secure the presidency in 1856, they secured over one hundred seats in the Congress.²⁹³ The Republicans near-instant success was an ominous sign in the South. It reinforced the sentiments found in the locomotive theme from suspense novels.²⁹⁴ Each Southern political and economic setback took on a sense of inevitable defeat at the hands of the North. For all the South’s political maneuvers and schemes, it was the North that seemed to grow stronger, while the South remained stagnant. Viewing themselves unable to compete in the current political environment, southern states started developing a plan for secession. It mirrored the justification used in Calhoun’s 1833 nullification argument.²⁹⁵ If there was a tyranny of the majority, the minority states could either nullify the law or have valid grounds for succession from the Union. Following that logic, the core traditional southern states determined that a Republican president would be politically catastrophic if combined with a Republican Congress. The core southern states decided that if Lincoln won they would secede.

Americans were nervous as the 1860 presidential election approached. They were concerned about the state of the Union and whether or not it would survive. An

²⁹⁰ Gienapp, *Abraham Lincoln and Civil War America*, 49.

²⁹¹ Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War*, 240.

²⁹² Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America*, 112. Howe refers to the period between 1834 and 1854 for Whigs as a period of “intense political excitement.” Howe, *The political Culture of the American Whigs*, 13.

²⁹³ Sandburg, *Lincoln*, 147; and Library of Congress. “Presidential Election of 1856: A Resource Guide, Accessed November 1, 2015 <http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/elections/election1856.html>.

²⁹⁴ Daly, *Literature, Technology, and Modernity*, 23-24. Using the train as a metaphor for the sense of inevitability presented by modernization, Daly identifies a core theme evidenced in the political events leading up to the war. Like the train, industrialists just keep coming back; night after night like clockwork, but bigger, stronger, faster each time.

²⁹⁵ Schlesinger, *The Age of Jackson*, 494.

unprecedented eighty percent of all white males eligible to vote cast their ballots in the election; over 4.5 million votes were cast.²⁹⁶ Lincoln received all votes from the Republican Party. The remnants of the Democratic Party, however, split its votes between various candidates.²⁹⁷ Not one vote was cast for Lincoln in the core Southern states.²⁹⁸ Yet, even with no votes from the South, Lincoln won the election.

The election of 1860 was the decisive event that split America into two socioeconomic political sections. Lincoln's victory in 1860 triggered a secession of southern states, beginning with South Carolina.²⁹⁹ The secession sent shockwaves throughout the Union and sparked indignant cries for war. On the eve of war, one New York Congressman, un-swayed by the emotional rhetoric, made a statement of profound clarity that foreshadowed how industrialization would impact the coming war. He stated that war was "...not a question of valor, but . . . who can throw the most projectiles? Who can afford the most iron or lead?"³⁰⁰ He foreshadowed that the traditional pageantry of warfare would eventually give way to the realization of industrialized warfare.

After concluding that he would be unable to bring the seceding states back to the bargaining table, Lincoln ordered a naval blockade of the southern states in April of 1861.³⁰¹ The naval blockade, later called the Anaconda Plan, was intended to cut off the commerce stream for the seceded states while buying time for a diplomatic solution.³⁰² Upon the backdrop of tremendous social and political turmoil sparked by industrialization, the Civil War began.

²⁹⁶ Library of Congress. "Presidential Election of 1860: A Resource Guide, Accessed November 1, 2015 <http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/elections/election1860.html>; and Vernon Burton, "Civil War and Reconstruction, 1861-1877," in *Companion to Nineteenth Century America*, ed. William L. Barney, 49.

²⁹⁷ McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom*, 175, 182.

²⁹⁸ Paludan, *The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln*, 5.

²⁹⁹ Gienapp, *Abraham Lincoln and Civil War America*, 74.

³⁰⁰ Quoted in Gerald F. Linderman, *Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 264.

³⁰¹ Goodwin, *Team of Rivals*, 351.

³⁰² Donald Stoker, *The Grand Design: Strategy and the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 36.

Summary of the Political Pillar

At the beginning of this chapter I noted that there were no political parties, that politics were primarily engaged in by the country's elites, and that the country was generally unified in the use of economic subsidies to support agricultural growth. At the conclusion of this chapter, we see that political parties came to dominate the political landscape, a massive increase in social input to the political process, and that the country had become bitterly divided over economic subsidies and the issue of slavery. Industrialization is at the core of why and how this dramatic change occurred. This chapter built upon the tensions that arose in the previous chapter. Social tensions fomented political tensions. Industrialization sparked political tension as it had previously sparked social unrest. Yet while it was the internalization of industrial modernization that had the greatest impact on the Social Pillar, the Political Pillar was most impacted by the economic impact of industrialization and the real politics of power in representative government. Industrialization swung the economic momentum out of the farms and into the factories. The changing economic environment gave rise to the importance of political parties.

The first to embrace a political party were the traditionalists—the Democratic Party. They successfully employed it to maintain the status quo. Eventually, modernists in turn created a party of their own—the Whig Party. As the new political parties took shape the battle transitioned to one of representation in government. Southern politicians calculated that the best way to maintain the balance of representative power in the Congress was to add new slave states. They came to this conclusion after realizing that they would never be able to match the pace of industrial population growth. As politicians from the North and South parried from point to counterpoint on western expansion, the chess match turned into a powder keg. The pressure exploded the Democrat and Whig parties into factions. The factions reconstituted along sectional lines that mirrored the fractured lines of the Social Pillar. With modernists on one side and traditionalists on the other, the once unified fabric of the country was torn in two. With southern states seceding war became inevitable. In the next chapter we will review the war. As we will see, it would take some time for the military to incorporate industrialization. When it did, however, the American Civil War would produce warfare on a scale and manner never before seen in human history.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE MILITARY PILLAR

Military Cohesion

The period of military cohesion begins in the early 1800s and ends with the Second Battle of Manassas in 1862. To better understand the first half of the war requires context. We will first explore the origins of the doctrines the combatants employed. Understanding the doctrines that shaped the early battles of the war will enable us to contrast the doctrines used in the later stages of the war. Contrasting the doctrines and their application shows the significant role industrialization had in shaping the way the war was fought and how it was ultimately concluded. We begin by reviewing the end of the militia system and the establishment of the professional regular army.

The Militia System

At the turn of the Nineteenth-Century, America did not have a strong military institution. The army struggled due to a general distrust for standing armies and bouts of congressional infighting over funding and troop strength.³⁰³ Under those conditions the army was reduced to anemic strength levels. These were factors of little consequence early on because the nation relied so heavily on its militia system. From the first settlement at Jamestown until the War of 1812 America relied on the militia system to augment the fledgling regulars whenever it needed to defend itself.³⁰⁴ This cobbling together of forces from the various states had been sufficient to keep America free and secure in the initial stages of the nation's life.³⁰⁵ Yet, as the nation grew, so did its security challenges. Western expansion and population growth increased the demand on the militia to secure the nation's interior. By the War of 1812 the burden of securing the frontiers, the interior, and

³⁰³ William B. Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1874-1861* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 3-8.

³⁰⁴ Fred Anderson, *A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years War* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984), 27; See Francis Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier 1783- 1846* (London: The Macmillan Company, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1969), 117. Prucha points to distrust for standing armies as part of the reason for the militia system.

³⁰⁵ Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York: Macmillan Publishing and Co. Inc., 1973), 117.

defending the borders stretched the system to its limits.³⁰⁶ While under such strain, the militia was called on to help repel the British in the War of 1812.³⁰⁷ The war exposed the flaws of depending on thinly-stretched militia and a poorly trained army in the face of a professional army.

There were problems with the militia system from the outset of the war.³⁰⁸ Although Congress had authorized President James Madison (1809 – 1817) to call upon the militia, states objected to his federal authority to do so.³⁰⁹ In addition to the question of federal authority there was a question of whether federal regular army officers had the constitutional authority to command state militia. Amid these confounding issues the vastly outnumbered British professional army rained down terror on New England with little resistance.³¹⁰ Although the New Englanders eventually repelled British forces, it was clear that a better system was needed to meet the country's emerging challenges.³¹¹ To some in Congress establishing a professional army was the best route to take.³¹² One of the most vocal advocates for a regular army was Madison. In addressing the Congress in 1815, he stated that:

If experience has shown in the recent splendid achievements of the militia the value of this resource for public defense, it has shown, also, the importance of. . . skill in the use of arms, and familiarity with the essential rules of discipline which cannot be expected from [the militia].³¹³

The main point here is that the system, not necessarily the militia itself, was cumbersome and ineffective to meet the nation's needs. Following the War of 1812, America embraced

³⁰⁶ William Ganoe, *History of the United States Army* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1988), 157.

³⁰⁷ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 61.

³⁰⁸ Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 107-109. Here Millet and Maslowski chronicle the political and military challenges the nation faced at the outset of the war. They indicate that the two largest issues were whether the federal government had the authority to command a state to supply militia and the practical matters of commanding and leading a military at wartime with disjointed chains of command.

³⁰⁹ Horsman, *The New Republic*, 221.

³¹⁰ Ganoe, *History of the United States Army*, 61.

³¹¹ Dale O. Smith, *U. S. Army Doctrine: A Study and Appraisal* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1955), 39.

³¹² Stephen E. Ambrose, *Duty, Honor, Country: A history of West Point* (Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 38. Here Ambrose shows that in the months leading up to the war, Congress had frantically tried to produce more officers, grow the regular army by thirteen regiments, and required the states to have a readiness of 80,000 militia. As he points out, these extreme measures were not able to be completed before the war began, but they show the inadequacy of the strength of America's fighting force and of its militia system.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, 43.

the challenge of establishing a new American military doctrine and creating a professional army and officer corps able to meet the nations emerging challenges.

Establishing West Point Doctrine

After deciding to adopt a new military system the next step was to select a foundational doctrine. The United States Military Academy at West Point was formally established in 1802.³¹⁴ Its mission was to produce military officers. Following the War of 1812, President James Monroe (1817 – 1825) appointed, Brigadier General Sylvanus Thayer the super intendant at West Point.³¹⁵ Once there, Thayer fully embraced the task of establish a new doctrine for the American war-fighter.³¹⁶ The U.S. military also went through a period of reconstruction and reformation during that post-war period, eventually growing into a large professional fighting force.³¹⁷ Within the next thirty years the regular army grew four fold. The growth in troop strength resulted in approximately 17,000 officers with the ability to call upon approximately 50,000 reserve soldiers as required.³¹⁸ With the newly expanded regular army, West Point aimed to provide a reformed officer corps to lead it.

Although reformed, the military institution never forgot the distrust and lack of congressional support they endured before the war of 1812. As a result they developed an apolitical culture that began to withdraw from social and political interaction.³¹⁹ The introduction of a European-focused doctrine further insulated the military. The preindustrial Napoleonic strategies and tactics provided a perfect distraction from the social and political turmoil the country was experiencing. Their resounding success in the Mexican-American war reinforced stance. The European doctrine coupled with its apolitical culture allowed the army to carve out a new simplified role for itself: train, fight,

³¹⁴ Henry Wagner Halleck, *Elements of Military Art and Science: Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battles, Etc.* (Forgotten Books, 2012), 379.

³¹⁵ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 134.

³¹⁶ Ambrose, *Duty, Honor, Country*, 63.

³¹⁷ Richard E. Dupuy, *The Compact History of The United States Army* (New York: Hawthorn Books Inc., 1956), 73.

³¹⁸ Skelton, *The American Profession of Arms*, 134.

³¹⁹ Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms*, 131.

and win. This new role was perhaps too simplified. As will see employing preindustrial European doctrine in the face of industrial warfare would have disastrous consequences.

There were two preeminent European schools of military thought in the early 1800s. One the one hand was the Napoleonic French model and the other was the Prussian model. The difference, as noted by military historians Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, was that the Prussian officer corps studied military strategy as a component of political policy—the art of war. Conversely, the French officer corps emphasized the application of military engineering, fortifications, and battlefield tactics—the science of war.³²⁰ Millet and Maslowski keenly note that the distinction between the two schools of thought were that the Prussians, lacking a Napoleon-like military figure, created an institution that promoted the importance of the collective officer corps. Their observations will be particularly insightful later in this chapter as we review the beginning stages of the war. There we will see how southern generals masterfully executed battlefield tactics to rack up victory upon victory. It will also serve as a point of contrast when we review the doctrine employed by Union generals to bring the war to a close. For now we return to the establishment of the West Point doctrine.

Thayer chose to found West Point doctrine on the principles of the French rather than the Prussians.³²¹ He entrusted the implementation of the doctrine to Dennis Hart Mahan and his pupil Henry Wagner Halleck.³²² Mahan was hand-picked by Thayer to be the head of West Point's most prestigious teaching position, engineering. He chose Thayer because of his brilliant military mind and their shared vision.³²³ To begin, Thayer sent Mahan to France to observe the military tactics and strategies of the European juggernaut.³²⁴ Under the sway of Napoleon, French military strategy was heavily predicated leveraging the precision of maneuver to destroy the enemy force, regarded as a critical tactic for territorial conquest.³²⁵ As a practical matter, Thayer may have also chosen

³²⁰ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 134.

³²¹ Ambrose, *Duty, Honor, Country*, 89-92.

³²² *Ibid.*, 99, 102.

³²³ Ambrose, *Duty, Honor, Country*, 99.

³²⁴ Michael Bonura, *Under the Shadow of Napoleon: French Influence on the American Way of Warfare from Independence to the Eve of World War II* (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 80-81.

³²⁵ Henry Wagner Halleck, *American Culture Series, Military and Naval History and Science: Elements of Military Art and Science* (New York: University Microfilms 1862, & Michigan: D. Appleton, 1956), 5.

the French model because the science of war required a strict adherence to discipline and attention to detail; two issues that plagued the army during the War of 1812.³²⁶

Mahan brought the Napoleonic theories codified in the writings of military theorist Antoine Jomini (1779 — 1869) to West Point. The Swiss-born Jomini's approach was centered on the mathematic and scientific aspects of warfare³²⁷ rather than the arts of war espoused by his contemporary, the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. It was perhaps Clausewitz himself who best distinguished the two schools of thought. He stated, seemingly in response to Jomini's principles:

It only needs intelligent treatment to make it conform to action, and to end the absurd difference between theory and practice unreasonable theories have so often evoked. . . Just as some plants bear fruit only if they don't shoot up too high, so in practical arts the leaves and flowers of theory must be pruned and the plant kept close to its proper soil—experience.³²⁸

Clausewitz's distinction between theory, practice, and the ultimate goal of warfare will be revisited when we examine the latter stages of the war. At this point the Napoleonic model was being installed as the America's new military doctrine.

The West Point faculty became familiar with Jomini through his published interpretations of Napoleonic military theory and practice.³²⁹ Jomini's treatise *The Art of War* became a West Point text in 1817.³³⁰ It emphasized seeking maximum returns for minimal risk through the employment offensive and defensive field fortifications to augment maneuver.³³¹ At the heart of Jomini's theory was the mastery of mathematics, geometry, and battlefield calculus.³³² Through the manipulation and mastery of angles,

³²⁶ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 134.

³²⁷ See John Shy, "Jomini," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 143-186.

³²⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*, 160, 169.

³²⁹ Donald Stoker, *The Grand Design*, 3.

³³⁰ Edward Hagerman, *The American Civil War and The Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 5.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, 5. Jomini's emphasis on battlefield calculations on his emphasis on the advantages of fixed fortifications was a contrast to his contemporary Clausewitz who lamented at military theorists that overemphasized tactics in the place of reality and theory. Warning of the dangers of ignoring reality in order to embrace military theories he stated, "It only needs intelligent treatment to make it conform to action, and to end the absurd difference between theory and practice unreasonable theories have so often evoked." Clausewitz, *On War*, 99; and Ambrose, *Duty, Honor, Country*, 100-102.

³³² Jomini's emphasis on battlefield mathematics is displayed in description for establishing a dominant position to secure a theater of operations. "The soil of the power which can bring into the field one hundred

shapes, and lines of operation a commander could both probe the enemy line and decisively attack its weaknesses during an engagement.³³³ Halleck echoed those sentiments in his chapter on strategy in his treatise *Element of Military Art and Science*.³³⁴ By reducing warfare to mathematical elements the commander gained the ability win wars by concentrating on its core feature: battles.³³⁵

At this point we can discern the logical conclusion of Jomini's scientific approach to military conflict—wars were won by sequencing a series of calculated battles. If each carefully selected battle was won it made would become impracticable for the opposition to continue. Clausewitz, on the other hand, viewed war in more absolute terms—the object of war was to destroy the enemy's will to fight.³³⁶ For him, every battle carried the potential to sap the enemy's will to carry on the war. The significance of this point of emphasis will be seen later in this chapter. For now we see that Jomini's teachings heavy influenced West Point doctrine. His teachings were most influential at West Point's top two schools of engineering and field artillery.³³⁷ The imprint of Jomini's emphasis on the strengths and weaknesses of offensive operations and fixed fortifications would be seen throughout the initial phases of the war.

The Jominian teachings at West Point dealing with the offense were two-pronged. The first prong was to destroy the enemy's army.³³⁸ The second prong was to gain and hold territory. Territory was controlled by destroying enemy fortifications and establishing offensive fortifications in their stead.³³⁹ The two prongs are similar to Clausewitz's approach of breaking the enemy's will by occupying his country and destroying his

and fifty or two hundred thousand troops cannot be violated with impunity; if a defeated army made the attempt, it would be none the less territory of a weak state, it would be absorbed in this theater, and the square would be enlarged till it reached the frontiers of a powerful state, or the sea. The outline of the frontiers may modify the shape of the quadrilateral so as to make it approach the figure of a parallelogram or trapezoid. In either case, the advantage of the army which has control of two faces of the figure, and possesses the power of establishing upon them a double base, will be still more decided, since it will be able to more easily cut the enemy off from the shortened side. Antoine De Jomini, *The Art of War*, 60-61.

³³³ Halleck, *American Culture Series, Military and Naval History and Science*, 64.

³³⁴ Halleck, *Elements of Military Art and Science*, 49-57; and Jomini, *The Art of War*, 52, 152-54.

³³⁵ Jomini, *The Art of War*, 136.

³³⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*, 102.

³³⁷ Ganoë, *History of the United States Army*, 164.; Ambrose, *Duty, Honor, Country*, 98.

³³⁸ Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms*, 83.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, 83.

forces.³⁴⁰ The two prongs differ, however, in that Jomini's approach was centered on rapid maneuver, brought to bear to win the day.³⁴¹ It did not contemplate destroying the enemy's will to fight altogether as Clausewitz did.

Codified within the first prong were fixing and pinning maneuvers that emphasized the importance of decisive offensive operations. The West Point model for decisive victories was two-fold. First maneuver was used to disrupt enemy lines, which was to be followed by massed frontal assaults at the heart of the enemy force.³⁴² The West Point model championed offensive operations in enemy territory. According to Halleck, "Offensive war is ordinarily most advantageous. . . [i]t is waged on foreign soil, . . . it augments its own resources at the same time that it diminishes those of the enemy; it adds to the moral courage of its own army, while it disheartens its opponents."³⁴³ The underlying assumption of offensive operations, however, was that the enemy force was not professionally trained and supported by the invaded country. To that scenario Jomini gave an ominous warning to invading forces in his treatise *The Art of War*:

The difficulties are particularly great when the people are supported by a considerable nucleus of disciplined troops. The invader only has an army: his adversaries have an army, and a people wholly or almost wholly in arms, and making means of resistance out of everything, and each individual of whom conspires against the common enemy; even the non-combatants have an interest in his ruin and accelerate it by every means in their power. He holds scarcely any ground but that upon which he encamps; outside the limits of his camp everything is hostile and multiplies a thousand fold the difficulties he meets at every step. These obstacles become almost insurmountable when the country is difficult. . . after the most carefully-concerted movements and the most rapid and fatiguing marches, he thinks he is about to accomplish his aim and deal a terrible blow, he finds no signs of the enemy but his camp-fires: so that while, like Don Quixote, he is attacking windmills, his adversary is on his line of communications, destroys the detachments left to guard it, surprises his convoys, his depots, and carries on a war so disastrous for the invader that he must inevitably yield after a time.³⁴⁴

³⁴⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, 102.

³⁴¹ Ambrose, *Duty, Honor, Country*, 101; and Jomini, *The Art of War*, 52, 152-54.

³⁴² Linderman, *Embattled Courage*, 21.

³⁴³ Halleck, *American Culture Series, Military and Naval History and Science*, 39.

³⁴⁴ Jomini, *The Art of War*, 21.

During the course of the Civil War, Union generals, particularly in the Western Theatre, would come to understand the significance of this point.

According to the second prong, the counter to an opposing army smashing the heart of one's ranks was the fixed fortification. Halleck's instructions at West Point show that cadets were taught that the second prong was much harder to achieve than the first.³⁴⁵ This was because he believed fixed fortifications in enemy territory held a significant advantage over the attacking force, which would certainly be "bloodied" during the assault.³⁴⁶ His remarks in *Military and Naval History and Science* expose his viewpoint:

Again, in the Seven Year's War, when the French neglected to secure their foothold in Germany, by placing in a state of defense the fortifications that fell into their power, the first defeat rendered their ground untenable, and threw them from the Elbe back upon the Rhine and the Mayne. They afterwards took the precaution to fortify their positions and to secure their magazines under shelter of strong places, and, consequently, were enabled to maintain themselves in the hostile county till the end of the war.³⁴⁷

Halleck's text reflected the European theories that American military officers were taught.³⁴⁸ The result of this approach would amount to a form of base-hopping akin to a game of leapfrog. The invading force would fight in skirmishes to clear a spot of land. From there they would hastily establish a field fortification that would allow them to rest and refit in enemy territory before repeating the process over and over until victory was secured.³⁴⁹ Conversely, when offensive forces encountered enemy fortifications, the commander would have to determine whether it was weak enough to attack directly or whether he had sufficient forces to lay siege to it.³⁵⁰ Judgement on this issue was critical. If

³⁴⁵ Halleck points to a series of examples of battles that were lost because of a failure to have fortifications concluding, "it is deemed unnecessary to further specify examples; the whole history of modern warfare is one continued proof of the importance of fortifications as a means of national defense, and as an auxiliary to offensive military operations. In the footnotes of his references he cites to Jomini, Napoleon, and French military historians. Halleck, *Elements of Military Art and Science*, 87.

³⁴⁶ Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms*, 40.

³⁴⁷ Halleck, *American Culture Series, Military and Naval History and Science*, 76; Weigley, *American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War*, 419-420. Here Weigley notes that creating a modern offensive strategy during the war was hindered in part because of the doctrinal emphasis on the superiority of defense to offense for the invaded party.

³⁴⁸ Hagerman, *The American Civil War and The Origins of Modern Warfare*, 14.

³⁴⁹ Jomini, *The Art of War*, 56-59.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 50.

improperly calculated, either course of action could have resulted in ruin. A direct attack could result in Halleck's prediction of heavy casualties. On the other hand, one's army could perish due to lack of supplies.³⁵¹ As we can see the two prongs were somewhat conflicted. Offensive operations were preferred unless they were conducted against field fortifications in hostile enemy territory.

These core principles went largely unchallenged in the formative years of the West Point doctrine and the reformation of the American military.³⁵² The principles were solidified with the resounding successes of the officer corps during the Mexican-American War (1846-1848).³⁵³ President James K. Polk's decision to forcefully annex Texas confirmed the value of a strong regular army and catapulted the officer corps to a new level of prominence.³⁵⁴ Although Polk's decision was an anathema socially and politically, it fostered a new connection between the people and their military.³⁵⁵ Soldiers came to be viewed as unpretentious and pure in motive, unlike interest-driven politicians.³⁵⁶ The army was no longer seen as a necessary evil, but rather a symbol of the traditional social values and mores that had unified the country prior to industrialization.³⁵⁷ From that point on, the regular army replaced the militia as the force tasked with securing the rapidly expanding country and its borders.³⁵⁸ After the war the majority of the regulars settled in

³⁵¹ One additional point here, the principles espoused at West Point for being cautious with one's forces in the face of fixed fortification is not in itself unique to French military theory. Sun Tzu, for example cautioned in the same manner in his seminal work, *The Art of War*: The rule is not to besiege walled cities if it can be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up to three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more. . . The general who is unable to control his impatience will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town remains untaken." Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Lionel Giles (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2002), 48-49. The main point here is that this view of fixed fortifications in enemy territory was engrained as a fundamental aspect of the West Point doctrine, which in the early stages of the war was a source of comfort for the South who had them and consternation in the North who would have to contend with them.

³⁵² Smith, *U.S. Military Doctrine*, 54.

³⁵³ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 65.

³⁵⁴ Robert Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848- 1865* (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press: 1967), 28.

³⁵⁵ Potter, *The Impending Crisis*, 4-8. Here Potter frames the challenges Polk faced in annexing Texas from Mexico. There was widespread discontent with the move because it was seen as a vulgar display of aggression to acquire more states to satisfy the political goals of southern politicians to maintain the status quo of power in the congress.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

³⁵⁷ Dupuy, *The Compact History of the United States Army*, 103.

³⁵⁸ Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms*, 129.

along the western frontier and coastlines as sentries to maintain security for pioneers moving west.³⁵⁹

West Point Doctrine and Confederate Secession

The newly-codified West Point theories on decisive battlefield victories and fixed fortifications shaped the key characteristics at the start of the Civil War. The first objective was to invade the South, destroy enemy strongholds and build its own strongholds to sustain itself. The second objective was to decisively destroy the Southern Army and bring the war to an end.³⁶⁰ Based on West Point's teachings, the South likely knew of the challenges an invading force would face if it decided to secede. The trepidation of Union officers being on offense at the beginning of the war has also been well chronicled.³⁶¹ This trepidation was a reflection of the European doctrine that the American military embraced, which gave a psychological advantage to the South as the invaded force with fixed fortifications.³⁶² Confederates, on the other hand, took comfort in the psychological and physical advantages of being on the defensive.³⁶³ As outlined by de Tocqueville: "If the Union were to undertake to enforce the allegiance of the Confederate States by military means, it would be in a position very analogous to that of England at the time of the War of Independence."³⁶⁴ Both sides would have done well, however, to heed Jomini's final observations about how technology can produce significant and long-lasting strategic effects, "...very great changes of army organization took place from the time of the revival of the art of war and the invention of gun powder to the French Revolution..."³⁶⁵ Much like gunpowder, industrialization would transform the nature of warfare with devastating consequences. Unfortunately, it would take the hard experiences of war for both sides to come to terms with this change. They ignored industrialization to their own peril.

³⁵⁹ Ambrose, *Duty, Honor, Country*, 125; and Ganoë, *History of the United States Army*, 116.

³⁶⁰ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 83.

³⁶¹ Harry Williams, *Lincoln and His Generals* (New York: Gramercy Books, 1952), 145.

³⁶² Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue*, 18.

³⁶³ Clark, *Railroads in the Civil War*, 28.

³⁶⁴ Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 450.

³⁶⁵ Jomini, *The Art of War*, 220.

Until the secession of southern states, the military remained largely undistracted by political and social events of the time.³⁶⁶ The main reason why was that the military remained intellectually in debt to the European military tradition. They viewed it as the pinnacle of warfare and military philosophy.³⁶⁷ This sentiment was reinforced by the success the military experienced in applying preindustrial European tactics. With its newfound doctrine and professional army, America had successfully repelled European border threats, defeated Mexico, and settled its interior. Edward Hagerman supports this claim, stating that up to the war that the, “American military thought, not having experienced cause to innovate, followed the French lead. Military thinking...remained essentially within the Napoleonic tradition filtered through an eighteenth century world view.”³⁶⁸ As a result, Americans fought the initial phase of the Civil War in the same manner they fought in the Mexican-American War. The façade of winning by the means of preindustrial war would be short-lived.

Before we transition from the establishment of American military doctrine to its implementation in the Civil War, let us summarize what we have covered up to this point. At the turn of the Nineteenth-Century, America had a weak regular army and relied heavily on the militia system to defend its borders and secure its interior. Western expansion coupled with the War of 1812 increased the burden on the militia system, pushing it to the brink. After the War of 1812, West Point adopted a new two-pronged doctrine based on Napoleonic principles of warfare codified by Jomini. The doctrine had two main prongs. The first prong consisted of offensive operations to secure decisive battlefield victories. The second prong centered on securing ultimate victory by territorial acquisition. Throughout the establishment of the West Point doctrine and buildup of the regular army the military was little affected by industrialization. This was in large part because of the apolitical nature the military had developed and its focus on European tactics and strategies. It found no need to ponder the consequences of industrialization and warfare. Little did the U.S. military know, but it would soon be the first to head into the breach of

³⁶⁶ Dupuy, *The Compact History of the United States Army*, 111.

³⁶⁷ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 66.

³⁶⁸ Hagerman, *The American Civil War and The Origins of Modern Warfare*, 26.

industrial warfare. Ironically, had Europe looked to America during the Civil War, it could have perhaps avoided repeating many of the same mistakes just over a half a century later.

The War Begins

Perched uneasily on the social and political fractures of mid Nineteenth-Century America, the Civil War began. In its initial phases, both sides fought the war in much the same manner. There was a ceremonial flare characterized by battlefield engagements that were short in duration and of limited intensity. Confederates fired the first shots of the war at Fort Sumter on 12 April 1861; no one was injured or killed.³⁶⁹ As the sound of cannon fire filled the air, southerner Mary Chesnut rejoiced, “How gay we were last night.”³⁷⁰ Two days later Lincoln would leverage technology by assembling the first wartime telegraph system to communicate with his field commanders.³⁷¹ Technology began influencing the war from its inception.

The First Battle of Manassas, also known as The First Battle of Bull Run, was the first major battle fought in the war in June of 1861.³⁷² In the build up to the battle, both sides claimed they were spiritually aligned with righteousness and that the other was morally wrong.³⁷³ Recounting a moment of solace with other southern women, Chesnut notes that “These women have all a satisfying faith. ‘God is on our side,’ the cry. When we are shut in we ask, ‘Why?’ We are told: ‘Of course He hates the Yankees.”³⁷⁴ Southerners claimed Union forces were made up of hired European immigrants who were not American at all.³⁷⁵ Conversely, Northerners claimed Southerners were traitors willing to destroy the nation in order to subjugate their fellow man.³⁷⁶ In the beginning, the war was viewed more as a test of righteousness than of strategy or tactics.³⁷⁷ Men signed up anxiously, hoping the war

³⁶⁹ McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom*, 215.

³⁷⁰ Chesnut, *Mary Chesnut’s Civil War*, 48.

³⁷¹ David H. Bates, *Lincoln in the Telegraph Office: Recollections of the United States Military Telegraph Corps During the Civil War* (New York: The Century Co. 1907), 14, 40-43.

³⁷² Williams, *Lincoln and His Generals*, 20.

³⁷³ William Wiley, *The Civil War Diary of a Common Soldier: William Wiley of the 77th Illinois Infantry*, ed. Terrence J. Winschel (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 9.

³⁷⁴ Chesnut, *Mary Chesnut’s Civil War*, 48.

³⁷⁵ Linderman, *Embattled Courage*, 65.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 65.

³⁷⁷ Stanley Hirshson, *The White Tecumseh: A Biography of William T. Sherman* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997), 82.

would not end before they got a chance to go to battle.³⁷⁸ Avery Craven succinctly describes the beginning of the war as, “intense humanitarian impulses and awakened religious feelings.”³⁷⁹

Clausewitz argued that every war has key characteristics that he termed its nature.³⁸⁰ The key characteristics of the beginning of the American Civil War are codified in the First Battle of Manassas. It was a battle fought in the mold of the teachings of West Point. The two armies met on a battlefield and conducted orchestrated maneuvers probing each other’s lines to exploit weaknesses.³⁸¹ The nature of the initial stages of the Civil War was decidedly traditional. It reflected more of a gentlemen’s duel than industrial warfare. One example can be seen in Union Major General Benjamin F. Butler’s admonished his troops to treat southern civilians and their property like they would treat their own.³⁸² The only aggression authorized was on the battlefield metered out against the enemy face to face.

The traditional nature of the initial phases of the war is further accentuated by the spectacle it promoted. Northern political appointees arrived leisurely to the battlefield to meet their troops, while pandering to the cheers of the spectators.³⁸³ Confederate forces, although less hampered by bureaucratic politics and with stronger leadership in the officer ranks, conformed to the same practices.³⁸⁴ Men and women flocked to the battlefields to watch the battlefield spectacle.³⁸⁵ During the engagement, battlefield commanders formed their troops into firing lines in the face of the advancing enemy that bravely waded into fields of fire.³⁸⁶ Interestingly, the First Battle of Manassas was also the first time the railroad was used in the war. Confederate General Pierre G. T. Beauregard used it to shuttle troops to reinforce Confederate General Joseph E. Johnson, decisively turning the tide of the

³⁷⁸ Wiley, *The Civil War Diary of a Common Soldier*, 2; and Gienapp, *Abraham Lincoln and Civil War America*, 86.

³⁷⁹ Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War*, 15.

³⁸⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, 99.

³⁸¹ Shelby Foote, *Fort Sumter to Perryville* vol. 1 of *The Civil War: A Narrative* (New York: Vintage, 1958), 76.

³⁸² Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 31.

³⁸³ Ganoë, *History of the United States Army*, 257.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 271.

³⁸⁵ James R. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War: 1861- 1865* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1961), 41.

³⁸⁶ Gienapp, *Abraham Lincoln and Civil War America*, 86.

battle.³⁸⁷ When the smoke filled air cleared it was the confederate forces that carried the day. Lincoln learned of the defeat by telegraph.³⁸⁸ The first major battle had been fought and the industrialization had already started to play a role. With the victory many in the South thought gleefully that a significant battle was won, and perhaps even the war.³⁸⁹ The defeat put increased pressure on the North to find leaders who could win decisive battles.³⁹⁰ The two sides would meet again thirteen months later in a violent clash that produced unprecedented casualties, signaling the changing nature of warfare.

The Second Battle of Manassas was fought in August of 1862. The historian John Hennessy gives a gripping account of how dynamic the battle was in terms of the changing rationale of Union commanders. It was a harbinger of the gruesome nature of the next phase of the war.³⁹¹ The battle featured fighting forces that contributed over 100,000 men in total to the battle and produced over 22,000 casualties in just two days of fighting.³⁹² In the lead up to that battle, Union General John Pope issued a series of general orders that were the first notions of “hard war.”³⁹³ Although short-lived and much maligned by his officers and many in the North, these orders would later be applied with vigor by generals Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman.³⁹⁴ Similar to the argument presented elsewhere in this study, Mark Grimsley cites Pope’s end of “Kid Glove Policies” as evidence of a shift in the Union warfighter’s rationale from one of conciliation to one of pragmatism, which would ultimately end in hard war.³⁹⁵ The shift Grimsley references is evidence that the Union rationale was indeed transitioning from traditionalism to a more modern form of warfare. Hennessy concludes that the battle was perhaps the apex of the West Point

³⁸⁷ Clark, *Railroads in the Civil War*, 28.

³⁸⁸ Bates, *Lincoln in the Telegraph Office*, 90-92.

³⁸⁹ Foote, *Fort Sumter to Perryville*, 84-85. In the height of excitement emotion swayed both populations, but in retrospect to the way the war ultimately concluded, the only decisive victory was the one that brought the Confederacy to surrender to itself back to the Union.

³⁹⁰ Williams, *Lincoln and His Generals*, 76.

³⁹¹ John J. Hennessy, *Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999).

³⁹² Stoker, *The Grand Design*, 167.

³⁹³ Hennessy, *Return to Bull Run*, 14-20.

³⁹⁴ Foner, *The Fiery Trial*, 220.

³⁹⁵ Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 85-89, 3-4.

doctrine in terms of the South's crushing use of maneuver; yet with the massive casualties sustained, neither side would fight quite the same way again.³⁹⁶ Too much had changed.

The First and Second Battles of Manassas serves as an anchor point from which we will be able to contrast the phases of the American Civil War that followed. The First Battle of Manassas was fought using preindustrial European-styled tactics and applied with corresponding notions of civility and pageantry. The second battle showed signs that the West Point model was fraying. Pope's general orders, approved by Lincoln, stand in sharp contrast to those given by his Union counterpart just thirteen months earlier.³⁹⁷ Additionally, the size, scope, and intensity of the second battle were several orders of magnitude greater than the first. This greater scale stemmed in large part from the advances in mobilization and in the lethality of weaponry.³⁹⁸ We can at this point evaluate the first and second battles of Manassas and conclude that the nature of the war was changing in terms of scope and scale. The escalating casualties would transformational impact not only the warfighter, but those back home that supported them as well.³⁹⁹ No one would go untouched.

Military Disruption

The period of military disruption begins with the battle of Antietam in September 1862 and ends with the Battle of Chattanooga in November 1863. The period is characterized by high intensity conflict between massive opposing forces, catastrophic losses of life, and new battlefield tactics. The major battles fought during those years—including Antietam and Gettysburg in the East and Chancellorsville, Vicksburg, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga in the West—signify the breaking point of applying traditional West Point tactics. This characterization was due in part to the introduction of

³⁹⁶ Hennessy, *Return to Bull Run*, 456; and Weigley, *American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War*, 428.

³⁹⁷ Lincoln yet again sat anxiously by the telegraph only to receive the deflating news of Pope's loss. Bates, *Lincoln in the Telegraph Office*, 118-122.

³⁹⁸ Foote, *Fort Sumter to Perryville*, 638-640; supra note 44.

³⁹⁹ Drew Gilpin Faust, *This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2008), 145; and Chesnut, *Mary Chesnut's Civil War*, 428-429.

industrialization into the war coupled with social and political pressures achieve decisive battlefield victories that would end the war.⁴⁰⁰

In the traditional limited warfare model, generals won battles by the sound planning implementation of battlefield tactics.⁴⁰¹ Beyond planning and tactics, generals believed their chief role was to instill courage by leveraging the righteousness of the cause.⁴⁰² Those sentiments dominated the era of flint-lock and muzzle-loaded rifles, but were terribly out of step with the harrowing realities of rifled small arms and cannon fire.⁴⁰³ It is during this period that we see courage give way to what Grimsley refers to as pragmatism. To wit, standing upright in an open field and wading into rifle fire from an entrenched enemy was no longer courageous; it was downright insane. It was in this period that generals began to apply technological advancements of industrialization and ushered industrial warfare in to the American Civil War.⁴⁰⁴ We first look to the Battles of Antietam and Gettysburg in the east before turning to the battles of the Western Campaign.

Fighting in the East: Unraveling the First Prong

The Battle of Antietam was fought in September of 1862. There were over 23,000 casualties fought by armies totaling over 120,000 men.⁴⁰⁵ The losses suffered at Antietam further exposed the flaws in the Jominian principals of decisive maneuver followed by full frontal assaults in light of the changed conditions of warfare.⁴⁰⁶ The Jominian principles were designed to produce decisive battlefield victories; yet even in the face of growing armies and massive casualties, the battles were not decisive.⁴⁰⁷ The loss of life was horrific,

⁴⁰⁰ Dupuy, *The Compact History of the United States Army*, 134.

⁴⁰¹ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 89.

⁴⁰² Linderman, *Embattled Courage*, 16.

⁴⁰³ Foote, *Fort Sumter to Perryville*, 93-95. For more on the advances of rifled small arms See Robert V. Bruce, *Lincoln and the Tools of War* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 204-205. Here Bruce gives an account of how rifled breach loading munitions shaped the battlefield after their introduction in 1862. In particular he points to the tremendous advantage forged from breach-loading weapons that allowed them to reload and fire from the prone position. His work overall recount's the struggle Lincoln had in finding and employing technological advances on the battlefield due to the traditionalist ideals of his subordinates. See also Stephen R. Sears, *Landscape Turned RED: The Battle of Antietam* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2003), 184-189; supra note 44.

⁴⁰⁴ Pursell, *The Machine in America*, 87.

⁴⁰⁵ Stoker, *The Grand Strategy*, 189.

⁴⁰⁶ Hagerman, *The American Civil War and The Origins of Modern Warfare*, 56.

⁴⁰⁷ Sears, *Landscape Turned RED*, 309.

but the armies continued to reconstitute and barrel into each other again and again. During that battle, the notions of a brave and honorable death gave way to the harsh realities of mass killing.⁴⁰⁸ In short, many began to ask, what was the point of bravery in the face of technology, that, “...when placed in any point of contact against an invading force, is capable of destroying a thousand men in a minute.”⁴⁰⁹ The historian Drew Gilpin Faust unceremoniously describes the carnage men saw during these massive new types of battles: “Men had become putrefied meat, not so much killed as slaughtered. . .”⁴¹⁰ Whatever romanticism had attached to war could no longer be sustained.

The traditional overtones of the war were subjugated to the realities of industrialization. The historian Stephen Sears views the events of Antietam differently than I have presented. He points to the failure of Union commanding General George B. McClellan, rather than the changing nature of warfare brought on by industrialization. In his estimation, McClellan’s “failure” to employ “the established principles . . . that a professional soldier was expected to know” prevented him from decisively crushing the wounded confederate force as it limped from the battlefield.⁴¹¹ Sears proposes that had McClellan followed the West Point doctrine of deploying his strategic reserves, he could have crushed the enemy and perhaps ended the war. Yet, in light of the unprecedented scale and speed of casualties wrought at Antietam, it is difficult to imagine any general committing his strategic defensive reserve in such a situation. McClellan’s hand was likely stayed by the crushing reality that the nature of warfare had changed. To this end, Sears does give tacit acknowledgment to McClellan’s argument of ensuring his own fighting force was strong enough to protect the nation’s capital. The author’s overall reading of the events at Antietam, however, shows that he does not appreciate the weight of decision-making during that chaotic period. Sears, like many of McClellan’s contemporaries fighting the war, failed to see that Antietam, like Second Manassas, was more of a reflection of the new

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., 186. Here Sears gives an account that accentuates the point. A Georgia regiment lay in wait for regiments from New York and Pennsylvania. As they stood “in plain sight of one another and blazed away. . . finally it was by mutual consent, the two lines could take it no longer and lay down behind whatever cover they could find and continued the fight.” Linderman, *Embattled Courage*, 127.

⁴⁰⁹ *Sensationalist Literature and Popular Culture in the Early American Republic*, ed. Pitcher and Hartigan, 321.

⁴¹⁰ Faust, *This Republic of Suffering*, 57.

⁴¹¹ Sears, *Landscape Turned RED*, 310.

normal in warfare than an anecdotal lack of nerve on the part of the warfighter. This point is further shown in the Battle of Gettysburg that soon followed.

In the month of July following the harrowing Battle of Antietam, Union Major General George Gordon Meade's force of 93,000 men clashed with Confederate General Robert E. Lee's force of 75,000 men in the Battle of Gettysburg.⁴¹² The total number of casualties was staggering: over 51,000 men; 23,000 from the Union and 28,000 from the Confederates.⁴¹³ Gettysburg had perhaps the most influence on the jettisoning of traditional notions of bravery. Long-range artillery battles coupled with improved rifling led to some of the first instances of digging entrenchments to improve their odds of surviving.⁴¹⁴ The implementation of entrenchments is another signal that the warfighter was beginning to internalize the changed nature of warfare. By choosing to establish entrenchments as a priority, it necessarily meant that the notion of bravery by full frontal assault in the face of a hail of bullets was melting away. This is not to say that frontal assaults did not continue, but as we will see with Grant at Cold Harbor, when it was employed in the face of an entrenched enemy it became in the ominously prophetic words of Thayer, "bloody."

Gettysburg also bore the grim realities of industrial warfare: e.g., being wounded or disfigured without the opportunity for bravery. Abner Small, a Union soldier wrote of the hospitals in a personal letter saying he "grew old at the sight of the suffering."⁴¹⁵ We also see at Gettysburg that the paralysis and "failures" Sears attributed to McClellan present in Confederate commanders as well.⁴¹⁶ Neither side was spared.

The responses of the warfighters waging war under these extreme circumstances is not so condemning when we evaluate just how much the war had transformed in just two years. It is at this point that we see the benefits of a multi-disciplinary approach for explaining why events happened. From a purely military history perspective Union

⁴¹² Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 212-215.

⁴¹³ McPherson, *The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom*, 578.

⁴¹⁴ Shelby Foote, *Fredericksburg to Meridian* vol. 2 of *The Civil War: A Narrative* (New York: Vintage, 1958), 483.

⁴¹⁵ Quoted in Linderman, *Embattled Courage*, 133.

⁴¹⁶ Foote, *Fredericksburg to Meridian*, 487.

generals, particularly in the first half of the war, are often judged too harshly or given too much credit for their use of battlefield tactics.

Citizens of the era viewed generals' performance in much the same way as military historians have portrayed them, timid or worse, incompetent. In the romanticized notions of warfare, people from both the North and the South pressed their military commanders ever more into the grinders of war to secure coveted decisive victories that would bring the war to an end.⁴¹⁷ Some passionately claimed that the bigger and bloodier the battles, the more quickly the war would come to an end.⁴¹⁸ Under the weight of such daunting demands commanders began to internalize that to bring the war to an end it would require more than just battlefield victories. The doctrine would have to change.

To briefly summarize, the period of disruption featured massive battles fought in the conventional mold of West Point doctrine. The outcome of executing traditional tactics with improved industrial weaponry was an exponential increase in casualties. The First Battle of Manassas serves as a contrasting point the battles of Antietam and Gettysburg. These battles represent the breaking point between traditional warfare and modern warfare in the East. At the conclusion of Gettysburg, the entire nation was sobered by what the war had become. Traditional warfare tactics had gone from noble to border-line insanity. It was clear that a new strategy was needed. It is at this point that we transition to the campaign in the West, where a new doctrine consistent with industrial modernization began to emerge.

Fighting In the West: Unravelling the Second Prong

Union generals fighting in the West were the first to break from the traditional West Point military model. The West contained Confederate industrial and commercial centers, while those in the East contained its more symbolic centers.⁴¹⁹ As Union forces moved into the South, they initially concentrated on the fixed fortifications, which were generally located near the economic and industrial centers. Bitter fighting at the forts, combined with

⁴¹⁷ Anne Bailey, *The Chessboard of War: Sherman and Hood in the Autumn Campaigns of 1864* (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 12.

⁴¹⁸ Royster, *The Destructive War*, 254.

⁴¹⁹ Joseph Mitchell, *Decisive Battles of the Civil War*, (New York: Fawcett Premier, 1955), 161.

a vitriolic populace, led Union officers to see southern citizens as an additional enemy.⁴²⁰ Lincoln was becoming impatient with his generals' lack of progress. His desire to secure decisive battlefield victories led him to replace Major General William S. Rosecrans with Major General Ulysses S. Grant as the Commander of the Western Theater in 1862.⁴²¹ Lincoln relieved him after several unsuccessful engagements with Confederate forces. On one occasion was forced to leverage the railroad to send him 20,000 soldiers in order to avoid a disastrous defeat.⁴²² Once in command, Grant immediately looked to control Tennessee because it provided military and economic access to the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers.⁴²³ Yet in order to control Tennessee, Grant first had to neutralize the fort in Vicksburg Mississippi, the redoubt of the Mississippi River.⁴²⁴ Grant set out on a campaign to set siege to Vicksburg.

During the Vicksburg campaign, Grant decided to separate from his supply lines and rely on foraging from the local area.⁴²⁵ The decision caused consternation on the part of one of his key subordinates, General Sherman. Sherman's chief concern was that Grant's proposal required his forces to break a fundamental premise of the second prong of the West Point doctrine. It was imperative that an invading force maintain a base of supply while occupying enemy territory.⁴²⁶ Coincidentally, it would be Sherman who later relied on the technique to great effect in the latter years of the war.⁴²⁷ Despite Sherman's

⁴²⁰ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 48.

⁴²¹ Peter Cozzens, *The Shipwreck of Their Hopes: The Battles for Chattanooga* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 1-3.

⁴²² Bates, *Lincoln in the Telegraph Office*, 172-182; and Williams, *Lincoln and His Generals*, 283.

⁴²³ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 119; and Stoker, *The Grand Design*, 222.

⁴²⁴ Hagerman, *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare*, 175.

⁴²⁵ Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant: Complete and Unabridged* (New York: Cosmo Classics, 2006), 216. Here Grant ordered Major General Francis P. Blair drive out enemy forces in the area and then to forage both food and supplies from the area to use for sustainment of Union forces; and Hagerman, *The American Civil War and The Origins of Modern Warfare*, 199-201.

⁴²⁶ Stoker, *The Grand Design*, 265. See Jomini, *The Art of War*, 131-32. This principle will be reviewed in detail when it is applied by Sherman after the siege of Atlanta.

⁴²⁷ William T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman* (New York: Library of America, 1990), 659. Sherman would later explain and attempt to justify his use of foraging during his "March to the Sea." He states "No doubt, many acts of pillage, robbery, and violence, were committed by these parties of foragers, usually called "bummers," for I have since heard of jewelry taken from women, and the plunder of articles that never reached the commissary; but these acts were exception and incidental. I have never heard of any cases of murder or rape; and no army could have carried along sufficient food and forage for a march of three hundred miles; so that foraging in some shape was necessary. The country was sparsely settled, with no magistrates or

concerns, Grant's move proved successful and he subsequently captured Vicksburg. Grant sent word of his victory to Lincoln by telegraph. It was much welcomed news to Lincoln who had also just received news of the victory at Gettysburg.⁴²⁸

Grant was successful at Vicksburg in part because of a new strategy he employed through General Sherman. During the campaign Sherman pursued a two-fold effort to entrench his forces and destroy southern railroads. His entrenchments shielded Grant from Confederate general Joseph E. Johnston's counter assault forces. Yet perhaps more importantly, it allowed Sherman to destroy Southern railroads and communications lines to prevent rapid reinforcements.⁴²⁹ At the end of the Vicksburg campaign, Sherman was ordered by General Halleck to take his corps and reinforce Grant in Tennessee after employing his army to the reconstruction of the railroad en route.⁴³⁰ The tactics of entrenching and destroying railroads would become key features of the Western Campaign.

The emphasis on destroying and rebuilding railroads were telling signs of the growing significance of industrialization to the war effort.⁴³¹ To that end, once Northern forces were in Tennessee, they realized that they could score two immediate victories. First, they could inflict a military defeat on the Confederate Army by trying to force it into a decisive battle. Second, they could cripple the South economically by severing vital railroad connections.⁴³² While skirmishes and battles continued to be fought on traditional battlefields, Grant and Sherman were some of the first generals to understand the growing connection between southern industrial enablers and their ability to wage war. Industrialization was rising from the background to the foreground.

civil authorities who could respond to requisitions, as is done in all the wars of Europe, so that this system of foraging was simply indispensable to our success."

⁴²⁸ Bates, *Lincoln in the Telegraph Office*, 156.

⁴²⁹ Hirshson, *The White Tecumseh*, 160.

⁴³⁰ Sherman, *Sherman*, 376.

⁴³¹ Clark, *Railroads in the Civil War*, 30.

⁴³² Mitchell, *Decisive Battles of the Civil War*, 164; Robert C. Black, *The Railroads of the Confederacy* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 4. Here black identifies the significant amount of rail lines Tennessee had in comparison to the rest of the Confederacy.

Sherman and Industrial Modernization in Warfare

General Sherman was one of the first to embrace industrial modernization in warfare. There were certainly other military figures who embraced industrial modernization, yet Sherman is noted here because through his actions and memoirs the shift in his approach to the war is clearly evident. Not only did his tactics change in the later stages of the war, he changed. His speech and actions reflected industrial modernization and industrial war as defined earlier in this study. It was the culmination of his experiences in the Western Campaign that reshaped his outlook on the war. He came to realize the center of gravity had shifted.

Sherman saw the futility of preindustrial warfare fought by increasingly modern means. He saw first-hand that bitter fighting in massive battles could not yield decisive victories in modern industrial warfare. This point was accentuated in the Battle of Chickamauga, Tennessee. Fought between Confederate General Braxton Bragg and Union General Rosecrans on 20-21 September 1863, the battle was one of the fiercest of the war.⁴³³ It undoubtedly left a deep impression on Sherman that a new strategy was needed to win the war. What he witnessed there was an example of industrialization's impact on the war. In the battle of Chickamauga alone, there were over 126,000 troops on the battlefield, 60,000 from the Union and 66,000 from the Confederates. In two days, the Union suffered over 16,000 casualties and the Confederates suffered over 18,000.⁴³⁴

One month after the Battle of Chickamauga, Sherman met up with Grant's forces in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Shortly after reporting in, they went to observe the Grant's battlefield position. In his account, Sherman states:

The next morning we walked out to Fort Wood, a prominent salient of the defenses of the place, and from its parapet we had a magnificent view of the panorama. Lookout Mountain, with its rebel flags and batteries, stood out boldly... All along Missionary Ridge were the tents of the rebel beleaguering force; the lines of trench from Lookout up toward Chickamauga were plainly visible; and rebel sentinels, in a continuous chain..."Why," said I, "General Grant, you are besieged;" and he said, "It is too true." Up to that moment I had no idea that things were so bad.⁴³⁵

⁴³³ Stoker, *The Grand Design*, 323.

⁴³⁴ Mitchell, *Decisive Battles of the Civil War*, 173.

⁴³⁵ Sherman, *Sherman*, 387.

The visual accounts of the Battle of Chattanooga support the main point, the nature of the war had changed drastically since the First Battle of Manassas.

Grant ordered Sherman to penetrate the enemy entrenchments and drive him out. The plan of action must have sent chills through Sherman because, in line with Clausewitz's lament over implementing "...the absurd practice of unreasonable theories." It accentuated the need to adapt their military rationale to the realities of modern warfare.⁴³⁶ In the following days, Sherman, as ordered, initiated a full-frontal assault against entrenched Confederate forces.⁴³⁷ Historian Peter Cozzens's account of the night before Sherman's assault signaled the developing reality of modern warfare in its early stages:

Throughout the long, bitterly cold night he had compelled his men to dissipate what remained of their strength in digging entrenchments and hauling cannon up the soggy slopes...Hardly anyone slept- those fortunate enough to escape fatigue duty found their blankets stiffen with frost only a few minutes after they laid them out on the ground. Most gave up any thought of rest and walked around in the dark to keep warm.⁴³⁸

Under those conditions, Sherman and his men began the assault. Braving for a time the hail of artillery and infantry fire, he suffered in total over 1,300 casualties in one engagement. The campaign was an ominous harbinger of the type of warfare that would take place in Europe at the turn of the twentieth century.⁴³⁹ It was also perhaps the first documented case in the Civil War of a commander instructing his forces to entrench while conducting an assault in an engagement; tactically solidifying his gains inch by inch.⁴⁴⁰ It was not be the last time Sherman implemented new tactics in the face of the changing nature of war.

The victories Union forces achieved between the years 1862 and 1863 came at a high cost in terms of human life. The generals who fought in them came to view completely destroying an enemy army as an unrealistic objective.⁴⁴¹ Like the locomotive of train novels, large modern fighting forces had come resistant to defeat by traditional means, i.e. decisive battlefield victories.⁴⁴² One example of this was Sherman's actions after Union

⁴³⁶ Hirshson, *The White Tecumseh*, Ibid., 160.

⁴³⁷ Cozzens, *The Shipwreck of their Hopes*, 135.

⁴³⁸ Ibid., 205.

⁴³⁹ Eksteins, *Rites of Spring*, 92.

⁴⁴⁰ Hagerman, *The American Civil War and The Origins of Modern Warfare*, 224.

⁴⁴¹ Hirshson, *The White Tecumseh*, 178.

⁴⁴² Weigley, *American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War*, 429.

forces captured Missionary Ridge on November 25, 1863. After the hard-fought victory Sherman did not order a pursuit of the withdrawing Confederate forces before him.⁴⁴³ Sherman came to recognize the same thing that McClellan recognized at Antietam. He concluded that the maxim of decisively enemy fighting forces on the battlefield had become fleeing at best. Even if Sherman could have destroyed the fleeing force, the cost of doing so was becoming too high. On this point, Gerald Linderman states:

...other forces at play in the Civil War signaled something far more potent than combat's cost in lives: that the very nature of combat did not fit, and could not be made to fit, within the framework of soldier expectations... Ultimately, they led many to the realization that they could not fight the war they had set out to fight.⁴⁴⁴

Linderman's statements are in line with Clausewitz's notion that the realities of war must eventually trump the theories of war. The mushroomed size of the fighting forces combined with their ability to reconstitute quickly because of industrial support simply did not fit within the traditional preindustrial model of warfare. The changing nature of warfare was rendering the Jominian principles of decisive tactical victories as a pathway to victory obsolete.

The Cost of Fighting Traditional War by Industrial Means

Historians who fail to understand the impact of the Industrial Revolution on the Civil War draw erroneous conclusions. Donald Stoker, Sears, considers Union officers' inability to decisively destroy Confederate forces after key victories as simply a failure to leverage the tactical advantages available to them.⁴⁴⁵ Contemporary social, political, and military historians often levy the same criticisms. Those criticisms are not without merit. However, they rarely, if ever, account for industrialization's impact on the war. Anecdotal assessments that rest primarily on lack of nerve or on incompetence offer poor explanations for why such a fundamental tenet of limited warfare was seldom achieved by either side in the war. The years 1862 to 1863, when viewed within the context of

⁴⁴³ Cozzens, *The Shipwreck of their Hopes*, 345.

⁴⁴⁴ Linderman, *Embattled Courage*, 134; Mountjoy, *Technology and the Civil War*, 14-15; and Menand, *The Metaphysical Club*, 49.

⁴⁴⁵ Stoker, *The Grand Design*, 331.

industrialization, show that the nature of the war changed exponentially while it was being fought.

It is difficult to fully analyze what affected these generals' decisions during those times without supporting context. One such example is logistics. As armies grew, the concepts of logistics necessarily became a focal point of warfare.⁴⁴⁶ Jomini began his eighteen rules on logistics trying to convince the reader of its growing importance to warfare.⁴⁴⁷ In doing so, he emphasized the relevance of logistics to marching, supplying, and protecting a large fighting force. Halleck, however, categorized logistics as little more than a method of accountability.⁴⁴⁸ Contrast Halleck's preindustrial West Point characterization of logistics to the historian Mark Wilson's observation of logistics during the Civil War. According to Wilson's account, "In four years, the Union supplied its soldiers with roughly 1 billion barrels of pork and 100 million pounds of coffee, 6 million woolen blankets, and 10 million pairs of trousers."⁴⁴⁹ Hagerman describes the challenges McClellan faced as unprecedented in warfare because multiple individual facets of the war were changing simultaneously, though at different rates.⁴⁵⁰ These issues reflect, at least in part, the stresses imposed on generals by industrialization that few seemed to have recognized as a possibility for the struggles of Union generals, from McClellan to Sherman. This observation does not absolve the leaders for the decisions they made. However, within the context of industrial modernization, there may be new realizations that can be added to the discussion as to why they made the decisions they did.

⁴⁴⁶ Dupree, *Science in the Federal Government*, 120-123. Here Dupree illustrates how Civil War technologies grew out of the intersection between science and technology borne out of the pressures of warfare.

⁴⁴⁷ Jomini, *The Art of War*, 195-97.

⁴⁴⁸ Halleck, *Elements of Military Art and Science*, 88-113.

⁴⁴⁹ Wilson, *The Business of Civil War*, 1.

⁴⁵⁰ Hagerman, *The American Civil War and The Origins of Modern Warfare*, 44.

Military Fracture

The period of military fracture begins with the Battle of Atlanta and ends at the conclusion of the war. At the conclusion of 1863, President Lincoln was pressed for time. He was under considerable pressure to have his generals win decisive victories as he fought for his political life.⁴⁵¹ Impatient citizens demanded the military to deliver the decisive victories it had promised to end the bloodshed and bring the war to a close.⁴⁵² What followed was an unparalleled shift in the application of military tactics, techniques, and procedures, which ultimately redefined what it meant to overcome the enemy and disarm him in warfare.

The Union strategy for winning the war became centered on exhausting the rebellious citizens of the South.⁴⁵³ By 1863, citizens on both sides of the national divide were war-weary.⁴⁵⁴ The flood of folks that once flocked to sign up had slowed to a trickle, forcing both sides to implement mandatory conscriptions.⁴⁵⁵ Yet even as public support for the war waned, neither side believed it could afford to back down or concede. Instead, both sides intensified their efforts to achieve the one doctrinal maxim that would bring the war to an end—destruction of the enemy army through decisive military victories.⁴⁵⁶ This sentiment is reflected in Clausewitz's statement; "The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war... the more important will the destruction of the enemy [becomes]..."⁴⁵⁷ The intense pressure of the situation fractured and then shattered the antiquated West Point model that had led to enormous losses on both sides.

⁴⁵¹ Sandburg, *Lincoln*, 274.

⁴⁵² Linderman, *Embattled Courage*, 220.

⁴⁵³ Stoker, *The Grand Design*, 229.

⁴⁵⁴ Rhodes, *History of the Civil War*, 389; Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), 90. Bauman establishing that emotional fervor is difficult to sustain in modern warfare.

⁴⁵⁵ Wish, *Society and Thought in Early America*, 538.

⁴⁵⁶ Smith, *U.S. Military Doctrine*, 56.

⁴⁵⁷ Clausewitz, *On War*, 99.

New Leadership and a New Strategy

The Oxford English Dictionary's definition of modernity is consistent with the changing nature of the war. In order for a modern military rationale to form, the traditional rationale of holding enemy territory and decisively destroying the enemy army had to be rejected.⁴⁵⁸ Although not uniform, both Union and Confederate leaders were forced change their approaches to the war.⁴⁵⁹ President Lincoln replaced his traditionalist generals with those willing to embrace the new realities of the war. He also searched for fresh military ideas to counterbalance southern army tactics as the Union penetrated the South.⁴⁶⁰

Lincoln wanted generals who could transcend the antiquated West Point offensive and defensive doctrines.⁴⁶¹ He lamented over his generals' inability to leverage the North's massive strategic advantages in money, materials, or manpower.⁴⁶² At the conclusion of the Vicksburg and Tennessee Campaigns, Lincoln appointed Grant commander of the Army of the Potomac in the Eastern Theater.⁴⁶³ Lincoln, in an attempt to ensure Grant's success for the intended summer campaigns, instituted a conscription order of 500,000 men in that same month.⁴⁶⁴ In a speech for Grant's promotion on 9 March 1864, Lincoln stated his cautious optimism that Grant would be able to defeat the Confederate army:

The nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to do, in the existing great struggle, are not presented with this commission, constituting you Lieutenant General in the Army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you also, a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that with what I here speak for the nation goes my own hearty personal concurrence.⁴⁶⁵

Lincoln would follow up his sentiments in a letter a month later to Grant stating:

Not expecting to see you again before the Spring campaign opens, I wish to express, in this way, my entire satisfaction with what you have done up to

⁴⁵⁸ Simpson, and Weiner, *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 948.

⁴⁵⁹ Ganoë, *History of the United States Army*, 292.

⁴⁶⁰ Stephen E. Woodworth, *Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns* (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 47.

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁴⁶² Stoker, *The Grand Design*, 218.

⁴⁶³ Sherman, *Sherman*, 463; and Bates, *Lincoln in the Telegraph Office*, 244.

⁴⁶⁴ Stoker, *The Grand Design*, 349.

⁴⁶⁵ Lincoln, "Speech to Ulysses S. Grant: March 9, 1864," in *Abraham Lincoln, Slavery, and the Civil War*, ed. Johnson, 265-266.

this time, so far as I understand it. The particulars of your plans I neither know, or seek to know. You are vigilant and self-reliant; and, pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you. While I am very anxious that any great disaster, or the capture of our men in great numbers, shall be avoided, I know these points are less likely to escape your attention than they would mine. If there is anything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it. And now with a brave Army, and just cause, may God sustain you.⁴⁶⁶

Lincoln felt that he had found a general up to the task of leveraging the full potential of industrialization in warfare to bring the war to an end. Before leaving the Western Theater, Grant placed Sherman, his trusted friend, in command of the Union Forces.

In 1864, Grant and Sherman implemented a new strategy that diverged sharply from the West Point limited warfare model. After the realignment of command in the Eastern and Western Theaters, Sherman and Grant created a new two-pronged strategy to achieve decisive victories.⁴⁶⁷ The first prong in their strategy was to defeat the Confederate military. The second prong was to destroy its industrial support apparatus. This strategy was differed from the West Point strategy because it was not anchored in securing territory and destroying enemy fixed fortifications. The most significant difference was in how it was implemented. The goal of their sledge-hammer and anvil approach was to decisively bring the war to a close by destroying the South's infrastructure while destroying its army in the East.⁴⁶⁸ They would carve through the body of the snake and smash its head. They reasoned that this action would create the decisive victory that would break the Confederate will to fight. An approving Lincoln hoped that it would also secure his re-election.

Historian Charles Royster poignantly characterizes modernization in warfare as “a state of mind, an outlook conducive to the worst in war.”⁴⁶⁹ He goes further in his assessment by referencing the elements that make modern war “appallingly frightful,” which is embodied in an attitude that accepts erosion of ethical considerations and the

⁴⁶⁶ Lincoln, “Letter to Ulysses S. Grant: April 30, 1864, in *Abraham Lincoln, Slavery, and the Civil War*, ed. Johnson, 266.

⁴⁶⁷ Bailey, *The Chessboard of War*, 2.

⁴⁶⁸ Grant, *Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant*, 463.

⁴⁶⁹ Royster, *The Destructive War*, 357.

willingness to employ an unlimited use of weaponry to achieve victory.⁴⁷⁰ I would make a minor change to Royster's argument by stating that industrialization changed "ethical considerations," which facilitated the "attitude" of unlimited force to achieve victory. Royster's assessment of the attitude of modern warfare is precisely what we will see manifest in both Grant and Sherman. In the East, Grant focused on implementing the first prong with a modern rationale—destroying the enemy army by continuous warfare. In the West, Sherman aimed to implement the second prong by destroying the South's true fortifications—its industrial economic centers. For Grant, the trench warfare he experienced in 1863 was a precursor to what he and his men would face from 1864 to the end of the war.⁴⁷¹ Bringing the war to a close would require hard fighting.

Grant and Continuous Warfare

Grant's prevailing rationale, although modern, still retained elements that were traditional at their core. To the end of the war, Grant's main goal remained the destruction of enemy forces, territorial occupation became secondary.⁴⁷² The immediate issue was that modernizing fighting forces were resistant to total destruction. Particularly in the East, Confederate forces had become too big to crush in battles. Grant's solution was to pursue a strategy of attrition through continuous warfare.⁴⁷³ Grant states that his goal of continuous warfare was not aimed at the Jominian principle of decisively winning tactical engagements. Instead he embraced the principles of Clausewitz, which were offensive operations aimed at crushing the enemy and destroying his will to fight:

From the very early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. . . From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had. . . until the military power of the rebellion was *entirely broken*. I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy. . . Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁷¹ Hagerman, *The American Civil War and The Origins of Modern Warfare*, 243.

⁴⁷² Stoker, *The Grand Design*, 373.

⁴⁷³ Linderman, *Embattled Courage*, 147.

enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be *nothing left to him but an equal submission*. . .⁴⁷⁴

In this statement Grant displays a line of reasoning that is aligned with the sense of inevitability that accompanied modernization. This is the same concept that has been presented in the social and political pillars of this study. His new rationale did not suffer from ails that Lincoln lamented in his predecessors. Grant would leverage his army's strengths in numerical superiority and technological productivity continually, like the locomotive, against Confederate forces until they were thoroughly smashed. Contrast Grant's statements to the West Point doctrine founded upon Jomini's principles. The two do not correlate to one another. Interestingly, there are a set of principles that Grant's reasoning does align with; Clausewitz:

The fighting forces must be *destroyed*: that is they must be *put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight*. Whenever we use the phrase 'destruction of the enemy's forces' this alone is what we mean. The country must be occupied; otherwise the enemy could raise fresh military forces. Yet both these things may be done and the war that is the animosity and the reciprocal effects of hostile elements, cannot be considered to have ended so long as the enemy's will has not been *broken*: in other words, so long as the enemy government and its allies have not been driven to ask for peace, or the population made to submit.⁴⁷⁵

The changed conditions in new reality of war did not submit to the principles of Jomini. This is not to say that speedy maneuver and attacking enemy lines of communication and supply became obsolete; they just became insufficient to deliver decisive victories in the face of massive armies supported by industrial population centers. The model proposed by Clausewitz embraced the grizzly nature of bloody combat fueled by the passion of the people.⁴⁷⁶ Simply shifting from the Jomini model to the Clausewitz model does not in itself signify modernization. It was his machine-like application of continuous warfare with the sense of inevitability that was modern. Now that we have established that Grant transitioned in his thinking from the West Point model to an emerging modern rationale, let us look at how he applied it on the battlefield.

⁴⁷⁴ Grant, *Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant*, 46 (emphasis added); and Weigley, *American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War*, 430-434.

⁴⁷⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, 102 (emphasis added).

⁴⁷⁶ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 134.

One example of Grant's application of his new rationale can be seen in the Battle of Cold Harbor from 31 May to 12 June 1864. The featured the characteristics of modern warfare: trench warfare, massive casualties, and high-intensity, short-duration battles. Confederate Captain A. B. Mulligan described the scene at Cold Harbor in a letter to his family: "Yankee lines with 10,000 troops and a quantity of artillery consisting in all by far the greatest mounted army ever known in this country and perhaps in the world. His avowed object being to conquer the whole of Virginia tearing up railroads, burning bridges..."⁴⁷⁷ Out of the 60,000 troops under Grant's command at Cold Harbor, one unit attempting a frontal assault on an entrenched Confederate position sustained 3,500 casualties, in 8 minutes.⁴⁷⁸ Of the battle Grant stated:

I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. . . At Cold harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were for the Confederate side. Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight them "one Confederate to five Yanks." Indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the Army of the Potomac.⁴⁷⁹

His tactic of continual warfare in the face of devastating losses gained him the infamous nickname "the butcher."⁴⁸⁰ Grant undoubtedly struggled with the staggering losses of life during his Eastern campaign; yet, he continuously engaged the enemy, wearing him down with the power of modern weaponry. Warfare had turned a corner.

⁴⁷⁷A. B. Mulligan Jr., "My Dear Mother and Sisters": *Civil War Letters of Capt. A. B. Mulligan, Co. B 5th South Carolina Cavalry- Butler's Division- Hampton's Corps 1861- 1865*, ed. Olin F. Hutchinson Jr. (Spartanburg: The Reprint Company, Publishers, 1992), 128.

⁴⁷⁸Stoker, *The Grand Design*, 372. For a detailed description of how advanced trench warfare and field fortifications were in the campaign see Earl J. Hess, *In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat* (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 2009).

⁴⁷⁹Grant, *Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant*, 344.

⁴⁸⁰Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 232.

Sherman and the Buildup to Atlanta

In the West, Sherman took command of Union armies in March 1864, and was immediately urged by Lincoln and Grant to chase and destroy of the rebel army in his vicinity.⁴⁸¹ Sherman's first objective was General Johnston's army, whom he had scuffled with while guarding Grant's flank in Vicksburg. He subsequently chased him in tit-for-tat skirmishes until he defeated him at Kennesaw Mountain in July 1864.⁴⁸² In a letter to General Halleck Sherman spoke of the difficulties at Kennesaw:

We continue to press forward on the principle of an advance against fortified positions. The whole country is one vast fort, and Johnson must have at least fifty miles of connected trenches, with abates and finished batteries. We gain ground daily, fighting all the time. On the 21st General Stanley gained a position near the south end of Kenesaw, from which the enemy attempted in vain to drive him; and the same day General T. J. Wood's division took a hill, which the enemy assaulted three times at night without success, leaving more than a hundred dead on the ground. Yesterday . . . the enemy made a strong effort to drive them away, but failed, leaving two hundred dead on the field. Our lines are now in close contact, and the fighting is incessant, with a good deal of artillery-fire. . . I think we will soon have to let go of Kenesaw, which is the key to the whole country.⁴⁸³

Sherman's words speak to the difficulties he faced at Kennesaw Mountain. He ultimately prevailed in those skirmishes by conducting massive frontal assaults, but paid a heavy price of over 2000 casualties.⁴⁸⁴

Sherman's victory freed him to lay siege to Atlanta. It also underscored to Sherman that frontal assaults yielded maximum risk for minimal gain. Following Johnston's defeat, Jefferson Davis promptly replaced him with General John Bell Hood, which Sherman learned of through an Atlanta newspaper.⁴⁸⁵ Sherman was ordered to pursue Hood's army. Although he understood that fighting Hood for traditional objectives while extended in the South would put him at a major disadvantage, he followed his orders. While aggressively

⁴⁸¹ Williams, *Lincoln and His Generals*, 306-307.

⁴⁸² Stoker, *The Grand Design*, 358.

⁴⁸³ Sherman, *Sherman*, 530.

⁴⁸⁴ Linderman, *Embattled Courage*, 136.

⁴⁸⁵ Hirshson, *The White Sherman*, 228.

pursuing Hood, Sherman destroyed as much Southern railroad and economic infrastructure as he could along the way.⁴⁸⁶ He would leave few stones unturned.

Sherman's mission highlighted all the disadvantages noted in Halleck's West Point offensive versus defensive theory. While chasing Hood through Georgia, Sherman developed two main conclusions for why he could not destroy the Confederate Army in the West. First, the smaller Southern army had better knowledge of the terrain and engaged in effective guerilla tactics.⁴⁸⁷ Secondly, his invasion of the South galvanized the resistance to rally together for the defense of the homeland.⁴⁸⁸ During his pursuit of traditional objectives in southern territory, Sherman continued to internalize the significance industrialized centers had on the South's ability to wage war. In 1864, both Northern and Southern industrial centers were indispensable extensions of their militaries.⁴⁸⁹ Rather than destroy the military to destroy the resistance, it was becoming apparent to Sherman that the principle should be inverted. To destroy the military, one needed to destroy the resistance.

The Southern military strategy was primarily defensive with the intent of protecting the critical infrastructure that allowed it to continue the war.⁴⁹⁰ Confederates could wait engage Union forces on favorable grounds. If Confederate forces were locked in an unfavorable engagement, they could slip back into the well-known terrain, denying Union forces the decisive victories they sought. Confederates understood that the North desperately sought decisive military victories to boost its population's morale and increase Lincoln's chances of being re-elected.⁴⁹¹ In the North they knew that every casualty, minor victory, or defeat symbolized Lincoln's inability to bring the war to an end. The Confederate political strategy for the 1864 presidential election was to promote the perception that they would fight to the last southerner. With each day that the war continued, the South

⁴⁸⁶ Sherman, *Sherman*, 571; Black, *The Railroads of the Confederacy*, 250; and Clark, *Railroads in the Civil War*, 61. Here Clark illustrates the significance of Sherman's railroad destruction as Hood was forced to destroy invaluable locomotives and cars that he could not get out because the railway had been severed.

⁴⁸⁷ Weigely, *The American Way of War*, 123.

⁴⁸⁸ A.A. Hoehling, *Last Train from Atlanta* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff Press, 1958), 38.

⁴⁸⁹ B. H. Liddell-Hart, *Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1958), 272.

⁴⁹⁰ Hagerman, *The American Civil War and The Origins of Modern Warfare*, 152.

⁴⁹¹ Rhodes, *History of the Civil War*, 226.

was strengthening its case politically. Another letter written by Captain Mulligan just before the 1864 elections showed his confidence in the Southern political strategy: "By October I expect to get a furlough. Our peace prospects are getting brighter every day and the time is not far distant, I trust, when I shall be able to lay aside my sword and return to the usual avocations of my life and to you my dearest mother."⁴⁹²

Sherman understood the political calculations the South had made but was unable to decisively engage Hood's army during the latter half of July of 1864.⁴⁹³ The July skirmishes did, however, result in heavy casualties on both sides, but Hood's forces sustained the most. The lop-sided manpower losses occurred during the Battles of Peachtree Creek (5,000 to 1,800), Decatur (10,000 to 3,700), and Ezra Church (5,000 to 600). One reason for the disparity in losses was that Sherman fought almost solely from entrenched defensive positions while Hood conducted frontal assaults.⁴⁹⁴ The losses had a withering effect on Hood's ability to put pressure on Sherman's forces. It also severely limited Hood's ability to prevent Sherman from laying siege to Atlanta, a massive economic industrial hub of the confederacy.

Atlanta was strategically significant in large part because it was the last major railroad junction that connected the eastern and western Confederate states.⁴⁹⁵ Sherman and Grant had previously devised plan to capture Atlanta if the opportunity presented itself.⁴⁹⁶ Seeing Hood hobbled, Sherman decided to break contact and lay siege to Atlanta. While laying siege, Sherman corresponded with the city mayor for terms of surrendering the city. After several debates with the mayor over terms of surrender and the merits of the siege, Sherman decided to occupy the city by force.⁴⁹⁷

Sherman's capture of Atlanta both solved and created problems. The capture secured Lincoln's primary political objective by instilling confidence in northern populace

⁴⁹² Mulligan, *My Dear Mother and Sisters*, 144.

⁴⁹³ Tom Osborne, *The Fiery Trail: A Union Officers Account of Sherman's Last Campaigns*, ed. Richard Barksdale Harwell and Phillip N. Racine (Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press, 1986), 9.

⁴⁹⁴ Linderman, *Embattled Courage*, 137.

⁴⁹⁵ Richard Wheeler, *Sherman's March: An Eye Witness Account of the Cruel Campaign that helped end a Cruel War* (New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Publishers, 1978), 28.

⁴⁹⁶ Hagerman, *The American Civil War and The Origins of Modern Warfare*, 276.

⁴⁹⁷ Sherman, *Sherman*, 588.

that the Union could win the war.⁴⁹⁸ Yet once secured, Sherman had to request additional forces to police the Atlanta population and prevent them from aiding rebel forces.⁴⁹⁹ Observing Atlanta's women and children feeding and supplying Confederate forces showed him that rebellious citizens posed as much a threat as their army.⁵⁰⁰

The observations Sherman made during his campaigns in the West crystallized in Atlanta. In putting together all the lessons he had learned in the West, Sherman concluded that the true adversary resided within the Southern industrial centers.⁵⁰¹ With that recognition, he realized it would be all but impossible to win the war within the traditional framework.⁵⁰² Seizing and occupying hostile industrial centers while relying on extended supply lines were already daunting tasks. Those tasks, combined with the burden of chasing down, and decisively destroying rogue armies, made the situation all but impossible. In capturing his prize, he realized that he may be in danger of being overextended in the heart of enemy territory.

Throughout his campaigns Sherman had become familiar with occupying Southern industrial centers. He recalled how women and children in factories fueled the Southern war effort in Vicksburg.⁵⁰³ The practice of employing women and children in factories had become a common occurrence since the beginning of the war because states shared responsibility for supplying men with clothing, equipment, and weapons.⁵⁰⁴ What made the situation different in the South was the population's belligerence towards Union forces. In Vicksburg, Grant ultimately applied elements of hard war to gain control and to protect his forces. Union forces stripped the Vicksburg area of resources, including personal effects from civilians' homes to both deprive the southern military resistance and to sustain his army.⁵⁰⁵ Perhaps in a moment of empathy, after stripping the town, Grant authorized food and supplies to be offered to the women and children. Sherman came to see the inhabitants of Atlanta in harsher terms than Grant did in Vicksburg.

⁴⁹⁸ Goodwin, *Team of Rivals*, 656.

⁴⁹⁹ Hoehling, *Last Train from Atlanta*, 41.

⁵⁰⁰ Wheeler, *Sherman's March*, 30.

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁵⁰² See note 25.

⁵⁰³ Grimsley, *The Harsh hand of War*, 142.

⁵⁰⁴ Wilson, *The Business of Civil War*, 12.

⁵⁰⁵ Hirshson, *The White Tecumseh*, 161.

Vicksburg and Atlanta offer snapshots of how much the nature of the war had changed for civilians since the picnics of Bull Run. Accordingly, Sherman reasoned that other southern industrial population centers would require the same level of occupation. At that point, Sherman deduced that the enemies in industrial warfare were the South's industrial economic hubs.⁵⁰⁶ In doing so, he reversed the military axiom that to defeat a people, one must defeat their military.⁵⁰⁷ By his calculations, when the people fueling the enemy army were brought to obedience, then the war would end.⁵⁰⁸

Sherman's changed rationale at Atlanta was a turning point in the way he fought the remainder of the war. In line with the definitions presented for modernization presented earlier in this study, he began to view himself as an arbiter prosecuting war against the South for the sake of re-instituting order.⁵⁰⁹ In order to accomplish his goal he internalized industrial modernization. The outcome of this internalization was Sherman's dispassionate machine-like use of force to break the South's industrial infrastructure, crushing its will to fight in the process.⁵¹⁰ The following quotes from Sherman illustrate his rationale. In a confidential letter to General Halleck Sherman foreshadowed the treatment he would give to the southern population:

God knows that I deplore this fratricidal war as much as any man living, but it is upon us, a physical fact; and there is only one honorable issue from it. We must fight it out, and civilians begin to realize the fact, that reconciliation and reconstruction will be easier through and by means of strong, well-equipped, and organized armies than through any species of conventions that can be framed.⁵¹¹

For Sherman the time for talking was over, only an uncompromising use of force would bring the southern population back into the fold. Another example of Sherman's rationale is evidence in perhaps a more well-known letter he wrote to the Mayor of Atlanta, James M. Calhoun, where he stated:

⁵⁰⁶ Osborne, *The Fiery Trail*, 33.

⁵⁰⁷ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 149.

⁵⁰⁸ William Sherman, *Sherman's Selected Correspondence of Civil War: William T. Sherman, 1860-1861* (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 542.

⁵⁰⁹ Eksteins, *Rites of Spring*, 92.

⁵¹⁰ Liddell-Hart, *Sherman*, 334; and Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, 103. Bauman establishes that systematic, machine-like destruction of the enemy is a trait of modern warfare.

⁵¹¹ Sherman, *Sherman*, 366.

I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have peace and a division of our country. If the United States submits to a division now, it will not stop. . . The United States does and must assert its authority. . . Once admit the Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the national Government, and, instead of devoting your houses and streets and roads to the dread uses of war, I and this army become at once your protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger. . . We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your houses, or your lands, or any thing you have, *but we do want and will have a just obedience to the laws of the United States*. That we will have, and, if it involves the destruction of your improvements, we cannot help it.⁵¹²

Sherman's rationale is on full display in the Atlanta note. He demands obedience to the order of the law and dispassionately declares that he will destroy whatever is necessary to achieve it. Sherman's deductions also reveal a sense of probing for his enemy's true vulnerabilities in the emerging nature of warfare. Through his hard-fought experiences he knew he could not decisively destroy the enemy army by traditional military means. His writing to the mayor of Atlanta goes a step further in displaying that was no longer particularly interested in trying to.⁵¹³ He had found the enemy center of gravity. It was a significant leap from the traditional military rationale for Sherman to elevate the economic and industrial spheres to levels previously reserved for fighting forces.⁵¹⁴

To briefly summarize, Sherman came to a turning point in his rationale much like Grant did, albeit in his own way. Sherman fought through the Tennessee Campaign and remained in the Confederate controlled west after Grant went east. It was the culmination of his experiences in fighting Confederate forces and dealing with the hostile southern population that solidified his new conclusion that the will of the people was tied to their ability to generate combat power by way of their economic industrial hubs. Sherman came to view the hubs of Vicksburg, Atlanta, Savannah, and other major Confederate cities as more than mere strategic points; they were the heart of the enemy resistance. If he could destroy them, he could break the enemy's will to continue the war. In the heart of the South, the decisive blow would be dealt not on the battlefield, but in the city center.

⁵¹² Ibid., 601.

⁵¹³ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 163.

⁵¹⁴ Liddell-Hart, *Sherman*, 308.

Sherman and Hard War

Sherman's new plan to pursue industrial economic centers was not immediately accepted by his superiors. Although Sherman displayed the kind of thinking Lincoln was looking for since the beginning of the Tennessee Campaign,⁵¹⁵ Grant was not totally convinced.⁵¹⁶ Grant denied Sherman's proposal to target economic centers as too risky.⁵¹⁷ It was too radical for a Union general to openly reject the pursuit of Confederate forces, even if the intent was for a larger prize. Ironically, Grant himself had requested authorization to engage in this type of exhaustive warfare from Halleck in the winter of 1863, but he was denied for practically the same reason.⁵¹⁸

Instead, Sherman was instructed to finish off Hood's rogue army.⁵¹⁹ Grant convinced Sherman that without the threat of Hood, he could next raid Savannah to deal another crippling blow to the Confederate infrastructure.⁵²⁰ Sherman followed orders as instructed and chased Hood out of Georgia. Yet he returned to Atlanta determined to implement his new strategy.⁵²¹ In late 1864, Hood was ordered to consolidate his forces in support of another war effort.⁵²² Under those conditions, Sherman's plan to smash through the Confederate South like a hammer and link up with Grant's anvil forces was approved.⁵²³

Sherman's plan was based on his new modern military rationale. His plan was to apply hard war by "strike[ing] out into the heart of Georgia, and make for Charleston, Savannah, or the mouth of Apalachicola... and into the very bowels of the Confederacy."⁵²⁴ A part of that strategy, however, would break one of Jomini's maxims:

never to attempt [an invasion] without having secured the hearty and constant alliance of a respectable power near enough the field of operations to afford a proper base, where supplies of every kind may be

⁵¹⁵ Sherman, *Sherman*, 614.

⁵¹⁶ Charles E. Vetter, *Sherman: Merchant of Terror, Advocate of Peace* (Gretna: Pelican Publishing Company, 1992), 190.

⁵¹⁷ Sherman, *Sherman*, 558.

⁵¹⁸ Hagerman, *The American Civil War and The Origins of Modern Warfare*, 244.

⁵¹⁹ Ganoe, *History of the United States Army*, 293- 294.

⁵²⁰ Hagerman, *The American Civil War and The Origins of Modern Warfare*, 283.

⁵²¹ Sherman, *Sherman*, 584.

⁵²² Stoker, *The Grand Design*, 380.

⁵²³ Sherman, *Sherman*, 639.

⁵²⁴ Quoted in Liddell-Hart, *Sherman*, 323.

accumulated, and which may also in case of reverse serve as a refuge and afford new means of resuming the offensive.⁵²⁵

Sherman had come full-circle. He was now promoting the very position he had opposed while with Grant in Vicksburg. Sherman understood that it would be impossible to cut through the economic centers of the south with an ever increasing supply chain.⁵²⁶ He would have to forage.

By foraging he would be able compound the crippling effects of destroying Confederate economic centers. Sherman's Special Field Order, Number 120 to his soldiers before he embarked on his mission through the South displays his confidence in his new plan and his rationale to destroy only property capable of furthering the Confederate war effort:

3. There will be no general train of supplies. . . .
4. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march...
5. To Corps commanders alone is entrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc. . . In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted...⁵²⁷

In a traditional setting, coupling foraging with hard war would create the text-book type of risk Halleck adamantly warned against. The fear was that it would enrage the local populace and cause them to sabotage the invading force.⁵²⁸ An enraged populace was much more likely to destroy and frustrate supply lines and future operations. As discussed earlier, Grant was mindful of this reality. Used mostly as a defensive measure, Grant used foraging in a manner consistent with Halleck's observations, as a last effort to preserve his fighting force while laying siege at Vicksburg.

For Sherman, Halleck's warnings did not apply. His intention was not to occupy southern population centers, but rather to destroy them. He understood that with confederate forces diminished, an agitated population would be powerless to stop his army as it marched through the South. This is a point worth emphasizing. We see now that the traditional consequences of foraging did not apply because Sherman was employing it for a modern reason. While the notion of destroying population centers was not new to warfare,

⁵²⁵ Jomini, *The Art of War*, 131-32.

⁵²⁶ Hagerman, *The American Civil War and The Origins of Modern Warfare*, 208-209.

⁵²⁷ Sherman, *Sherman*, 651.

⁵²⁸ Halleck, *Elements of Military Art and Science*, 94-97.

the rationale for why Sherman decided to destroy them was. The significance of Sherman's change in rationale will be explored as this chapter proceeds.

Beginning with Atlanta, Sherman's plan was to destroy the South's industrial economic hubs rather than occupy them. Although he was perhaps the visionary of this strategy, Sherman did not execute this plan in a vacuum. He was authorized to implement his plan of hard war by his superiors, Lincoln and Grant. They allowed him to pursue it because his modern reasoning showed that industrial centers were the lynchpin to the war effort.⁵²⁹ The Northern population also accepted this strategy. They did so because it was presented as orderly, restrained, and on the whole, dispassionately executed.⁵³⁰ Sherman presented his case as the most cost efficient method of breaking the Southern resistance.⁵³¹ Sherman's purpose for hard war was to destroy the South's ability to wage war; not to punish it.⁵³² It is important to note that although the nature of warfare was changing, sustained acts of barbarism would fly in the face of professional soldiers.⁵³³ Understanding Sherman's rationale from Atlanta to the end of the war puts his use of hard war in the context and distinguishes his acts from abject barbarism.⁵³⁴

Sherman's approval to implement hard war on industrial centers was a striking example of how much warfare had evolved. Once Sherman was ready to march on from Atlanta, he ordered the inhabitants to leave, offering them safe travel.⁵³⁵ Once the city was evacuated, he ordered his army to destroy the remaining railway and burn the industrial district.⁵³⁶ The roaring fire served as notice to the remaining economic centers of the South that the dynamics of warfare had changed. If Confederates continued to resist, more industrial centers would be destroyed.⁵³⁷

⁵²⁹ Liddell-Hart, *Sherman*, 315.

⁵³⁰ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 181.

⁵³¹ Sherman, *Sherman's Selected Correspondence of Civil War*, 550.

⁵³² Hoehling, *Last Train from Atlanta*, 225.

⁵³³ Wheeler, *Sherman's March*, 160.

⁵³⁴ William Sherman, "War is Hell!": *William T. Sherman's Personal Narrative of His March Through Georgia* (Georgia: The Beehive Press, 1974), 108.

⁵³⁵ Wheeler, *Sherman's March*, 40.

⁵³⁶ Rhodes, *History of the Civil War*, 405.

⁵³⁷ Sherman, *Sherman*, 585; and Bailey, *The Chessboard of War*, 15.

Sherman strategically attacked industrial centers because he determined they were heart of the southern military resistance.⁵³⁸ He committed himself to systematic destruction of the enemy with machine-like efficiency, which was in every way a modern aspect of warfare.⁵³⁹ Not only was the influence of industrial modernization apparent in this line of thinking, the significant point to note here is that Sherman's assessment was spot on. He concluded that if he destroyed the Southern factories, homes, and farms where shoes, shirts, and muskets were made, defeating the army would become inconsequential.⁵⁴⁰ The operations against the railroads and economic industrial centers indeed had a significant impact on the South.⁵⁴¹ In a letter sent home in May 1864, the once optimistic Captain Mulligan wrote:

The money I send you is worth but little now. It may be utterly worthless by the fall... If we do not whip the Yankees soon it will take \$10,000 to purchase a pound of tea.⁵⁴²

Sherman systematically applied hard war. Perhaps most terrifying to the local inhabitants was how Sherman executed his plan. Before arriving, he sent warnings to the inhabitants that his army was going to raze their city.⁵⁴³ As Sherman maneuvered through the South, it harkened back to the locomotive narrative. Confederate forces tried to detract and derail Sherman's approach, but they could not stop the seemingly inevitable progress of the Union locomotive. His methodical march of destruction from one industrial economic population center to another exposed the Confederate Army's weakness in full view of the victims bound on the tracks. With every southern industrial center that was destroyed, Confederate forces grew weaker.⁵⁴⁴ The campaign also demoralized Confederate soldiers as they received news of the destruction of their hometowns and cities.⁵⁴⁵ At that point, the South felt the weight of a looming Northern victory.

⁵³⁸ Liddell-Hart, *Sherman*, 305.

⁵³⁹ Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989),103.

⁵⁴⁰ Sherman, *Sherman's Selected Correspondence of Civil War*, 544-549.

⁵⁴¹ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 203.

⁵⁴² Mulligan, "My Dear Mother and Sisters", 118.

⁵⁴³ Wheeler, *Sherman's March*, 21.

⁵⁴⁴ Mulligan, "My Dear Mother and Sisters", 153.

⁵⁴⁵ Hoehling, *Last Train from Atlanta*,255.

The major industrial and communications centers from Savannah to Raleigh were systematically degraded or destroyed. By the time Sherman reached Grant for the final phases of the war, the cost of the destruction inflicted on the South was estimated at over \$100 million in contemporary dollars.⁵⁴⁶ The financial devastation sustained by the South was a tangible indicator of an even greater psychological devastation.⁵⁴⁷ The North also paid a heavy price for the war: over \$1.8 billion dollars, eclipsing the total cost of all wars fought by the United States up to that point combined.⁵⁴⁸ The collective number of soldiers killed in action was 623,026; the number of casualties is estimated to be 1,094,453.⁵⁴⁹ This terrible price was paid by the entire nation.⁵⁵⁰

News of the turning of events of late 1864 was well received in the North, as its people regarded the previous four years of war as "...a fearful foreboding of evil, a dread of the future... we could scarcely see any light."⁵⁵¹ As the light of victory dawned in the North, the darkness and gloom of defeat set in on the smoldering South. The results of Sherman's forces in the final year of the war reflected his clear intent to decisively destroy the South's critical points of vulnerability.⁵⁵² To that end he was successful. The campaign crippled the South in a way that made it impossible to continue or resist.⁵⁵³

Sherman's rationale in applying hard war exposed something many southerners failed to grasp: Sherman's actions worked because Confederates were vitally connected to industrialization. Most in the South, however, perceived Sherman's actions through a traditional lens. After the burning of Atlanta, Confederate President Jefferson Davis declared that Sherman was too far extended and would suffer the same fate as Napoleon during his disastrous retreat from Moscow in 1812.⁵⁵⁴ Southerners saw the destruction as vengefully motivated to inflict psychological and emotional pain. Sherman, however,

⁵⁴⁶ Wilson, *The Business of Civil War*, 1.

⁵⁴⁷ Liddell-Hart, *Sherman*, 346.

⁵⁴⁸ Wilson, *The Business of Civil War*, 1.

⁵⁴⁹ Linderman, *Embattled Courage*, 125.

⁵⁵⁰ See Faust, *This Republic of Suffering*.

⁵⁵¹ Goodwin, *Team of Rivals*, 684.

⁵⁵² Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 204.

⁵⁵³ Vetter, *Sherman*, 194.

⁵⁵⁴ Stoker, *The Grand Design*, 379.

viewed the psychological effects of his strategy as a consequence the South brought upon itself.

Although not uniform, both the North and South fully embraced industrialization in their efforts to win the war. In this sense, Stoker's contention that the Civil War had elements of warfare that ranged from the medieval practices of burning crops and villages, to elements of industrial modern warfare through examples of mobilizing industry and trench warfare is accurate.⁵⁵⁵ His argument shows that many methods of warfare were employed during the Civil War simultaneously, including hard war and foraging. The individual forms were not in and of themselves new or modern concepts at the time of the Civil War.

The factors that transformed these varying forms into Modris Eksteins' vision of modern warfare were two-fold: First was the effect industrial centers had on enhancing military size, scope, and lethality of the war. Second were the rational deductions that Union generals like Grant and Sherman made in the face of escalating industrial warfare that allowed them realize the lynchpin of enemy resistance had changed. Although they industrialized at different rates, the North and South had come to rely on industrialization. Each relied on it enough to leverage its advantages and to become susceptible to the weaknesses of modern warfare.

Summary of the Military Pillar

America began the Nineteenth-Century with a fledgling regular army. It was plagued with a general sense of distrust for standing armies amongst the populace and a lack of political support and funding. The country much preferred to rely on its state supported militia system. The country's growing security requirements along with a disastrous start to the War of 1812 exposed the weaknesses of the militia system. Following the war the Congress moved to substantially increase the size of the regular army and West Point sought to establish a new doctrine for its military officers. The two dominant European military theories of the time were the Napoleonic model codified in writing by Antoine de Jomini and the Prussian model codified by Carl von Clausewitz. West Point chose Jomini, which focused on the science of warfare rather than Clausewitz's art of warfare. The

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid., 374.

Jominian model focused on winning a calculated series of engagements that ultimately rendered the enemy incapable of continuing the fight. Clausewitz's model focused on crushing the enemy center of gravity, destroying their will to fight. West Point accentuated two aspects of the Napoleonic principles espoused by Jomini. The first was that disciplined battlefield maneuvers during offensive operations produced decisive tactical victories. The second was that establishing and destroying field fortifications were critical components to sustaining battlefield victories.

The lessons of West Point were solidified by the army's victory in the Mexican American War. It was during that time that the army developed an apolitical culture, which made it indifferent to the social and political issues the country faced following industrialization. The army became further insulated from social and political issues because its teachings kept its focus on preindustrial European tactics, which had won it a great victory. The Civil War began in the model that the Mexican-American War ended. The First Battle of Manassas is one example of how both the Union and Confederates employed preindustrial European-style tactics in battle. It is the early stages of the war that we also begin to see industrialization employed to augment the war effort beginning with the establishment of the wartime telegraph and use of railroads to transport troops to the battlefield. The Second Battle of Manassas is an example of perhaps the apex of the offensive tactics and strategies of the West Point doctrine. Yet even with the excellence with which Confederates employed artillery, infantry, and cavalry on the battlefield, it produced a result unlike any that had been seen before—enormous casualties. Second Manassas served as both a high water mark and a turning point in the War.

If Second Manassas was a turning point for traditional warfare, Antietam and Gettysburg were the breaking points. The size and scope of the battles coupled with the massive losses of life were unsustainable. From that point forward Union Generals like Grant and Sherman began to seek new ways to achieve the decisive battlefield victories that would bring the war to a close. The modern ideology that transformed the way the war was fought came out of the Western Theatre. There, under fierce combat soldiers abandoned the traditional notion that dying on the open field of battle in favor of living to fight another day. They realized that in the face of improved munitions and massive armies pouring withering showers of lead onto concentrated points, wading into open fields was

suicide. It is at that point that entrenching became a central component of the war. It was in the Western Campaign that both Grant and Sherman began to employ methods of warfare in line with a modern ideology. They began to speak and act in terms that were previously highlighted in the chapter on the social pillar, but yet unseen in the war—machine-like discipline, dispassionate destruction for the sake of order, the futility of resistance, and the brooding power of inevitability.

Grant and Sherman coupled the modern industrial rationale to the traditional two-prongs of the West Point doctrine in different ways, both with resounding success. Grant modified the first prong of offensive operations to destroy the enemy force in a decisive battlefield victory. To do this he employed a form of attrition warfare, which he terms continuous warfare. Sherman modified the Second prong of gaining and controlling enemy territory by destroying and establishing field fortifications until it became impracticable for the enemy to continue the fight. He did this by destroying rather than capturing the Confederacy's major industrial hubs. By breaking from the traditional preindustrial European warfare model they were able to achieve the decisive battlefield victories that had long eluded the Union. By replacing the Jominian model of limited warfare with a model more in line with the teachings of Clausewitz, they were able to fully harness the power of industrial warfare. Once harnessed, they were able to crush Confederate will to fight, decisively bringing the war to a close.

CONCLUSION

The central question of this thesis is what caused the American Civil War. I have sought to show in this study that the American Industrial Revolution provides the explanation. After the Industrial Revolution took hold in America, the country's social, political, and military landscape changed. The nation was transformed from holding a generally uniform mindset to one separated along ideological lines. This investigation explores positive correlations between social, political, and military events of the period and the threads that connect them. The narrative of a consistently visible ideological clash between traditional and modern rationales is not meant to create a cause-and-effect relationship between industrialization modernization and the Civil War. Yet, in light of these correlations, the ideological conflict between traditionalism and modernization does help explain how and why the period was characterized by such profound change.

Modernization and traditionalism provide vehicles for understanding the transitions that occurred after the Industrial Revolution. The impact of industrialization touched all aspects of American life. This study reviews the effects in separate social, political, and military sections to show the depth and breadth of change that occurred in those days. Each section in this study gives examples that reflect a common thread of ideological friction and change. The adversarial relationship between modernity and tradition provides predictable patterns that can be confirmed or disconfirmed by the same group of events. The pattern has three general phases: cohesion, instability, and ultimately a fracture.

The social impact of industrialization began in cities. Before the Industrial Revolution in America, the social landscape was predominantly agrarian. Most Americans looked to agriculture to define the relationship with the world and to each other. It was a culture that relied on religion and proven habits of the past to understand the present and the unknown of the future. The technological advantages of industrialization changed the definition of nature for those working in and around factories. The creation of an alternative ideology, even in its infancy, produced social challenges and changes. Industrial population centers took on a new ideological rationale: modernization.

Modernization was based on an industrial nature which looked towards of the future with little regard for the past. Urban areas took the first steps toward social realignment by questioning and redefining traditional mores and norms. As rural traditionalists and modernizing urban areas began to clash, economics came to the fore.⁵⁵⁶ The newfound economic influence of northern cities, combined with their position on free wage labor, was a threat to those in the agricultural South.

Before the revolution, most Americans viewed politics as a necessary evil to accomplish large general tasks. Political parties emerged due to mounting economic tensions between agricultural and industrializing sections of America. The main economic question was how much support should be diverted from agriculture to industry. Agricultural traditionalists viewed the question as an affront to their economic livelihood and way of life. A secondary question that emerged was whether the nation should be a free wage labor society or a slave owning society. As political parties grew in importance, they began to splinter and realign along geographic lines. The realigned parties became densely packed geographic entities that struggled to compromise on social, economic, or political issues. In the final stages before the outbreak of the war, earnest attempts to form compromises were unsuccessful. In the wake of the retreating political middle ground, the final attempts at compromise resulted in secession.

The military was an institution little affected by the turmoil sweeping through the country. The result was a military that began the war fighting in a traditional fashion despite the advances of industrialization. Traditional strategy and tactics gave way to necessity as the war dragged on. Social and political pressure from both sides forced field commanders to break from traditional tactics. They exploited the advances of modernization to achieve decisive victories to bring the war to a close.

By the end of the 1862, there was intense social and political pressure from both sides to bring the war to a close. In an effort to break the enemy's will and destroy his army, generals on both sides increasingly relied on industrialization to gain decisive military advantages. The initial result of incorporating industrialization into the war expanded the battlefield to include civilians who supported the effort. Incorporating industrialization

⁵⁵⁶ MountJoy, *Technology and the Civil War*, 15-16.

dramatically increased the size and scope of battles in the war. From the beginning of 1864 to the end of the war, some generals were able to effectively employ the industrial modern military rationale to exploit the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the industrial of warfare.

Two generals highlighted in this study are Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman. They were central figures in the latter half of the war and their final campaigns reflect the war's transformation from traditional to modern. Their application of hard war was not a new military tactic; but why they employed it was novel. They ultimately rejected the traditional military rationale in favor of a modern one. Sherman in particular aligned his thinking with industrial modernization and was able to understand the inherent weaknesses of a military wedded to civilian industrialization. Sherman's successes in destroying the South's economic and industrial centers, communication, and railway lines helped bring the war to a close. Evidence of the impact of industrialization modernization can clearly be seen in the fact that it was the destruction of the industrial centers that produced decisive results, not slowly traditional victories on the battlefield.

Up to this point I have provided evidence of the impact of industrialization through a three-phase linear approach from pillar to pillar. To conclude the study, let us now step out of the linear presentation and overlay the three phases of the pillars on top of one another. It is at this point that the significance of the American Industrial Revolution comes to the forefront. We can see from this vantage point that its impact was highly disruptive to every significant facet of American life—all at the same time. Industrialization was the revolutionary driving force behind the transformation that occurred in America's values, mores, economy, and ultimately in the war itself. I have striven in this study to show through a multi-disciplinary approach that the American Industrial Revolution effectively explains what caused the American Civil War.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Corey P. Gray is currently a student at Florida State University Graduate School Department of History.

Educational background. Gray earned a B.S. in History and Political Science from Florida State University in 2002. After graduation he was accepted for a summer Congressional Internship in Washington D.C. with U.S. Senator Bill Nelson. At the completion of his internship he returned to Florida State to begin graduate school and enrolled in the Reserve Officers Training Corps. He took a break in study from 2005 to 2010 to perform a tour of military service. He received his Juris Doctorate from the University of Miami School of Law in 2014.

Professional background. Gray achieved the rank of Major in the United States Army. During his tours of service he performed the duties of Platoon Leader, Company Executive Officer, and Targeting Officer in the First Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division. He performed the duty of Company Commander in the 377th Military Intelligence Battalion, and performed the duty of Intelligence Foreign Disclosure Officer at the United States Southern Command.

Awards and Honors. In 2002 he was selected as a United States Congressional Intern for the Honorable U.S. Senator Bill Nelson, named the Florida State College of Social Sciences Humanitarian of the Year, inducted into the Florida State Garnet and Gold Key Leadership Honorary Society, and the Order of Omega Greek Leadership Honorary Society. In 2004 he was named the Florida State University Reserve Officer Training Corp Senior Cadet Leader and inducted into the Phi Alpha Theta History Honor Society. During his military service since 2005 Major Gray was awarded the Iraq Campaign Medal with three bronze campaign stars, the Bronze Star Medal, the Combat Action Badge, the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Joint Service Achievement Medal, on two occasions awarded the Army Commendation Medal, and on three occasions he was awarded the Army Achievement Medal. In 2011 he entered the University of Miami School of Law. He graduated *cum laude*

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